A Goal-Oriented Theory of Science

Dissertation, University of Calgary (Canada) (1997)
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Abstract

Various goods can be achieved through scientific practice. The goals of science or of a given area of science are those goods which ought to be achieved by these disciplines. Any given scientific enterprise can be evaluated according to the extent to which it achieves these goals. ;In order to achieve these goods, certain methods should be used. A method, as I conceive of it, is any practice or institution which is put in place as a means to achieve the goals. The methods are to be evaluated according to how well they enable us to achieve our goals. The difference between methods and goals is that goals are intrinsically worth achieving. Methods qua methods, on the other hand, have only instrumental value. ;The aim of my dissertation is to build up a case for a goal-oriented theory of science, and to provide the foundations for such a theory. Some philosophers of science have turned away from nonnative philosophy of science because they want to have a naturalistic theory of science, which takes more account of scientific practice. The goal-oriented theory manages to be both nonnative and naturalistic. In developing the theory I look at some of the different goals of science, and how to assess them. Finally I consider how we should choose our scientific methods in the light of our goals

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