Persons and the metaphysics of resurrection

Religious Studies 43 (3):333-348 (2007)
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Abstract

Theories of the human person differ greatly in their ability to underwrite a metaphysics of resurrection. This paper compares and contrasts a number of such views in light of the Christian doctrine of resurrection. In a Christian framework, resurrection requires that the same person who exists on earth also exists in an afterlife, that a postmortem person be embodied, and that the existence of a postmortem person is brought about by a miracle. According to my view of persons (the Constitution View), a human person is constituted by—but not identical to—a human organism. A person has a first-person perspective essentially, and an organism has interrelated biological functions essentially. I shall argue for the superiority the Constitution View as a metaphysical basis for resurrection

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Author's Profile

Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
The possibility of resurrection by reassembly.Justin Mooney - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (3):273-288.
IV—Empathy and First-Personal Imagining.Rae Langton - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (1):77-104.
Christian materialism in a scientific age.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):47-59.
Emergent individuals and the resurrection.Jonathan D. Jacobs & Timothy O'Connor - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (2):69 - 88.

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References found in this work

Human Beings.Mark Johnston - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):59-83.
Why constitution is not identity.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (12):599-621.
The Possibility of Resurrection.Peter Van Inwagen - 1978 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (2):114-121.
When does a person begin?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48.
The importance of being identical.John Perry - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 67-90.

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