Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth

Oxford, England: Oup Usa (2005)
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Abstract

When ordinary people - mathematicians among them - take something to follow from something else, they are exposing the backbone of our self-ascribed ability to reason. Jody Azzouni investigates the connection between that ordinary notion of consequence and the formal analogues invented by logicians. One claim of the book is that, despite our apparent intuitive grasp of consequence, we do not introspect rules by which we reason, nor do we grasp the scope and range of the domain, as it were, of our reasoning. This point is illustrated with a close analysis of a paradigmatic case of ordinary reasoning: mathematical proof.

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Chapters

General Introduction

This part of the book reveals how two widespread assumptions have powerfully shaped philosophy for a long time. The first assumption is called “the truthmaker assumption.” It means that if a belief, a statement, a sentence is true, then it's made true by how the world is in those respects ... see more

Introduction to Part I

Truth has been a central topic in philosophy. At present it's a particularly popular word to write about, if only because the many widespread positions that philosophers currently have on truth allow so many other topics from philosophy to come clearly into range. To a large extent, any ma... see more

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Jody Azzouni
Tufts University

Citations of this work

Reliability of mathematical inference.Jeremy Avigad - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7377-7399.
Inconsistency and replacement.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):387-402.
Replacing Truth?Matti Eklund - 2014 - In Brett Sherman & Alexis Burgess (eds.), Metasemantics.
Meaning‐Constitutivity.Matti Eklund - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):559-574.
A metalinguistic and computational approach to the problem of mathematical omniscience.Zeynep Soysal - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):455-474.

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