Dissolving the star-tree paradox

Biology and Philosophy 31 (3):409-419 (2016)
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Abstract

While Bayesian methods have become very popular in phylogenetic systematics, the foundations of this approach remain controversial. The star-tree paradox in Bayesian phylogenetics refers to the phenomenon that a particular binary phylogenetic tree sometimes has a very high posterior probability even though a star tree generates the data. I argue that this phenomenon reveals an unattractive feature of the Bayesian approach to scientific inference and discuss two proposals for how to address the star-tree paradox. In particular, I defend the polytomy prior as a solution of the paradox and argue that it is preferable to a data-size dependent branch lengths prior from a methodological perspective. However, while this reply dissolves the star-tree paradox, the general challenge to Bayesian confirmation theory remains unmet.

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Bengt Autzen
University College, Cork

Citations of this work

Models on the move: Migration and imperialism.Seamus Bradley & Karim P. Y. Thébault - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 77:81-92.

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References found in this work

Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Epistemic instrumentalism, exceeding our grasp.Kyle Stanford - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):135-139.
Scientific inference.Abner Shimony - 1970 - In Robert Colodny (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 4.

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