Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe

Noûs 28 (4):419-34 (1994)
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10.2307/2215473

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Robert N. Audi
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.
Knowledge entails dispositional belief.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50.

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