Gadamer, Tradition and Subjectivity
Dissertation, New School for Social Research (
1998)
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Abstract
In Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer maintains that "tradition" and "prejudice" are constitutive of hermeneutic understanding, or the kind of understanding that is proper to the human sciences. This has led certain critics to accuse him of "conservatism" insofar as he appears to be ignoring, and thereby tacitly validating, the intellectual or political power structures that determine what counts as traditional, what it means to belong to a tradition, etc. On the other hand, there are those who charge him with undermining the possibility for truth in interpretation, inasmuch as understanding is determined by the "prejudices" of the interpreter and is thus inherently subjective or relative. In the former case, the claim is that Gadamer's account of hermeneutical reflection merely involves the appropriation of what is simply "given" to us by tradition, and that he does not provide any room for critique. The other objection is that Gadamer's hermeneutics precludes the possibility of objective understanding, and is therefore arbitrary. In both cases, it is this appeal to tradition and prejudice that concerns his detractors. However, the irony is that he is accused of being both "too radical" and "not radical enough." How is this possible? This is the basic question I will be exploring. And, I believe that the answer ultimately lies in the fundamentally different conceptions of "truth," "objectivity," and "subjectivity" which are operative here. It is also unclear what Gadamer means by tradition and prejudice, and to what degree we are constituted by them or understanding is dependent on them. This is why I believe it would be worthwhile to take a closer look at these concepts, consider their relation to one another, and evaluate Gadamer's hermeneutics in light of the claims of his critics as well as in relation to those of whom he is critical