Abstract
As the subtitle and consecutive division of contents indicate, these two volumes are integral parts of a single work and one may wonder why they were not published as such since the indices and bibliography in the second volume refers to both works. The basic tripartite thesis of the combined volumes may be stated thus. Both universal properties and universal relationships exist independently of the classifying mind, but not in factual independence of particulars; what universals in fact exist, however, must be determined not a priori by considering what predicates are applied to particulars by linguistic convention, but a posteriori according to the norms of an empiricistic epistemology. Hence, Armstrong calls his theory "a posteriori," or simply, "scientific realism," since it is the task of total science, conceived of as a total inquiry, to determine which monadic or polyadic predicates do correspond to universals and which do not. The first volume is essentially a critical appraisal of classical approaches to the nominalism-realism controversy, whereas the second is a more positive presentation of the author’s own theory and grows out of the prior critique. Thus the second volume can be read independently of the first, especially since a brief recapitulation of the argument of volume one is given at its beginning. Similarly, a brief summary of the argument of volume two is appended to volume one. Thus the two volumes, which apparently grew out of materials presented in independent, but related, seminars, could still be used as such. Only this and the possibility of a student buying the overly expensive work by parts seems to justify the peculiar way in which this set was published.