Abstract

Contrary to most speech acts theorists, Sbisà’s reading of Austin rightly emphasizes the conceptual, or “internal,” link between the necessity of uptake for an illocutionary act to be achieved and its conventional nature. She thus refuses to consider the uptake as a theoretical means to promote an intentionalist account of speech acts. I submit, first, that this is the only correct understanding of Austin’s revolutionary conception of speech efficiency; and second that she is right in drawing such an internal link between “conventionality” and the necessity of some kind of “recognition” or “acknowledgment” for any symbolic (or ritual) action (such as an illocutionary act) to take place. In this chapter, I examine Sbisà’s arguments in favor of this claim and borrow some insights from linguistic anthropology and sociolinguistics to reinforce her position. Thus, I will concur with her in defending a conventionalist account of speech acts, including assertions, orders, and so on.