Comments on Ferré’s “The Practicality of Metaphysics”

Review of Metaphysics 58 (3):529-532 (2005)
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Abstract

Ferré proposes three criteria for judging whether or not a metaphysical theory is “well made.” Two of the criteria are “adequacy” and “coherence.” For a metaphysical theory to be well made, it must be inclusive, leaving nothing out of its purview. And it must be integrated, bringing together all it includes into a unified whole. Adequacy and coherence apply to metaphysical theories the criteria for any non-trivial logical system: that it be both complete and consistent.

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