Abstract

This article aims to Maritain's self-theory, theory of knowledge as well as his poetry dealt with the freedom of God's relationship with people such as three-point, to view Maritain thought and freedom of the relationship between the bit cell. Hope expounded the relationship between these different areas, the composite of Maritain to bit cells on the relationship between freedom and to the whole idea. According to Maritain's theory of self-reliance, acceptance of the nature of existence through self-sustaining activities to enhance the state to exercise there. In this view, individuals with the freedom to exercise his nature , and to become a perfect place grid; However, the bit cells may also be due to the freedom to indulge in self-centered and selfish rather than development, stagnation in the material only as individuals. Perspective on self-reliance, personal freedom seems there's an active, positive exercise; but the knowledge to analyze the poem, there is not as active exercise of the main activities. Maritain believes that poetry requires a knowledge of the truth of freedom to tolerate others, also requires the poet's subjectivity and the world between the two things combined are interested. This bear needs a spiritual passivity, but if people dealt with acts of goodness contribution, not even passive play a role in this. In explaining the divine and the relationship between human freedom, Maritain insisted everything good comes from God's moral freedom, can be interrupted, "with good and consistent behavior." The establishment of this act, the people do not credit. However, people may be eliminated, thereby breaking God's behavior - which would constitute a moral evil. So to say, human activity is the most liberal, "not destroy" is free to not hinder, but let the goodness of God through my actions and bear fruit. Therefore, the primary meaning of liberty does not seem a positive initiative is not a negative stand, but do not act freely. How do we combine these various views on it? We can briefly say: We usually "feel" the most liberal freedom of behavior only indirectly, this behavior depends on the free exercise of a more basic, that is passively endure the truth to others; and this in turn depends on the passive nature of people and then bit grid in the most basic freedoms: that is, by God's goodness is not to eliminate acts of cooperation with God. This paper examines the relationship between person and freedom in Jacques Maritain. This relationship is explored from three points of view: Maritain's theory of subsistence; his theory of poetic knowledge; his theory on the relation of divine and human freedom. After explicating this relationship in each of these different areas, a synthesis of Maritain's overall thought concerning the relationship of person and freedom is attempted. According to Maritain's theory of subsistence, the "received existence" of the nature is elevated to the state of exercising through the subsistent act. In this theory, an individual, by freely exercising his nature , becomes a full person. By freely giving into egoism and selfishness, however, the person fails to develop and remains merely a material individual. In the context of subsistence, freedom seems to be an active, positive exercise of one's being. In the context of poetic knowledge, however, the exercise of existence is not analyzed primarily as an " activity ". Maritain tells us that poetic knowledge, which requires an intentional union between the poet's subjectivity and" things in the world ", demands a free" suffering "of the truth of the other. This suffering demands a spiritual passivity; but when speaking of man's contribution to the good moral act, even this passivity disappears. In explaining the relationship of divine and human freedom, Maritain holds that all moral good has its source in God's free but breakable "movement in the line of the good". To this movement man contributes nothing. Man may, however, nihilate the movement of God, thus breaking it this would be a morally evil act. Man's supreme free act then becomes "non-nihilation", that is freely not obstructing but permitting God's good movement to reach its fruition through me. Thus, freedom seems to be primarily not a positive activity, nor a passive suffering, but freely not action. How to synthesize these various perspectives? Briefly we can say that what we usually "feel" to be our most free activity is only indirectly free. This activity depends upon the more fundamental exercises of freedom in passively suffering the truth of the other; this passivity in turn depends upon the most fundamental free act of the human person: cooperating with God by not nihilating His good movement