Intention isn't indivisible

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):365-366 (1997)
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Abstract

An intertemporal bargaining model of commitment does not entail the interaction of parts within the person as Rachlin claims, and is needed to explain properties of self-control that his molar generalization model does not predict.

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