Abstract

It is claimed that the principality and gradation of being, as elaborated in the philosophical thought of Mulla Sadra, lead to nominalism. This claim is raised in different ways. The rejection of natural universals and any kind of immaterial being such as Platonic ideas is one of the results of nominalism. Mentally-posited status of quiddities is the most important reason for those who believe that there is no distance between the philosophical system of Mulla Sadra and nominalism supporting their claim by two other ideas of Mulla Sadra: particular gradation of being and substantial motion. Also some of the commentators of Sadra philosophy, without alluding to the relation between the principality of being and nominalism, asserted that there is no place for natural universals in the philosophical system of Mulla Sadra and his occasional usage of this word stems from the sediment of the idea of principality of quiddity, which was current before Mulla Sadra. This article intends to reject this claim. A precise examination of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy will show that he uses the words such as natural universal, specific form, essence, and quiddity in a new way with a different meaning. Furthermore, he believes in Platonic ideas in a modified way. So, Mulla Sadra is not a nominalist; he is a realist that integrated the theory of Plato and Aristotle. In addition to Platonic ideas, he believes in specific form, natural universal, and quiddity; although they are subordinative beings.