Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy

ISSNs: 2633-6847, 2633-6855

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  1.  8
    John Finnis and the central case constitution.Renato Costa - 2024 - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 49 (1):25-49.
    This article formulates a novel conception of constitutions based on John Finnis’s jurisprudential work. The ‘central case constitution’ transcends the formal or functionalist analyses currently dominant in constitutional theory by considering a constitution as having a ‘double life’. Constitutions are necessarily and intrinsically normative and factual. The article explores Finnis’s natural law philosophy, emphasizing the central case constitution’s alignment with the practical reasonableness viewpoint and its role in directing a political community towards its common good. Focusing on key elements such (...)
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  2.  6
    New directions in theories of criminalization.Paige Crosweller - 2024 - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 49 (1):50-65.
    Over the past few decades criminal law scholarship has been dominated by moralistic conceptions of the criminal law but recent years have seen the emergence of the so-called ‘political turn’ in criminal law theorizing. In this article I analyze the theory proffered by Vincent Chiao, one of the most persuasive proponents of the political or ‘public law’ trend, in contradistinction to the moralistic theory of criminalization defended by Anthony Duff. I demonstrate that the differences between the two theories are more (...)
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  3.  6
    A dual character theory of law.Guilherme da Franca Couto Fernandes de Almeida - 2024 - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 49 (1):1-24.
    One persistent question in jurisprudence relates to the role of morality in the concept of law. For instance, consider the question of whether unjust statutes are laws. Legal positivists say that they’re laws in every relevant sense, while natural lawyers say that they’re not. This article considers a different answer inspired by recent findings in experimental philosophy: there is one relevant sense in which unjust statutes are laws, but also a different relevant sense in which they aren’t. After considering the (...)
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  4.  5
    Book review: Julie Dickson, Elucidating Law (Oxford University Press 2022). [REVIEW]Bárbara Ronsoni de Oliveira & João Henrique Luttmer - 2024 - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 49 (1):66-70.
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