My philosophical views

The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.

See also:

QuestionAnswerComments
A priori knowledge: yes or no?Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?Accept an intermediate viewI prefer to accept a more Aristotelian approach to this question: while I think there is something to be said for Plato's "Intelligible Realm" and the Forms, I am inclined toward universals being present within physically real objects themselves (I would distinguish between types of real-ness; i.e., the "physically" real, "mentally" real, and the "virtually" real, among others). As such, I would argue that any one thing-of-a-certain-kind will exhibit properties in absence of which it would no longer be of that particular kind. Moreover, these properties cannot exist within a vacuum, requiring some stratum or substrate upon/within which they are instantiated/incarnated. Still, I am willing to extend some credence to either side of the Platonism/nominalism divide, insofar as I am inclined to belief in Being-as-such, or Be-ing (e.g., 'God', 'G-d', Tillich's "God-beyond-God"), which exists in such a way as is comparable to Plato's Form of the Good/Beauty (I have defended within a recent paper, which I am developing for publication, the position of the Forms of "the Good," from 'Republic', and "Beauty", from 'Symposium', being identical via the identification of the Line, Cave, and Ascent/Ladder). By this I mean that such an entity co-equally instantiates within its essence all universals which are then incarnated within objects. Considering the space provided, I will refrain from going into too much detail here, but I would argue that this is not a pure Platonism qua an abstract Form of the Good/Beauty: I would argue that I toe the line between 'ante rem' and 'in re' realism, viz. universals, insofar as Be-ing is the most real entity in all of reality, and that from which all other things (along with their properties) derive their being. Clearly, I would confess, I have been Thomistically-trained. Turning to nominalism, I would allow for the a quasi-epistemic nominalism, which is to say that what I call some particular thing in no way has an impact upon its quiddity: I need not call the table upon which rests my laptop a "table" -- I could as easily call it a "chair" or a "dog", among others -- since calling it a "table" in no way prevents it from fulfilling the function for which it was created; the what-ness of the table is not dependent upon my calling it a "table." To put it another way, I would suggest that I am willing to consider the concept of 'resemblance nominalism', as developed by such thinkers as Rodriguez-Pereyra. Still, I return always to universal realism as a working ideal. Along with so many of the questions asked before and subsequently, I am still working through the myriad philosophical issues I come across and have held, in order that I may arrive at a more cogent understanding of reality.
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?Accept: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?Lean toward: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?Agnostic/undecided
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?Accept: non-skeptical realismI have begun to lean toward relational realism, as well as what I have termed (for my own thought processes) quantal/quantum realism -- I turn to quantum theory as a means of explaining the nature and unity of all reality.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?Lean toward: compatibilism
God: theism or atheism?Lean toward: theismAs a Roman Catholic (born/raised; former seminarian, etc.) I lean toward theism; nevertheless, I cannot help but admit that I have questioned my position in recent years. This is not say that I have considered atheism (which I find dubious, at best) or agnosticism (which I find unconscionable); rather, I debate with myself the nature of my theism (i.e. is it a form of "theism" or a broader "[X]-theism"). To this end, I have begun to lean toward a Teilhardian theistic personalism, rooted in the work of Thomas Aquinas and Karol Wojtyla.
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?Accept an intermediate view
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?Lean toward: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?Accept an intermediate view
Logic: classical or non-classical?Accept an intermediate viewI find them both fascinating and valuable
Mental content: internalism or externalism?Agnostic/undecided
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?Lean toward: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?Lean toward: naturalism
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?Accept an intermediate viewI am an emergentist in my philosophy of mind, which is arguably a form of physicalism -- if by "physicalism" we mean a reductive metaphysical naturalism, my emergentism is not of the kind which would reduce the mind, consciousness, and other mental processes to a mere epiphenomenon of bio-physical complexity (or, "epiphenomenalism" per se). I am willing to grant that the mind is an epiphenomenon of a certain kind, insofar as it does emerge from the bio-physical complexity of particular organisms; however, the mind qua a self-aware "I" or ego (e.g., the Cartesian 'cogito') is something which, upon arising with significant enough complexity in its own right (thus becoming the 'cogito'), is ontologically distinct within reality (I do not say "physical reality" on the grounds that I find this to be a redundancy). I am currently engaged in a graduate seminar, for my MA, which is entitled "Philosophy and Science of Mind;" moreover, my preliminary thesis work, leading to the writing of my prospectus, is engaged with the relationship(s) between: quantum and complexity theories, the problem of embodiment, "embodied" cognition, and extended mind theories; in particular, I am concerned with these questions vis-à-vis the trans- and post-humanist movements.
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?Agnostic/undecided
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?Lean toward: two boxesI lean toward this response on the grounds that, if "the Predictor" is almost always correct in predicting the outcome of the game, I am certain to leave with $1,000. On the other hand, I could leave with $1,001,000. Either way, I will leave with more money in my pocket than I entered with. The other side of this coin is that I could take a gamble and select the opaque box: if the Predictor predicts correctly, I am going to leave with $1,000,000--more than $1,000, but inconsequentially less than $1,001,000; if, however, s/he is wrong, I leave with nothing. Still, I have taken a gamble, one which will cost me nothing more than potentially leaving empty-handed. As such, I lean toward two boxes due to the guarantee of a payout; but I am also partial to my "gut" instinct, or selecting the one box.
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?Accept more than oneI have recently studied the work of Alasdair MacIntyre (his virtue ethics), and I have always enjoyed the Aristotelian/Thomistic perspective; however, Kant's deontology, particularly the three formulations of the categorical imperative have always resonated with me (my undergraduate ethics professor hammered them home for us, despite himself being an Aristotelian). That said, I "lean toward" deontology insofar as I also lean, in part, toward the virtue ethics tradition. At the same time, I recognize the value of Bentham and, more so, Mill. Nevertheless, I am least inclined toward the consequentialist tradition in-itself, preferring to recognize a moderated form which is (I would argue) presupposed in the deontological tradition, which is itself presupposed within the virtue ethic tradition. Consequentialism, to put it another way, may be necessary (after a fashion), but it is not sufficient. This is the error of consequentialist ethics, especially in recent years (cf. Peter Singer, et al).
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?Accept more than oneAs a robust relational/quantum realist (my adapted term), I categorically reject the naïve realism of disjunctivism. Instead, I lean heavily toward the sense-datum theory (albeit NOT phenomenalism per se, since I am not a reductive metaphysical naturalist), with components of qualia/adverbial theory and representationalism/intentionalism. As a Thomistically-trained quasi-Aristotelian, I am one who will always espouse the importance of "proceeding from those things most knowable to us toward those things most knowable in-themselves." That said, I turn always to the sciences, which rely upon sense-data for empirical measurement. AT the same time, quantum theory (i.e., the Uncertainty Principle, etc.), as well as several other burgeoning theories, incline me to a form of adverbial-intentionalism: the instantiation of some object and its relevant properties (such as the spin, location, or velocity of an electron) rely upon the act/experience of perception, qualia which are then represented within the mind; but, this does not preclude sense-data. On the contrary, the qualia ARE the sense-data which are present within the objects -- the act/experience of perceiving the qualia are what incarnate the probabilities of reality.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?Accept an intermediate viewI am a personalist in the vein of Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) and Dietrich von Hildebrand, as well as M.F. Scheler (derivatively) and Teilhard de Chardin (by extension). In this way, I would state that my theory of personal identity is an amalgam of the biological and the psychological views; I would clarify this by stating that I am an animal, but a human animal -- there is a faculty of reason which is unique to me as a member of the human species (I admit the debate over the presence of reason within other animal species, i.e. dolphins, chimpanzees, etc.). Moreover, I am "an incommunicably unique subject" possessing a particular, yet universalized biological nature (which is still evolving) which incarnates/instantiates qua a mediated ontological emergentism certain psychological/cognitive properties which are likewise unique to me as a particular subject.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?Accept an intermediate viewI tend toward an authoritarian perspective on an amalgam between communitarianism (as understood to be a reliance of the individual on the community) and egalitarianism (as understood in the sense of universal equality of persons); I view, with disfavor, libertarianism as a political theory, under the presupposition that most people are generally incapable of adequately determining what is best for themselves and society as a whole (expounding further, I abhor democracy)
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?Lean toward: Fregean
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?Lean toward: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?Lean toward: survival
Time: A-theory or B-theory?Agnostic/undecidedI remain undecided because I think that all parts of time are real in some fashion; put another way, the present is entirely real, existing in the "now", whereas the past is less so (though still real) and the future even less than this (since it has yet to become "the now"). I am still developing a cogent manner by which to properly articulate this perspective on time
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?Reject bothI reject both solutions on the grounds that it is an unrealistic moral "dilemma"; furthermore, even if the former were not the case, there is insufficient information provided (I have heard and read numerous renditions of this "problem")
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?Lean toward: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible