The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: yes | Anamesis and inatism are derived from our human condition as a specie. | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Lean toward: nominalism | Meaning comes from thinking. | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Accept an intermediate view | The value of a work of art is independent of my current assessment. And even my interest in a work can be modified according to my research and to awaken new interests. | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Lean toward: no | Some things we can not conciliate. | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Accept another alternative | Looking for a new way of thinking about the issue, but the authors whom I studied these questions are ambiguous. | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Accept an intermediate view | Some kund of things we may choose, others not. | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept an intermediate view | As a scientist, I am inclined to atheism, but as an individual I am inclined to trust in God. | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept an intermediate view | Toward things as they are, or submit things to the test of reason? Both options are somewhere where the thinking happens. | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Lean toward: contextualism | No one lives alone, we are all in a given society historically determined and varied projects. | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: externalism | Things exist independently of my will. | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Lean toward: moral realism | | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Accept an intermediate view | In nature things happen so naturalistic, according to the natural laws discovered, but things happen in science through the scientists. | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept: cognitivism | Broadly trend, increasing and cumulative, it is possible to see the world. | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: internalism | Regardless of hegemonic values in a given society, it is possible to induce individually the value of right and wrong in a given situation. | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Accept more than one | | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Lean toward: egalitarianism | Equality is a horizon to which a democratic society is to achieve, but it is a fatal error to admit that this equality exists in class society. | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Lean toward: scientific realism | What is thing in itself? | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | There is no fact of the matter | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | As Kierkegaard said. | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |