My philosophical views

The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.

See also:

QuestionAnswerComments
A priori knowledge: yes or no?Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?Lean toward: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?Accept bothObviously, there are subjective properties of aesthetic valuation. However, unlike in ethics, I think subjective aesthetic properties matter a lot. Anyway, the real interesting question is whether there exist any objective aesthetic properties as well. Technically, I strongly lean towards "yes, there are objective aesthetic properties" but there wasn't an option for "accept subjective and lean toward objective."
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?Lean toward: internalismStrongly lean
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?Lean toward: libertarianism
God: theism or atheism?Agnostic/undecidedBut lean ever so slightly towards an extremely non-specific theism. That is, I think it's likely that a rational agent was involved in the creation of the universe in some respect, but if indeed such a being exists, I know nothing about it. How confident am I in this? It's a guess. Maybe 0-1% confident.
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?Lean toward: rationalismStrongly lean
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Logic: classical or non-classical?Accept: classical
Mental content: internalism or externalism?Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?Lean toward: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?Agnostic/undecided
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?Accept an intermediate viewReally, I intuitively lean towards an intermediate view, but this is a weak leaning. I don't have sufficient practical knowledge in the area, but Parfit's notion of climbing three sides of the same mountain sounds appealing (whatever he really means in the minute details, I don't know, as I haven't yet read the book).
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?Lean toward: biological viewAlong the lines of Eric T. Olson's work. But I am very, very open to some particular further-fact view being correct! I broadly consider the psychological view to be mostly implausible. However, certain specific versions of the psychological view, especially in the vein of Barry Dainton's notion of phenomenal continuity, are more appealing to me than the standard psychological view.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?Lean toward: libertarianismVery strongly lean
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?Lean toward: deathStrongly lean
Time: A-theory or B-theory?Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?Accept: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?Lean toward: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possibleBut this is intuitive. I don't have an argument for why it would be metaphysically impossible.