The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: yes | How could I think, otherwise? [the comma is on purpose] | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Lean toward: nominalism | "nominalism" and "platonism" are too old categories for our abstract stuff; they are too remiscent of: "onta" or "legomena"? Bu we may use "existence" as "what can be derived in a proof", and there are many kinds of proofs (something like that in Wittgenstein's remarks). Certainly a name is not enough to justify an abstract object, but an abstract object is enough to justify the use of a proper name (square root of 2, for instance). | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Lean toward: objective | ignorance may make us give value to horrible things | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept: yes | Certainly yes, as Quine also does - just with some restrictions:) | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: internalism | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Reject all | If somebody will give us a clear concept of "internal world" the question could be answered. But I have no idea of what an internal world might be. | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Lean toward: compatibilism | | |
God: theism or atheism? | There is no fact of the matter | | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept: rationalism | no inference, no knowledge | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Accept: contextualism | in this context there is no other chance. | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Lean toward: non-Humean | and miracles follow the laws of nature, if you get to know them better... | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Accept both | they are logics, aren't they? | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Reject both | old fashioned debate;we need definitions of mental contents which avoid such a bold dichotomy | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Lean toward: moral anti-realism | "omnia munda mundis" sounds an anti-realistic stance in meta ethics | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | There is no fact of the matter | There are too many theories behind both naturalism and non-naturalism. If non-naturalism is to accept the relevance and non reducibility of the normative to neurological features of the brain, well I lean towards non naturalism. If non naturalism is to accept some "reality" not grounded on natural facts, then I lean towards naturalism. | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Accept an intermediate view | is anomalous monism physicalist? | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Lean toward: cognitivism | | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: externalism | sometimes motivations come after judgements | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Accept: one box | no rational ground for that; just a feeling and a disposition to guess. | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Lean toward: virtue ethics | | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Lean toward: representationalism | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Accept: psychological view | | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Accept: Fregean | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Lean toward: scientific realism | It depends very much on which science is concerned; we cannot discard Einstein's worries too easily (physics); at the same time we cannot discard Wittgenstein's attitude towards mathematics (anti-realism) | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Lean toward: survival | Have you seen "Space Balls"? | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Lean toward: switch | unless I know personally the person who will be damaged; that would make a real difference | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Lean toward: deflationary | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Reject one, undecided between others | how could we say that something logically possible is inconceivable? | |