The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Lean toward: yes | | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Accept: subjective | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept: yes | | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Accept: externalism | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Lean toward: non-skeptical realism | I accept non-skeptical realism, but even so I think it is important to try to beat the skpetic. | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Accept: no free will | causality makes impossible for anyone to do otherwise. | |
God: theism or atheism? | Agnostic/undecided | I reject theism but I am not an atheist; I am a weak agnostic. | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Lean toward: rationalism | | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Lean toward: invariantism | | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Accept: non-Humean | Laws are independent objects (independent metaphysical substract). | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: externalism | Wittgenstein showed us the problem with the private speaker, but there is something private we have in mind (even if there is no effect to communication). | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Accept: moral anti-realism | There are no real moral facts. | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Lean toward: naturalism | But we have to think that the imateriality of the mind is part of the natural world, as anything there is. | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Lean toward: physicalism | I do accept a kind of supervenience physicalism but I also accept that the mind is somehow imaterial. | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Lean toward: non-cognitivism | If we are determinist and an error theorist (as I am), we have to see the ethics as nothing more than influence on behaviour, and values as entities that do not exist in the world. | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Accept: internalism | | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | There is no fact of the matter | | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Accept more than one | | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Lean toward: egalitarianism | | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Accept: Fregean | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Lean toward: scientific realism | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Accept: death | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Lean toward: A-theory | I am tempted to accept presentism. | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | There is no fact of the matter | | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Accept more than one | A deflationary theory for some cases and a correspondence theory for the most part of cases. | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Accept: conceivable but not metaphysically possible | | |