The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: yes | | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Agnostic/undecided | This is a difficult question. I am most familiar with the nominalism of Quine and Goodman, though neither have totally convinced me of the position. It seems to me, based on the degree of familiarity I have with the issue at this point, that it is possible to construct coherent systems and arguments in most cases regardless of one's ultimate stance on the existence of abstract objects, although such stances can lead to weaknesses in said systems, such as in the case of Russell's earlier work, which led to perhaps a too-rich ontology. Whatever the case, it is an issue I need to contemplate much further than I have currently before determining a position. | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Accept both | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Lean toward: no | | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: externalism | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Lean toward: idealism | At present I ultimately lean toward idealism, though I take it our ordinary conversations about the external world are at least sensible to some degree. I think radical skepticism about the external world is valuable to consider, but side with Moore. It is the skeptic's job, including the idealist, to convince us of his position, and not the realist's job to convince the skeptic of common sense. Though of course, a good discussion will have contributions, considerations, and arguments from both. | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
God: theism or atheism? | Lean toward: theism | | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Lean toward: rationalism | Again I am pathetically uninformed, but I would take an intermediate stance on this issue. I do believe some fundamental forms of knowledge are given, and to this extent endorse rationalism. However, I believe the remainder of our acquired knowledge is empirical. This I suppose, makes me a rationalist.
Though it is dicey. It is unclear to me that it is clearly demarcated in every possible case that a given set of knowledge is empirically or rationally devised. It could be the case that certain forms of knowledge are innate in a sense, or fundamentally stem from the way we operate, but must be rendered as occurrent by experience. | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Lean toward: contextualism | | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Lean toward: Humean | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Accept both | Both are points of interest. | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: externalism | I lean toward externalism, however I am quite green on the issue. I am hoping phil papers will help bring me up to speed. :) | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Lean toward: moral realism | | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Lean toward: naturalism | | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Lean toward: non-physicalism | | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Lean toward: cognitivism | | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: internalism | | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Lean toward: deontology | I lean toward deontology, but also have interest in virtue ethics. I do not find consequentialism (at least the majority of the time) adequate. | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Accept more than one | Biological and Psychological. Of course, there may too, be a further fact. | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Skip | | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Lean toward: Fregean | In spite of the strength of arguments against descriptivism, and in spite of Kripke's work on names, I am still a fan of Frege. | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Lean toward: scientific anti-realism | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Lean toward: B-theory | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Lean toward: don't switch | I lean toward don't switch, as I find deontology stronger than consequentialism, though of course, such problems as the trolley problem are an issue as they often have duties diverging from intuitive notions of good. At least on my interpretation. | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Lean toward: correspondence | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Agnostic/undecided | | |