1. The Situation in Cognition 2. Situated Cognition: A Potted Recent History 3. Extensions in Biology, Computation, and Cognition 4. Articulating the Idea of Cognitive Extension 5. Are Some Resources Intrinsically Non-Cognitive? 6. Is Cognition Extended or Only Embedded? 7. Letting Nature Take Its Course.

In two studies, the author attempts to develop a general symbol theoretical approach to knowledge representation. The first study, Modeling change - the frame problem, critically examines the - so far unsuccessful - attempts to solve the notorious frame problem. By discussing and analyzing a number of related problems - the prediction problem, the revision problem, the qualification problem, and the book-keeping problem - the frame problem is distinguished as the problem of finding a representational form permitting a changing, complex (...) world to be efficiently and adequately represented. This form, it is argued, is dictated by the metaphysics of the problem world, the fundamental form of the symbol system we humans use in rightly characterizing the world. In the second study, Pictures and words, the symbol theoretical approach is made more explicit. The subject Is the distinction between pictorial representation and verbal representation, and the further implications of this distinction. The study focuses on pictorial representation, which has received little attention compared to verbal representation. Observations, ideas, and theories in AI, cognitive psychology, and philosophy are critically examined. The general conclusion is that there is as yet no cogent and mature theory of pictorial representation that gives good support to computer applications. The philosophical symbol theory of Nelson Goodman is found to be the most thoroughly developed and most congenial with the aims and methods of AI. Goodman's theory of pictorial representation, however, in effect excludes computers from the use of pictures. In the final chapter, an attempt is made to develop Goodman's analysis of pictures further turning it into a theory useful to AI. The theory outlined builds on Goodman's concept of exemplification. The key idea is that a picture is a model of a description that has the depicted object as its standard model. One consequence Is that pictorial and verbal forms of representation are seen less as competing alternatives than as complementary forms of representation mutually supporting and depending on each other. (shrink)

While much has been written about whether visual perception is cognitively penetrable, the analogous question with respect to auditory perception has received very little attention. Here we argue that instances of top-down modulation of auditory processing, although extensive, do not constitute cases of cognitive penetration of auditory perception since the changes in the phenomenology of auditory perception caused by top-down influences cannot plausibly be attributed to the listeners’ discursive thoughts.

Not long ago the standard view in cognitive science was that representations are symbols in an internal representational system or language of thought and that psychological processes are computations defined over such representations. This orthodoxy has been challenged by adherents of functional analysis and by connectionists. Functional analysis as practiced by Marr is consistent with an analysis of representation that grants primacy to a stands for conception of representation. Connectionism is also compatible with this notion of representation; when conjoined with (...) functional analysis, it provides a means of analyzing psychological systems in term of rules and representations without becoming committed to symbolism. Direct theorists, who rejected the orthodox symbolist conception of representation because it violated their strictures against cognitive mediational mechanisms, should find it possible to accept rules-and-representations and information-processing analyses of the mechanisms of information pickup couched in terms of functional analysis. (shrink)