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  1. Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticism.Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer - 2006 - Mind and Society 5 (1):1-38.
    This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: an epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that (...)
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  • Are people programmed to commit fallacies? Further thoughts about the interpretation of experimental data on probability judgment.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1982 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 12 (3):251–274.
  • Many reasons or just one: How response mode affects reasoning in the conjunction problem.Ralph Hertwig Valerie M. Chase - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (4):319 – 352.
    Forty years of experimentation on class inclusion and its probabilistic relatives have led to inconsistent results and conclusions about human reasoning. Recent research on the conjunction "fallacy" recapitulates this history. In contrast to previous results, we found that a majority of participants adhere to class inclusion in the classic Linda problem. We outline a theoretical framework that attributes the contradictory results to differences in statistical sophistication and to differences in response mode-whether participants are asked for probability estimates or ranks-and propose (...)
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