Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Many reasons or just one: How response mode affects reasoning in the conjunction problem.Ralph Hertwig Valerie M. Chase - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (4):319 – 352.
    Forty years of experimentation on class inclusion and its probabilistic relatives have led to inconsistent results and conclusions about human reasoning. Recent research on the conjunction "fallacy" recapitulates this history. In contrast to previous results, we found that a majority of participants adhere to class inclusion in the classic Linda problem. We outline a theoretical framework that attributes the contradictory results to differences in statistical sophistication and to differences in response mode-whether participants are asked for probability estimates or ranks-and propose (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Measuring Individual Differences in Decision Biases: Methodological Considerations.Balazs Aczel, Bence Bago, Aba Szollosi, Andrei Foldes & Bence Lukacs - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Testing boundary conditions for the conjunction fallacy: Effects of response mode, conceptual focus, and problem type.Douglas H. Wedell & Rodrigo Moro - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):105-136.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Towards a pattern-based logic of probability judgements and logical inclusion “fallacies”.Momme von Sydow - 2016 - Thinking and Reasoning 22 (3):297-335.
    ABSTRACTProbability judgements entail a conjunction fallacy if a conjunction is estimated to be more probable than one of its conjuncts. In the context of predication of alternative logical hypothesis, Bayesian logic provides a formalisation of pattern probabilities that renders a class of pattern-based CFs rational. BL predicts a complete system of other logical inclusion fallacies. A first test of this prediction is investigated here, using transparent tasks with clear set inclusions, varying in observed frequencies only. Experiment 1 uses data where (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • On the conjunction fallacy and the meaning of and, yet again: A reply to.Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi - 2012 - Cognition 122 (2):123-134.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Advancing the rationality debate.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):701-717.
    In this response, we clarify several misunderstandings of the understanding/acceptance principle and defend our specific operationalization of that principle. We reiterate the importance of addressing the problem of rational task construal and we elaborate the notion of computational limitations contained in our target article. Our concept of thinking dispositions as variable intentional-level styles of epistemic and behavioral regulation is explained, as is its relation to the rationality debate. Many of the suggestions of the commentators for elaborating two-process models are easily (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • On the nature of the conjunction fallacy.Rodrigo Moro - 2009 - Synthese 171 (1):1 - 24.
    In a seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events (e.g., Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement) is more likely to occur than one of the conjuncts (e.g., Linda is a bank teller). This belief violates the conjunction rule in probability theory. Tversky and Kahneman called this phenomenon the “conjunction fallacy”. Since the discovery of the phenomenon in 1983, researchers in psychology and philosophy (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Individual Differences in Framing and Conjunction Effects.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (4):289-317.
    Individual differences on a variety of framing and conjunction problems were examined in light of Slovic and Tversky's (1974) understanding/acceptance principle-that more reflective and skilled reasoners are more likely to affirm the axioms that define normative reasoning and to endorse the task construals of informed experts. The predictions derived from the principle were confirmed for the much discussed framing effect in the Disease Problem and for the conjunction fallacy on the Linda Problem. Subjects of higher cognitive ability were disproportionately likely (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.
    This paper is about guessing: how people respond to a question when they aren’t certain of the answer. Guesses show surprising and systematic patterns that the most obvious theories don’t explain. We argue that these patterns reveal that people aim to optimize a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity when forming their guess. After spelling out our theory, we use it to argue that guessing plays a central role in our cognitive lives. In particular, our account of guessing yields new theories (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations