Contemporary philosophy of moral motivation has much to say about the nature of moral beliefs and truths, but it has less to say about emancipation. By neglecting to discuss the emancipatory aspect of motivation, I argue, moral epistemology is neglecting a topic that should be central. Starting from Charles Taylor’s concern for the status of moral sources, the paper’s main points are that moral motivation has a distinctive emancipatory dimension which has been largely neglected in mainstream debates; that the issue (...) of emancipation can only be adequately conceptualized at the intersection of normative ethics and metaethics; that a full-blooded account of motivation must incorporate a phenomenology of motivational experience, which in turn requires extending the concept of motivation beyond a narrow definition to include such notions as meaning, articulation, identity, and freedom, and criticizing conceptions of motivation that are blind to or take for granted the quality of motivation; and thus providing the resources for a thick conception of motivation that breaks new ground by overcoming the existing boundaries between normative ethics and metaethics. (shrink)