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  1. Mental states as generalizations from experience: a neuro-computational hypothesis.Marco Mazzone - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):223-240.
    The opposition between behaviour- and mind-reading accounts of data on infants and non-human primates could be less dramatic than has been thought up to now. In this paper, I argue for this thesis by analysing a possible neuro-computational explanation of early mind-reading, based on a mechanism of associative generalization which is apt to implement the notion of mental states as intervening variables proposed by Andrew Whiten. This account allows capturing important continuities between behaviour-reading and mind-reading, insofar as both are supposed (...)
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  • Abstract concepts, compositionality, and the contextualism-invariantism debate.Guido Löhr - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (6):689-710.
    Invariantists argue that the notion of concept in psychology should be reserved for knowledge that is retrieved in a context-insensitive manner. Contextualists argue that concepts are to be understood in terms of context-sensitive ad hoc constructions. I review the central empirical evidence for and against both views and show that their conclusions are based on a common mischaracterization of both theories. When the difference between contextualism and invariantism is properly understood, it becomes apparent that the way the question of stability (...)
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  • Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things?Guido Löhr - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2171-2191.
    I discuss Edouard Machery’s claim that philosophers and psychologists when using the term ‘concept’ are really theorizing about different things. This view is not new, but it has never been developed or defended in detail. Once spelled out, we can see that Machery is right that the psychological literature uses a different notion of concept. However, Machery fails to acknowledge that the two notions are not only compatible but complementary. This fits more with the traditional view according to which philosophers (...)
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  • Introduction.Elisabeth Camp - 2007 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 3 (1).
    Here, I offer a rapid overview of the theory of metaphor, in order to situate the contributions to this volume in relation to one another and within the field more generally.
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  • Similarity Reimagined (with Implications for a Theory of Concepts).Corinne L. Bloch-Mullins - 2021 - Theoria 87 (1):31-68.
    Similarity‐based theories of concepts have a broad intuitive appeal and have been successful in accounting for various phenomena related to the formation and application of concepts. Their adequacy as theories of concepts has been questioned, however, as similarity is often taken as too flexible, too unconstrained, to be explanatory of categorization. In this article, I propose an account of similarity that takes the “foil” against which the target items are measured as integral to the process of comparison, making the similarity (...)
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  • Foundational Questions about Concepts: Context‐sensitivity and Embodiment.Corinne L. Bloch-Mullins - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):940-952.
    This review discusses recent work on foundational questions about concepts. The first of these questions is whether concepts are context-independent bodies of knowledge, or context-dependent constructs, created on the fly. The second question is whether concepts are abstract, amodal representations, or whether they are embedded within the sensory-motor system. I discuss these two questions in light of empirical data from psychology and neuroscience, as well as theoretical considerations, and examine their implications for theories of concepts.
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  • Bridging the Gap between Similarity and Causality: An Integrated Approach to Concepts.Corinne L. Bloch-Mullins - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3):605-632.
    A growing consensus in the philosophy and psychology of concepts is that while theories such as the prototype, exemplar, and theory theories successfully account for some instances of concept formation and application, none of them successfully accounts for all such instances. I argue against this ‘new consensus’ and show that the problem is, in fact, more severe: the explanatory force of each of these theories is limited even with respect to the phenomena often cited to support it, as each fails (...)
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  • Schemata and associative processes in pragmatics.Marco Mazzone - 2011 - Journal of Pragmatics 43 (8):2148-2159.
    The notion of schema has been given a major role by Recanati within his conception of primary pragmatic processes, conceived as a type of associative process. I intend to show that Recanati’s considerations on schemata may challenge the relevance theorist’s argument against associative explanations in pragmatics, and support an argument in favor of associative (versus inferential) explanations. More generally, associative relations can be shown to be schematic, that is, they have enough structure to license inferential effects without any appeal to (...)
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  • Intuitions and Concepts.Elan Marinho - 2021 - Revista Do Seminário Dos Alunos Do Programa de Pós-Graduação Lógica E Metafísica / UFRJ 12 (1):22-26.
    Nowadays, there is an image that the philosopher is a figure who sits in an armchair thinking about his questions and reaching his conclusions. This image is not completely wrong. In philosophy, there really are “armchair” methods. Several philosophers try to do philosophy with little appeal to experimental evidence and a significant part of philosophers do not even try to do controlled experiments to verify their hypotheses. In this sense, a closer image of armchair philosophy is one in which philosophers (...)
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