In “Racial Justice Requires Ending the War on Drugs,” Earp and colleagues argue that the personal use or possession of all currently illicit psychoactive substances should be immediately decriminal...

Children of prisoners are often negatively affected by their parents’ incarceration, which raises issues of justice. A common view is that the many negative effects associated with parental imprisonment are unjust, simply because children of prisoners are impermissibly harmed or unjustly punished by their parents’ incarceration. We argue that proposals of this kind have problems with accounting for cases where it is intuitive that prison might create social injustices for children of prisoners. Therefore, we suggest that in addition to the (...) question of whether children of prisoners are impermissibly harmed, we should ask whether the inequalities that these children endure because of their parent’s incarceration are objectionable from a social justice perspective. To answer this latter question, we examine the negative effects associated with parental imprisonment from the perspective of luck egalitarianism. We develop a luck egalitarian account that incorporates insights from the philosophy of childhood. On our account, children of prisoners might endure two different types of objectionable inequalities, since they are often deprived of resources that are important for ensuring fair equality of opportunity in adulthood, but also because they are likely to suffer inequalities in terms of childhood welfare. After defending this account, we explore its implications for policy. (shrink)

A criminal conviction can trigger numerous burdensome legal consequences beyond the formal sentence. Some charge that these “collateral” legal consequences (CLCs) constitute additional measures of punishment, which raises the further question of whether judges should consider these CLCs when making sentencing decisions, reducing the formal sentence in proportion to the severity of the CLCs the defendant will face. The idea that all CLCs constitute forms of punishment reflects a particular conception of punishment, which I call the “minimalist view.” In this (...) paper, I argue against the minimalist view. I contend that on a more adequate conception of punishment, some but not all CLCs constitute punishment. I also argue that whether judges should consider CLCs in sentencing decisions depends on whether the relevant CLCs constitute punishment. (shrink)

Among the advocates of expressive theories of punishment, there is a strong consensus that monetary fines cannot convey the message of censure that is required to punish serious crimes or crimes against the person. Money is considered an inappropriate symbol to express condemnation. In this article, I argue that this sentiment is correct, although not for the reasons suggested by advocates of expressivism. The monetary day-fine should not be understood as a simple deprivation of money, but as a punishment that (...) reduces the offender’s capacity to consume for a certain period of time. Conceived in this manner, I argue that it is perfectly suitable to convey censure. However, the practical impossibility of ensuring that the person who pays the fine is the same person who has been convicted of the offense seriously undermines the acceptability of the monetary fine as an instrument of censure. Minimizing the risk of the fine’s hard treatment being transferred to third parties is a necessary condition for the monetary fine to be considered a viable alternative to lengthy prison sentences. (shrink)

It has been argued that the social circumstances of many children of prisoners goes against established principles of social justice. In this paper the proper allocation of responsibility for remedying this social injustice is discussed. Through a discussion of four principles for allocating remedial responsibility, it is argued that the responsibility for children of incarcerated parents is shared among several actors, including the incarcerated parent, remaining caregivers, prison officials, social work professionals, and, to some extent, members of the wider community. (...) While incarcerated parents are partially responsible for remedying the harm caused to their children, prison officials have the responsibility to uphold the types of prison conditions under which incarcerated parents are able to fulfill their responsibilities to their children and socially contribute to their well-being. Similarly, whereas the main responsibility to care for the children of incarcerated parents falls on the caregivers (such as the remaining parent or other family relatives), states are at the same time responsible for implementing social welfare policies of the sort that can help caregivers fulfill their responsibilities for the well-being of these children. As for individual members of the wider community, they have an obligation not to contribute to the stigmatization and marginalization of the families of incarcerated individuals. (shrink)