In this paper we attempt to discuss what has Kochen-Specker theorem to say about physical invariance and quantum individuality. In particular, we will discuss the impossibility of making reference to objective physical properties within the orthodox formalism of quantum mechanics. Through an analysis of the meaning of physical invariance and quantum contextuality we will derive a Corollary to KS theorem that proves that a vector in Hilbert space cannot be interpreted coherently as an object possessing physical properties. As a consequence, (...) the notion of quantum object can be only defined in terms of nomological properties. We conclude the paper by analyzing the consequences of this Corollary to KS theorem for the ongoing debate about quantum individuality. (shrink)

We analyse the various conceptual notions that go under the umbrella “relationalism/substantivalism”. Our focus will be on evaluating the ontological status of spacetime in General Relativity. To this end we systematically develop the ontological framework that implicitly underlies the traditional debate and common understanding of physics. We submit that spacetime with its chronogeometric and inertial structure, represented by the triple of the bare manifold, the metric and the affine structure, is best construed as the totality of possible and actual spatiotemporal (...) relations of events. This can explain the non-fundamentality of general relativistic gravitational energy and suggests a non-causal, non-interactional understanding of the interdependence of matter in spacetime in GR. (shrink)

Although widely used across psychology, economics, and philosophy, the concept ofeffort is rarely ever defined. This article argues that the time is ripe to look for anexplicit general definition of effort, makes some proposals about how to arrive at thisdefinition, and suggests that a force-based approach is the most promising. Section 1presents an interdisciplinary overview of some chief research axes on effort, and arguesthat few, if any, general definitions have been proposed so far. Section 2 argues thatsuch a definition is (...) now needed and proposes a basic methodology to arrive at it, whosefirst step is to make explicit the various tacit assumptions about effort made acrosssciences and ordinary thinking. Section 3 unearths 4 different conceptions of effortfrom research on effort so far:primitive-feelings accounts,comparator-based accounts,resource-based accountsandforce-based accounts. It is then argued that the first 2kinds of accounts, although interesting in their own right, are not strictly speaking abouteffort. Section 4 considers the 2 most promising general approaches to efforts: re-source-based and force-based accounts. It argues that these accounts are not only compatible but actually extensionally equivalent. This notwithstanding, it explains why force-based accounts should be regarded as more fundamental than resource-basedaccounts -/- . (shrink)