Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Dual Defection Incentives in One System: Party Switching under Taiwan's Single non-transferable Vote.Alex Chang & Yen-Chen Tang - 2015 - Japanese Journal of Political Science 16 (4):489-506.
    Political scientists generally consider that the incentive for legislators to switch parties lies in their desire to be re-elected. While some scholars attribute defection to the legislators’ popularity and strong connections with their constituents which enable them to be re-elected without relying on party labels, others assert that legislators switch if they perceive that staying put might threaten their chances of re-election. In this paper, we find that the two assumptions, to some extent, contradict each other. More surprisingly, the two (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Effects of Election Reform on Legislator Perceptions: The Case of Taiwan.Timothy S. Rich - 2012 - Japanese Journal of Political Science 13 (3):317-336.
    Mixed member legislative systems have proliferated in the last twenty years, and while our knowledge of the institutional impacts has grown, we have had difficulty in separating institutional and contextual (namely party) influences. Through an analysis of Taiwan before and after the implementation of a mixed member majoritarian (MMM) system, the level of contamination between tiers and variance between parties becomes clearer. Survey results show a marked shift in constituency focus for district candidates, moving from multimember to single-member districts, while (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark