This essay has two parts: 1) a negative or destructive one, which consists of showing that there is no anomaly, even apparent, in the concept of ‘truth’ (and ‘falsehood’), so that the available theories of truth are not justified, either to solve or react to this alleged problem; 2) a positive or constructive one, which consists of proposing a characterization of truth (and falsehood) based solely on the “objective aspect” of this concept. Here, I will associate the concept of ‘truth’ (...) with the concept of ‘existence’, taking them as two different species of a common genus. Along the way, I will critically analyze the theories of truth “available on the market” and argue that truth only has an “objective aspect”. (shrink)

The problem of the selection of the legislative representatives is the problem of knowing how this representatives are selected. The electoral system is the system that most democratic organizations have adopted and has become so present nowadays that we take for granted the identification between electoral system and representative democracy. However the meaning of ‘representative democracy’ has no reference to a specific mode of selection of the representatives. Being compatible with the democratic principle, the criteria of competence for the exercise (...) of the legislative function ought to be the instituted mode of selection, for it is the best one. In general, this is precisely what representation aims in the context of division of labour: to leave to the experts the exercise of some social function belonging to all. (shrink)

RESUMO De acordo com a teoria das funções de verdade, a verdade/falsidade de uma proposição é computável a partir da verdade/falsidade das suas proposições “internas”: para cada proposição há uma função entre valores de verdade. Aplicada a proposições modais, origina a semântica dos mundos possíveis e, aplicada a proposições normativas, origina uma semântica que reduz os conceitos normativos aos conceitos modais, a semântica modal. Esta redução fica posta em questão com a existência dos chamados ‘paradoxos da lógica deôntica’. Estes não (...) podem ser vistos como meras anomalias, mas devem ser vistos como indícios da incorreção da semântica modal. Em todos eles, a regra da necessitação, assim como o axioma da distribuição, “não batem certo”. Não obstante, o cumprimento/incumprimento das normas já é computável a partir da verdade/falsidade das proposições que expressam os estados de coisas devidos. ABSTRACT According to the theory of truth-functions the truth/falsehood of a proposition is computable from the truth/falsehood of its “internal” propositions: for each proposition there is a function between truth values. Possible world semantics arises from the application of that theory to modal propositions; modal semantics - the reduction of normative concepts to modal concepts - arises from its application to normative propositions. But the ‘paradoxes of deontic logic’, as they are called, undermine such reduction: they cannot be seen as mere anomalies but instead as evidence for the wrongness of modal semantics. In all these paradoxes, the necessitation rule, as well as the distribution axiom, fail. Nevertheless, the fulfillment/nonfulfillment of norms is computable from the truth/falsehood of the propositions which express the required states of affairs. (shrink)