Abstract—How do judges decide cases? Are judges controlled by rules, principles and professional standards of reasoning or do they decide as politicians, using the law as an instrument to achieve predetermined goals. In Australia one influential view on this issue was expressed by Sir Owen Dixon when he called for a ‘strict and complete legalism’ for judges. Dixon’s strict legalism no longer commands the respect that it once did and his view is now commonly seen as naïve or as a (...) noble lie intended to hide the freedom open to judges when they decide cases. This article examines first Dixon’s understanding of strict legalism. It will argue that Dixon understood it as a form of practice and not as a rigorous scholarly system. Secondly, it will analyse Wilson v Darling Island Stevedoring to see whether the leading judgment of Fullagar J is in accord with Dixon’s judicial method. In Wilson the High Court was presented with a persistent legal problem—could stevedores claim the benefits of exemption and limitation clauses that commonly featured in bills of lading arising from the transport of goods and people? The third section of the article will consider the obvious belief of many of the judges in the authorities examined that the commercial inconvenience of not protecting stevedores was too great to ignore. These judges were willing to grant stevedores the protection of exemption clauses in contracts of carriage, a trend that continued, indeed accelerated, after Wilson. So, even if Fullagar J did judge as a strict legalist, does this perceived commercial imperative raise doubts about the appropriateness of this style of judging? In conclusion the article will consider the implications of showing that the reasoning in Wilson displayed a fidelity to Dixon’s notion of strict and complete legalism. (shrink)