Wolfgang Freitag claims to have developed a proposal that solves Goodman's famous New Riddle of Induction. His proposal makes use of the notion of ‘derivative defeat’; the claim is that in certain circumstances, the projection of some predicates is derivatively defeated, i.e., it is inductively invalid. Freitag develops the proposal using some compelling examples, and then shows that it likewise applies to the argument at the basis of the New Riddle. There, he alleges, the projection of ‘grue’ is derivatively defeated, (...) whereas the projection of ‘green’ is not. We thus have a justification for preferring the green induction over the grue induction. I do not think Freitag has solved the New Riddle. The problem is that his proposal tacitly assumes certain counterfactual claims that a grue-speaker would dispute. I thus argue that Freitag's claims beg the question against the grue-speaker, and I show why the grue-speaker would reject them. (shrink)