Graham Priest (1994) has argued that the following paradoxes all have the same structure: Russell’s Paradox, Burali-Forti’s Paradox, Mirimanoff’s Paradox, König’s Paradox, Berry’s Paradox, Richard’s Paradox, the Liar and Liar Chain Paradoxes, the Knower and Knower Chain Paradoxes, and the Heterological Paradox. Their common structure is given by Russell’s Schema: there is a property φ and function δ such that..

The privacy, real or illusory, afforded by the personal letter allows each participant the philosophical freedom to explore a range of possible opinions, to experiment with different ideas, to hesitate, and to change his or her mind in ways that published articles and books discourage. The private letter also allows the use of language and style of writing to be altered to suit the particular recipient. This is especially evident in Leibniz's correspondence with Des Bosses. Sometimes, however, the intended recipient (...) is not the addressee, as when Leibniz engaged with Locke through Thomas Burnett of Kemney. This situation was not an isolated occurrence in Leibniz's dealings with Locke. In this chapter, we shall see how Leibniz attempted to engage with Locke through a second correspondence and how he adapted the style and presentation of his views, not for the main correspondent, Lady Masham, but for the other intended recipient. We shall also see that the views Leibniz presents confirm his loyalty during this period to an ontology of embodied, perceiving substances. -/- The correspondence with Damaris Masham began shortly after Lady Masham sent Leibniz a copy of her father's The True Intellectual System of the Universe (TIS) at the end of 1703. Learning that the book was on its way, Leibniz's first letter was intended to thank her in advance. (shrink)

ABSTRACT When Hume, in the Treatise on Human Nature, began his examination of the relation of cause and effect, in particular, of the idea of necessary connection which is its essential constituent, he identified two preliminary questions that should guide his research: For what reason we pronounce it necessary that every thing whose existence has a beginning should also have a cause and Why we conclude that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects? Hume observes that our belief (...) in these principles can result neither from an intuitive grasp of their truth nor from a reasoning that could establish them by demonstrative means. In particular, with respect to the first, Hume examines and rejects some arguments with which Locke, Hobbes and Clarke tried to demonstrate it, and suggests, by exclusion, that the belief that we place on it can only come from experience. Somewhat surprisingly, however, Hume does not proceed to show how that derivation of experience could be made, but proposes instead to move directly to an examination of the second principle, saying that, "perhaps, be found in the end, that the same answer will serve for both questions". Hume's answer to the second question is well known, but the first question is never answered in the rest of the Treatise, and it is even doubtful that it could be, which would explain why Hume has simply chosen to remove any mention of it when he recompiled his theses on causation in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Given this situation, an interesting question that naturally arises is to investigate the relations of logical or conceptual implication between these two principles. Hume seems to have thought that an answer to would also be sufficient to provide an answer to. Henry Allison, in his turn, argued that the two questions are logically independent. My proposal here is to try to show that there is indeed a logical dependency between them, but the implication is, rather, from to. If accepted, this result may be particularly interesting for an interpretation of the scope of the so-called "Kant's reply to Hume" in the Second Analogy of Experience, which is structured as a proof of the a priori character of, but whose implications for remain controversial. (shrink)

Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology is widely regarded as one of the great works of 19th century science, and one of the most influential works in the entire history of the earth sciences. Yet the standard critical interpretation of the Principles makes such high regard and influence look puzzling at best. We are told, for instance, that Lyell’s argument rests on a contentious a priori methodological distinction between scientific and non-scientific explanations, the former featuring observed causes at their present intensities, (...) the latter featuring anything else. 2 We are also told that Lyell simply assumes a priori that. (shrink)

In Bayesian epistemology, the problem of the priors is this: How should we set our credences (or degrees of belief) in the absence of evidence? That is, how should we set our prior or initial credences, the credences with which we begin our credal life? David Lewis liked to call an agent at the beginning of her credal journey a superbaby. The problem of the priors asks for the norms that govern these superbabies. -/- The Principle of Indifference gives (...) a very restrictive answer. It demands that such an agent divide her credences equally over all possibilities. That is, according to the Principle of Indifference, only one initial credence function is permissible, namely, the uniform distribution. In this paper, we offer a novel argument for the Principle of Indifference. I call it the Argument from Accuracy. (shrink)

Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) was a prominent English mathematician and philosopher who co-authored the highly influential Principia Mathematica with Bertrand Russell. Originally published in 1922, this book forms the follow-up volume to "The Principles of Natural Knowledge" (1919) and "The Concept of Nature" (1920). In it, Whitehead puts forward an alternative theory of relativity, one which goes against the heterogeneity of Einstein's later theories in deducing that 'our experience requires and exhibits a basis in uniformity'. The text is divided (...) into three parts - 'General Principles', 'Physical Applications', and 'Elementary Theory of Tensors' - and exhibits a characteristically ambitious approach in mixing various academic disciplines. This is a fascinating book that will be of value to anyone with an interest in natural science, physics, and philosophy, together with the history of science. (shrink)

Introduction, the central experiences. - The concrete universal. - Uniformity and general law not antagonistic to individuality. - The teleology of finite consciousness, a sub-form of individuality. - Bodily basis of mind as a whole of content. - Self-consciousness as the clue to the typical structure of reality. - Ourselves and the absolute. - Individuality as the logical criterion of value. - Freedom and initiative. - Nature, the self, and the absolute.

Along the line of Hirst‐Mummert and Dorais, we analyze the relationship between the classical provability of uniform versions Uni(S) of Π2‐statements S with respect to higher order reverse mathematics and the intuitionistic provability of S. Our main theorem states that (in particular) for every Π2‐statement S of some syntactical form, if its uniform version derives the uniform variant of over a classical system of arithmetic in all finite types with weak extensionality, then S is not provable in strong semi‐intuitionistic systems (...) including bar induction in all finite types but also nonconstructive principles such as Kőnig's lemma and uniform weak Kőnig's lemma. Our result is applicable to many mathematical principles whose sequential versions imply. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I the Root of All Explanation II the Four Basic Forms of Explanation Notes Further Reading.

The principle of uniformity of nature has sometimes been invoked for the purpose of justifying induction. This principle cannot be established "a priori", And in the absence of a justification of induction, It cannot be established "a posteriori". There is no justification for assuming it as a postulate of science. Use of such a principle is, However, Neither sufficient nor necessary for a justification of induction. In any plausible form, It is too weak for that purpose, (...) And hence, It is insufficient. Since a justification which does not rely upon this principle can be given, It is not necessary. (shrink)

We show that Bounded Forcing Axioms (for instance, Martin's Axiom, the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom, or the Bounded Martin's Maximum) are equivalent to principles of generic absoluteness, that is, they assert that if a $\Sigma_1$ sentence of the language of set theory with parameters of small transitive size is forceable, then it is true. We also show that Bounded Forcing Axioms imply a strong form of generic absoluteness for projective sentences, namely, if a $\Sigma^1_3$ sentence with parameters is forceable, then (...) it is true. Further, if for every real x, $x^{\sharp}$ exists, and the second uniform indiscernible is less than $\omega_2$ , then the same holds for $\Sigma^1_4$ sentences. (shrink)

When we first begin to reflect about conduct in a philosophical way? whether as philosophers or not, we look for general truths, fundamental principles. Our acceptances and rejections, preferences, commendations and disgusts, seem at the start chaotic and unsystematic, and we hope to reduce them to order—to show that there are general principles by reference to which all our varied acts, admirations and decisions can be understood and justified. The number of such principles should for choice be small. Ideally, we (...) think, it should be possible to present our progress through life not as a thing of fits and starts, of zig–zags, gestures and recoils, but as aimed in a single uniform direction. If we esteem some things above others, praise some men, commend some deeds, admire some paintings this should be because in each case the Supreme Value or Ultimate Good finds expression in the esteemed, praised, commended or admired thing, man, deed or picture. We hope to find a single standard by coming up to or falling short of which things of all sorts will earn the prizes or rebukes they deserve. (shrink)

Cyclic mechanic is intended as a suitable generalization both of quantum mechanics and general relativity apt to unify them. It is founded on a few principles, which can be enumerated approximately as follows: 1. Actual infinity or the universe can be considered as a physical and experimentally verifiable entity. It allows of mechanical motion to exist. 2. A new law of conservation has to be involved to generalize and comprise the separate laws of conservation of classical and relativistic mechanics, and (...) especially that of conservation of energy: This is the conservation of action or information. 3. Time is not a uniformly flowing time in general. It can have some speed, acceleration, more than one dimension, to be discrete. 4. The following principle of cyclicity: The universe returns in any point of it. The return can be only kinematic, i.e. per a unit of energy (or mass), and thermodynamic, i.e. considering the universe as a thermodynamic whole. 5. The kinematic return, which is per a unit of energy (or mass), is the counterpart of conservation of energy, which can be interpreted as the particular case of conservation of action “per a unit of time”. The kinematic return per a unit of energy (or mass) can be interpreted in turn as another particular law of conservation in the framework of conservation of action (or information), namely conservation of wave period (or time). These two counterpart laws of conservation correspond exactly to the particle “half” and to the wave “half” of wave-particle duality. 6. The principle of quantum invariance is introduced. It means that all physical laws have to be invariant to discrete and continuous (smooth) morphisms (motions) or mathematically, to the axiom of choice. The list is not intended to be exhausted or disjunctive, but only to give an introductory idea. (shrink)

The pessimistic induction is built upon the uniformity principle that the future resembles the past. In daily scientific activities, however, scientists sometimes rely on what I call the disuniformity principle that the future differs from the past. They do not give up their research projects despite the repeated failures. They believe that they will succeed although they failed repeatedly, and as a result they achieve what they intended to achieve. Given that the disuniformity principle is useful (...) in certain cases in science, we might reasonably use it to infer that present theories are true unlike past theories. Hence, pessimists have the burden to show that our prediction about the fate of present theories is more likely to be true if we use the uniformity principle than if we use the disuniformity principle. (shrink)

The results established in this paper are in connection with the Relative Internal Set Theory (R.I.S.T.). The main result is the general principle of choice: Let α be a level and let Φ(x, y) be anαexternalαbounded formula of the language of R.I.S.T.. Suppose that to each elementx, dominated by α, corresponds an elementy x such that Φ(x, y x ) holds, then there exists a function of choice ψ such that, which is a very general principle of choice, (...) for everyx dominated by α, Φ(x, ψ(x)) holds. More than that, we establish that if all the elementsy x are uniformly dominated by a level β then we can prescribe that the function of choice is also dominated by β. (shrink)

Diogenes Laertius's “Lives of the Eminent Philosophers” is a fictionalised account of the history of philosophy, full of philosophical concepts and scientific terminology. The Ukrainian translation strategy this work proposed by the authors aims to ensure adequacy in meaning while maximizing the uniformity of terms. The main principles of this translation are: 1) to avoid Greekisms, Latinisms and calques from the Russian language; 2) to translate Greek etymologically related concepts with single-root words; 3) to translate single-root antonymic concepts in (...) the same way; 4) where lexical semantics is terminologically or substantively significant, to use synonyms; 6) composites or words with a complicated internal form can be translated periphrastically; 7) to use some neologisms to clarify meanings. (shrink)

The author presents a version of the ontological scheme of Newton’s mechanistic worldview based on both the study of previous versions of its understanding and the text of the “Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy”. Newton developed a model of new universality or a homogeneous and isotropic world in which uniform laws operate. This model is based on several ontological postulates Newton introduced, which can be isolated from several provisions of his classic work. The new mechanistic worldview is based on the (...) imputation of the world of universal simplicity. The quantitative “unit” of a simple, homogeneous, physical-geometric universe is an ambivalent corpuscle-point. The main constants of the “mechanistic universe” are the diversity of the numbers of masses, motions, and forces connected by clear reciprocal relationships. Newton also introduced theoretical space and time as a privileged, absolute reference system. Finally, in the Newtonian version of the mechanistic worldview, there are compelled metaphysical ingredients or inexplicable and transcendental qualities. They are gravity, ether, and God. Thus, the ontological scheme of Newton’s mechanistic worldview is a construction based on the sequential mental experiment of presenting the universe exclusively from the side of its “objectivity” and “sensory certification”. (shrink)

The paper gives an analysis of the theoretical-methodological principles of the philosophy of J. Pato?ka not only as a historian of philosophy, but also as a historian of science, especially of its revolutionary periods. The aim of the paper is to show that following the general context of his works here also Pato?ka consistently deals with the central issue of his philosophy, namely the life-world . In Pato?ka's view it was already the rise of ancient philosophy, and especially of the (...) mathematical natural science that destroyed the original uniform picture of the universe, splitting man's world into the natural world on one hand and the world construed by the mathematical natural science on the other hand. Further, the paper shows Pato?ka's view of phenomenology, which he has seen as a means, with the help of which this dichotomy could be resolved, as well as Pato?ka's criticism of the original Husserlian concept of phenomenology, which failed to avoid its subjectivist and solipsist tendencies. The problem of lifeworld led Pato?ka not only to the principles of non-subjective phenomenolog, but it also became the basis of his philosophy of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

It is consistent that for many cardinals λ there is a family of at least λ + unbounded subsets of λ which have uniformization properties. In particular if it is consistent that a supercompact cardinal exists, then it is consistent that ℵ ω has such a family. We have applications to point set topology, Whitehead groups and reconstructing separable abelian p-groups from their socles.

We prove the theorem from the title which answers a question addressed in the paper of Moore-Hrusak-Dzamonja [3].

Robert Hooke’s development of the theory of matter-as-vibration provides coherence to a career in natural philosophy which is commonly perceived as scattered and haphazard. It also highlights aspects of his work for which he is rarely credited: besides the creative speculative imagination and practical-instrumental ingenuity for which he is known, it displays lucid and consistent theoretical thought and mathematical skills. Most generally and importantly, however, Hooke’s ‘Principles … of Congruity and Incongruity of bodies’ represent a uniquely powerful approach to the (...) most pressing challenge of the New Science: legitimizing the application of mathematics to the study of nature. This challenge required reshaping the mathematical practices and procedures; an epistemological framework supporting these practices; and a metaphysics which could make sense of this epistemology. Hooke’s ‘Uniform Geometrical or Mechanical Method’ was a bold attempt to answer the three challenges together, by interweaving mathematics through physics into metaphysics and epistemology. Mathematics, in his rendition, was neither an abstract and ideal structure (as it was for Kepler), nor a wholly-flexible, artificial human tool (as it was for Newton). It drew its power from being contingent on the particularities of the material world. (shrink)

In this paper, we will question Heisenberg’s claim that the unpredictability of the experimental findings of quantum physics also affects the self-evident attitude about the universal and necessary nature of the principle of causality. We will try to answer the aforementioned problem by confronting Heisenberg’s criticism of Kant’s position on the universal and necessary/absolute nature of the principle of causality with Kant’s distinction between perceptual and experiential judgments. The distinction between perceptual and experiential judgments reveals that even in (...) Heisenberg’s experimental results that indicate the smallest degree of expectation, predictability, or uniformity of natural events, universal and necessary conditions of knowledge to which Heisenberg denies absolute value still preexist. (shrink)

Eminent science writer James Trefil examines the very underpinnings of scientific thought. He recounts the story of mankind's fascinating exploration beyond the earth and the simplistic beauty of the universal principles that govern the cosmos.

We investigate in detail the electromagnetic fields of a uniformly accelerated charge, in order to ascertain whether such a charge does ‘emit’ radiation, especially in view of the Poynting flow computed at large distances and taken as an evidence of radiation emitted by the charge. In this context, certain important aspects of the fields need to be taken into account. First and foremost is the fact that in the case of a uniformly accelerated charge, one cannot ignore the velocity fields. (...) This then leads to other equally vital points. The net field energy turns out to be exactly the same as that of a non-accelerated charge having a uniform velocity equal to the instantaneous velocity of the uniformly accelerated charge. Further, the Poynting vector, seen with respect to the ’present’ location of the uniformly accelerated charge, during the deceleration phase, possesses everywhere a radial component pointing inward toward the charge, becoming nil when the charge becomes momentarily stationary, and during the acceleration phase, points away from the charge position. Last, but not least, when the leading spherical front of the relativistically beamed Poynting flux, advances forward at a large time t to a far-off distance \, the charge too is not lagging far behind. In fact, these relativistically beamed fields, increasingly resemble fields of a charge moving in an inertial frame with a uniform velocity \, with a convective flow of fields in that frame along with the movement of the charge. There is no other Poynting flow in the far-zones that could be termed as radiation emitted by the charge which, in turn, is fully consistent with the absence of radiation reaction and is also fully conversant with the strong principle of equivalence. (shrink)

This note deals with the prepositional uniformity principlep-UP: p x N A (p, x) x N p A (p, x) ( species of all propositions) in intuitionistic mathematics.p-UP is implied by WC and KS. But there are interestingp-UP-cases which require weak KS resp. WC only. UP for number species follows fromp-UP by extended bar-induction (ranging over propositions) and suitable weak continuity. As corollaries we have the disjunction property and the existential definability w.r.t. concrete objects. Other consequences are: there is (...) no non-trivial countable partition of;id is the only injective function from to; there are no many-place injective prepositional functions; card () is incomparable with the cardinality of all metric spaces containing at least three elements. (shrink)

Taking inspiration from Searle’s ‘The Logic of Fictional Discourse’, this essay presents an argument against different versions of the so-called ‘speech act theory of fiction’. In particular, it argues that a Uniformity Argument may be constructed, which is additional to the Determination Argument commonly attributed to Searle, and which does not rely on his presumably controversial Determination Principle. This Uniformity Argument is equally powerful against the ‘Dedicated Speech Act’ theories that Searle originally targeted, and the more recent, (...) Grice-inspired versions of speech-act approaches to fictional discourse. (shrink)

The theoretical system Lyell presented in 1830 was composed of three requirements or principles: 1) the Uniformity Principle which states that past geological events must be explained by the same causes now in operation; 2) the Uniformity of Rate Principle which states that geological laws operate with the same force as at present; 3) the Steady-state Principle which states that the earth does not undergo any directional change. The three principles form a single thesis called (...) uniformitarianism which has been repeatedly questioned and which has been reputed to be unable to face the competing directional synthesis based on the theory of the earth's cooling down. As a result, the significance of Lyell's system has been reduced to a simple actualism which admits the validity of the only Uniformity Principle. I believe that the only way to understand Lyell's role in the history of science is to maintain the unity of his synthesis. To show the Newtonian roots of this synthesis I will compare Lyell's principles and Newton's Rules of Reasoning. I will conclude with an analysis of the methodological function of principles in Lyell's scientific endeavour. (shrink)

Barbara Fried takes the view that uniform taxation—that is, a single rate applicable to all income levels—cannot be defended on any grounds of justice. She goes further by saying that, of all possible rate structures, it might be “the hardest one”? to ground in “a”? theory of fairness. Using the contractarian-constitutional perspective advanced by John Rawls and James Buchanan, this article argues that tax uniformity can be seen as a requirement of justice. After modelling how the political world realistically (...) decides to distribute tax shares (self-interested parties act under a majority constraint), I show how the uniformity principle could emerge from the constitutional contract. In other words, rational individuals would choose uniformity as a procedural constraint under a “veil of uncertainty”?; that is, with limited knowledge regarding their positions under the future application of the rule. Moreover, I elucidate how the uniformity requirement integrates generalized criteria of fairness and efficiency into fiscal politics as it precludes fiscal exploitation and constrains majorities, and their most influential subgroups, to opt for policies in the direction of the Pareto frontier, and as such promotes outcomes acceptable to all participants. (shrink)

In the third section of his paper ‘Inductivism in 19th Century Economics’ Karl Milford presents us with a useful résumé of the impact of methodological con-siderations, especially amongst economists in the German-speaking world, on more properly economic problems, especially the development of price theory. It is interesting to learn from his report how diverse were the various approaches, both axiologically and methodologically. Each combination of objectivism or subjectivism with individualism or collectivism had distinguished representa-tives: the objectivism with regard to values (...) of Smith and Marx contradicted the subjectivism of Hufeland and Roscher, while the individualism of Smith and Hufeland contradicted the collectivism of Marx and Roscher. As Milford tells the story, it was only with publication of Menger’s Grundsätze in 1871, and his Untersuchungen in 1883, that the combination of subjectivism and individualism espoused by Hufeland finally attained a dominant position. The success of Menger’s approach seems to be attributable on the one side to the per-sistent inability of objectivist theories of values and prices to explain adequately the activity of the market; and on the methodological side, to his devastating attack on some aspects of the naively unaffected inductivism underlying most collectivist thinking. In fact Menger too was an inductivist who, in response to Hume’s attack on all modes of content-increasing inference, introduced and defended an a priori principle of induction. (shrink)

In the third section of his paper ‘Inductivism in 19th Century Economics’ Karl Milford presents us with a useful résumé of the impact of methodological con-siderations, especially amongst economists in the German-speaking world, on more properly economic problems, especially the development of price theory. It is interesting to learn from his report how diverse were the various approaches, both axiologically and methodologically. Each combination of objectivism or subjectivism with individualism or collectivism had distinguished representa-tives: the objectivism with regard to values (...) of Smith and Marx contradicted the subjectivism of Hufeland and Roscher, while the individualism of Smith and Hufeland contradicted the collectivism of Marx and Roscher . As Milford tells the story , it was only with publication of Menger’s Grundsätze in 1871, and his Untersuchungen in 1883, that the combination of subjectivism and individualism espoused by Hufeland finally attained a dominant position. The success of Menger’s approach seems to be attributable on the one side to the per-sistent inability of objectivist theories of values and prices to explain adequately the activity of the market; and on the methodological side, to his devastating attack on some aspects of the naively unaffected inductivism underlying most collectivist thinking . In fact Menger too was an inductivist who, in response to Hume’s attack on all modes of content-increasing inference, introduced and defended an a priori principle of induction. (shrink)

Boran Berčić, in the second volume of his recent book "Filozofija" , offers two responses to David Chalmers’s conceivability or modal argument against physicalism. This latter argument aims at showing that zombies, our physical duplicates who lack consciousness, are metaphysically possible, given that they are conceivable. Berčić’s first response is based on the principle of the uniformity of nature that states that causes of a certain type will always cause effects of the same type. His second response is (...) based on the assumption that the basic statements of physicalism in philosophy of mind are or should be contingently true. I argue that if Berčić’s first defence is aimed at the conceivability of zombies, it is unsatisfactory. Moreover, I argue that a quite similar argument, offered by John Perry in his book "Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness" , is afflicted by a similar problem. Nevertheless, under a more plausible interpretation, Berčić’s argument might be taken to attack the metaphysical possibility of zombies. This version of the argument might be effective and has the merit to point out a so far overlooked link between the discussion of the Chalmers’s conceivability arguments against physicalism and the modal strength of causal links and natural laws. Then, I argue that Berčić’s second defence of physicalism, which cannot be combined consistently with his first one, in any case, should not be formulated in the terms of contingent physicalism. (shrink)

We deal with the fragment of modal logic consisting of implications of formulas built up from the variables and the constant ‘true’ by conjunction and diamonds only. The weaker language allows one to interpret the diamonds as the uniform reflection schemata in arithmetic, possibly of unrestricted logical complexity. We formulate an arithmetically complete calculus with modalities labeled by natural numbers and ω, where ω corresponds to the full uniform reflection schema, whereas n<ω corresponds to its restriction to arithmetical Πn+1-formulas. This (...) calculus is shown to be complete w.r.t. a suitable class of finite Kripke models and to be decidable in polynomial time. (shrink)

Abstract -/- The indistinction between repose and uniform movement exposed in the principle of inertia marks one of the most famous dissertations: the discussion between Newton and Leibniz. Through their respective conceptions of space, both seek to solve the problem of indistinction. The relational space of Leibniz, supported by the principle of sufficient reason and the identity of indiscernibles leads to the kinematic solution of the problem of inertia. The objective of this paper is to show the contribution (...) of Leibniz, in terms of relations of order, by distinguishing between equality by identity and equality by equivalence. Under a philosophical approach we link identity, equivalence and equality as relations of order with the indiscernibility between different states of movement. We expose first the principle of sufficient reason and the identity of indiscernibles. Under Bernoulli's principle of indifference, we argue that we distinguish between equality in abstract and equality in concrete. As a third part, we present the relationship between the identity of the indiscernibles and the predicate of equality under logical analysis. Finally we present the conclusions. -/- . (shrink)

Se plantea la cuestión del papel de la armonía en la concepción de la racionalidad de Leibniz. Se sitúa esta noción en el marco de la metafísica de la individualidad sistémica, y aparece en dos lugares concretos. En primer lugar en el eje categorial uniformidad-diversi­dad, como principio de equilibrio entre ambos polos. Y en segundo lugar, aparece la noción de armonía en el nivel último de la racionalidad, concretamente en plano de la lógica de los principios. Este nivel se rige (...) por el principio general del orden, y precisamente este principio es explicado por Leibniz frecuentemente en relación con la armonía. (shrink)

Can rational communication proceed when interlocutors are uncertain which contents utterances contribute to discourse? An influential negative answer to this question is embodied in the Stalnakerian principle of uniformity, which requires speakers to produce only utterances that express the same content in every possibility treated as live for the purposes of the conversation. The principle of uniformity enjoys considerable intuitive plausibility and, moreover, seems to follow from platitudes about assertion; nevertheless, it has recently proven controversial. In (...) what follows, I defend the principle by developing two arguments for it based on premises reflecting the central aims and assumptions of possibility-carving frameworks for modeling inquiry—that is, frameworks which describe the evolution of individuals’ attitudinal states in terms of set-theoretic operations defined over a domain of objects representing possibilities. (shrink)

We argue that purely local experiments can distinguish a stationary charged particle in a static gravitational field from an accelerated particle in (gravity-free) Minkowski space. Some common arguments to the contrary are analyzed and found to rest on a misidentification of “energy.”.

This volume presents a collection of refereed papers reflecting the state of the art in the area of over-constrained systems. Besides 11 revised full papers, selected from the 24 submissions to the OCS workshop held in conjunction with the First International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming, CP '95, held in Marseilles in September 1995, the book includes three comprehensive background papers of central importance for the workshop papers and the whole field. Also included is an introduction by (...) one of the volume editors together with a bibliography listing 243 entries. All in all this is a very useful reference book relevant for all researchers and practitioners interested in hierarchical, partial, and over-constrained systems. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Categorical Prescriptiveness Uniformity as a Moral Matter Uniformity Contrasted with Neutrality The Overridingness of Moral Principles.

In this note we show that proof-theoretic uniform boundedness or bounded collection principles which allow one to formalize certain instances of countable Heine–Borel compactness in proofs using abstract metric structures must be carefully distinguished from an unrestricted use of countable Heine–Borel compactness.

The anti-Specker property, a constructive version of sequential compactness, is used to prove constructively that a pointwise continuous, order-dense preference relation on a compact metric space is uniformly sequentially continuous. It is then shown that Ishihara's principle BD-ℕ implies that a uniformly sequentially continuous, order-dense preference relation on a separable metric space is uniformly continuous. Converses of these two theorems are also proved.