Key Components of the Ontological Scheme of the World in “Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy”

Philosophy International Journal 7 (1):1-6 (2024)
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Abstract

The author presents a version of the ontological scheme of Newton’s mechanistic worldview based on both the study of previous versions of its understanding and the text of the “Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy”. Newton developed a model of new universality or a homogeneous and isotropic world in which uniform laws operate. This model is based on several ontological postulates Newton introduced, which can be isolated from several provisions of his classic work. The new mechanistic worldview is based on the imputation of the world of universal simplicity. The quantitative “unit” of a simple, homogeneous, physical-geometric universe is an ambivalent corpuscle-point. The main constants of the “mechanistic universe” are the diversity of the numbers of masses, motions, and forces connected by clear reciprocal relationships. Newton also introduced theoretical space and time as a privileged, absolute reference system. Finally, in the Newtonian version of the mechanistic worldview, there are compelled metaphysical ingredients or inexplicable and transcendental qualities. They are gravity, ether, and God. Thus, the ontological scheme of Newton’s mechanistic worldview is a construction based on the sequential mental experiment of presenting the universe exclusively from the side of its “objectivity” and “sensory certification”.

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