Suhrawardī, Yaḥyá ibn Ḥabash, 1152 or 1153-1191 -Criticism and interpretation ; Bābā Afz̤al, active 13th century -Criticism and interpretation ; ʻAṭṭār, Farīd al-Dīn, d. ca. 1230 -Criticism and interpretation.

The editor of Political Theory asked us to respond to the question, 'What is political theory?' This question is as old as political theory or political philos- ophy. The activity of studying politics, whether it is called science, theory, or philosophy, always brings itself into question. The question does not ask for a single answer, for there are countless ways of studying politics and no univer- sal criteria for adjudicating among them. Rather, the question asks, 'What comparative difference (...) does it make to study politics this way rather than that?' Political theory or philosophy not only spans three millennia of study- ing politics in innumerable ways but also three millennia of dialogues among practitioners over various approaches, their relative merits, and the contest- able criteria for their comparison. Because there is no definitive answer, there is no end to this dialogue. Rather, it is the kind of open-ended dialogue that brings insight through the activity of reciprocal elucidation itself. Dialogue partners gain insight into what ruling, being ruled, and contesting rule is through the exchange of questions and answers over different ways of study-ing politics and different criteria for their assessment in relation to how they throw light on different aspects of the complex worlds of politics-and what counts as the 'different aspects of the complex worlds of politics' is also ques- tioned in the course of the dialogue.'. (shrink)

Philosophy as Fiction seeks to account for the peculiar power of philosophical literature by taking as its case study the paradigmatic generic hybrid of the twentieth century, Marcel Proust's In Search of Lost Time. At once philosophical--in that it presents claims, and even deploys arguments concerning such traditionally philosophical issues as knowledge, self-deception, selfhood, love, friendship, and art--and literary, in that its situations are imaginary and its stylization inescapably prominent, Proust's novel presents us with a conundrum. How should it (...) be read? Can the two discursive structures co-exist, or must philosophy inevitably undermine literature (by sapping the narrative of its vitality) and literature undermine philosophy (by placing its claims in the mouth of an often unreliable narrator)? In the case of Proust at least, the result is greater than the sum of its parts. Not only can a coherent, distinctive philosophical system be extracted from the Recherche, once the narrator's periodic waywardness is taken into account; not only does a powerfully original style pervade its every nook, overtly reinforcing some theories and covertly exemplifying others; but aspects of the philosophy also serve literary ends, contributing more to character than to conceptual framework. What is more, aspects of the aesthetics serve philosophical ends, enabling a reader to engage in an active manner with an alternative art of living. Unlike the "essay" Proust might have written, his novel grants us the opportunity to use it as a practice ground for cooperation among our faculties, for the careful sifting of memories, for the complex procedures involved in self-fashioning, and for the related art of self-deception. It is only because the narrator's insights do not always add up--a weakness, so long as one treats the novel as a straightforward treatise--that it can produce its training effect, a feature that turns out to be its ultimate strength. (shrink)

The article discusses the definition of reflection as an activity and examines the main factors that determine the kinds of reflection. According to the author of the article, reflection as an activity can be defined by the following formula: the direction of attention to EXPERIENCE for the “detection” of its FORMS and their fixation by means of certain SEMIOTIC TOOLS carried out for the sake of achieving some PURPOSE. In this formulation, the terms “experience”, “form”, “semiotic tools”, “purpose” (...) are understood as parameters, the specification of which sets the description of certain kinds of reflection. In addition, the structure of “detection” participates in the formation of reflection, which consists of the languages of description, conceptual and terminological apparatus, knowledge and other conceptual means of the reflecting subject. Variants for specifying the parameters of the definition are considered in the article on the material of various philosophical techniques (mainly domestic tradition) and a number of general cultural reflexive practices. The author correlates his understanding of reflection with a number of ideas of the Moscow Methodological Circle (MMC), in which reflection techniques were given great importance. In particular, the author schematizes his understanding as a special case of an “act of activity”, the idea of which is the development within the MMC of some of K. Marx’s ideas. In connection with the clarification of the temporal structure of reflection (which is not grasped by schematization of reflection as an act of activity), the author introduces the idea of an elementary cycle of reflection and fixes it in the form of a scheme. In conclusion, the author examines the question of the correlation of reflection and thinking and considers the possibilities of correlating his definition of reflection with the typology of reflection set by the scheme of the thinking-communication-activity-system (proposed in MMC in 1983). (shrink)

The idea of active power played central role in the 17th Century philosophy and science. The idea is as follows: if not prevented, bodies necessarily do certain things in virtue of their power. This kind of thought naturally arose from what might properly be called the law of persistence, according to which moving bodies continue their motion unchanged if no new external force intervenes.1 What bodies do in virtue of their power was called actions, and in terms of actions (...) such things as resistance, pressure and affections were explained. What is this active power? One of the main aims of philosophers in the 17th and 18th Centuries was to find a good answer to this question. (shrink)

Abstract: From familiar concepts like TALL and TABLE to exotic ones like GRAVITY and GENOCIDE, they guide our lives and are the basis for how we represent the world. However, there is good reason to think that many of our most cherished concepts, like TRUTH, FREEDOM, KNOWLEDGE, and RATIONALITY are defective in the sense that the rules for using them are inconsistent. This defect leads those who possess these concepts into paradoxes and absurdities. Indeed, I argue that many of the (...) central problems of contemporary philosophy should be thought of as having their source in philosophical concepts that are defective in this way. If that is right, then we should take a more active role in crafting and sculpting our conceptual repertoire. We need to explore various ways of replacing these defective concepts with ones that will still do the work we need them to do without leading us into contradictions. (shrink)

Philosophy should not try to assimilate itself to the aims of the sciences. Scientism stems from the false assumption that a representation of the world minimally based on local perspectives is what best serves self-understanding. Philosophy must concern itself with the history of our conceptions, and we must overcome the need to think that this history should ideally be vindicatory. There is no basic conflict between arguing within the framework of our ideas, reflectively making better sense of them, (...) and understanding their highly contingent history. The third of these activities is an inescapable part of the second. (shrink)

What distinguishes philosophy is its attention to reality and sense as such, or what is traditionally called being and essence. As a result, philosophy as a way of life is, most fundamentally, not directly a matter of doing one kind of thing rather than another outside the classroom but instead of how we live with respect to our being. Enacting our being in one way rather than another inflects whatever it is we do. Consequently, even if we only (...) study philosophy in the conventional, apparently unlived way in the classroom, we are in active relation to our being and therefore fully living philosophy as a way of life. (shrink)

This collection of essays discusses a central feature of European philosophy: the idea of a universal active power as the ultimate world-explanation.

This paper aims to defend a dialectical account of selfhood in the context of the contemporary debates on personal identity in Anglo-American philosophy. I interpret Reductionism and Non-Reductionism—the two dominant positions in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy—as forming something analogous to an antinomy. Reductionists argue that the self is merely an identity that is reducible to a set of facts, while Non-Reductionists argue that the self is a separate entity beyond any set of facts. I argue that a comprehensive view (...) of the self requires aspects from both of these positions. The self, then, should be understood as an ongoing activity that relates the various features of one’s identity together. (shrink)

In the effort to defend and demonstrate the (prime) role of philosophy as an activity aiming at uncovering and questioning dogmas underlying our cognitive practices, the present article places under critical scrutiny the epistemic axiology informing organisation/management studies. That is, the plausibility of the largely unquestioned presumption that it is only the quest for truth that matters. This critical endeavour is effected by juxtaposing the conditions under which this would be the case, and in the prism of present (...) conditions concludes that this is not unquestionably the case. Throughout the line of analysis developed, important implications for the present role of philosophical discourses are drawn. (shrink)

We examine the "Theaetetus" in the light of its juxtaposition of philosophical, mathematical and sophistical approaches to knowledge, which we show to be a prominent feature of the drama. We suggest that clarifying the nature of philosophy supersedes the question of knowledge as the main ambition of the "Theaetetus". Socrates shows Theaetetus that philosophy is not a demonstrative science, like geometry, but it is also not mere word-play, like sophistry. The nature of philosophy is revealed in Socrates' (...) activity of examination and his refusal to deny his ignorance about knowledge. (shrink)

Beginning in earnest in the late 1990s, educational researchers devoted increasing attention to the study of “active learning,” leading to a robust literature on the topic in the scholarship of teaching and learning. Meanwhile, during largely the same period, political theorists discovered the radical philosophy of Giorgio Agamben, which soon after began to ripple through more radical forms of philosophy of education. While both the SoTL works on active learning and writings of “Agambenian” philosophers of education have offered (...) new insights into their respective fields, active learning has not yet received a systematic philosophical reflection and the community of Agambenian philosophy of education has not yet been systematized. This article addresses both gaps, first through an outline of existing Agambenian approaches to the philosophy of education and second by theorizing active learning as a form of “destituent potential.” The systematic reflection on the three threads of Agambenian philosophy of education—whatever, potentiality, and study—offers an introduction to less familiar readers, and the second section offers a model for how philosophical concepts can become theoretical tools for SoTL analysis. (shrink)

There are two ways that philosophy could transform a life to make it substantially more meaningful: on the one hand, philosophical enquiry might reveal other activities that would make life meaningful, enabling a philosopher (or others) to live meaningfully as a result of the enquiry, while, on the other hand, it might be that doing philosophy is in itself one way to make the philosopher's life notably meaningful. I explore the latter path. I argue against views of meaning (...) in life entailing that philosophy could not itself be particularly meaningful or only rarely could be, after which I critically reflect on a variety of respects in which philosophical reflection, either by its own nature or if undertaken in some familiar ways, would plausibly enhance the meaning in the philosopher's life. In particular, I critically discuss views of Bertrand Russell, Joe Mintoff, and Neil Levy that purport to explain how philosophy itself confers meaningfulness, contending that their explanations are not as comprehensive as my own. (shrink)

Santayana the Philosopher: Philosophy as a Form of Life highlights the far-ranging nuances of Santayana’s philosophical system, while also discussing his ever-present concern for contemporary human affairs. Santayana understood the activity of philosophy in a Greek manner, as a form of life, but his interests always included the perennial philosophical questions and how they related to the present.

The autor undertakes reflection on philosophy in context of Ludwig Wittgenstein statement that “the work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose”. He points out that it is a kind of activity that is specific for human beings and has a moral dimension.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sikh Philosophy as a Philosophy-of-PracticeMonika Kirloskar-Steinbach (bio)Some recent publications on Indian philosophy argue that the colonial narrative about the philosophical traditions from the subcontinent was erroneous. It wrongly suggested that the erstwhile Brahmanic thought embodied by the darśanas was an exhaustive representation of philosophical activity on the subcontinent and that this activity came to a grinding halt with the onset of European modernity. In (...) an attempt at rectifying this story, one path proposed by philosopher Vrinda Dalmiya (Dalmiya 2016, p. 125) is to cognize and fix the "epistemophilic excesses" in the field, that is, the obsessive compulsion in conventional academic philosophy to engage in theory for theory's sake. In the study of Indian philosophy, this malady manifests as the practice of channeling philosophical analysis solely through a darśanic framing. This monofocal lens, however, is unable to reflect either the diversity of practices on the ground or values like intellectual freedom that drive some such practices.Arvind-Pal Mandair's Sikh Philosophy: Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing World (Bloomsbury, 2022), discussed here in this forum, speaks to these concerns and offers a possible way forward. Sikh Philosophy advocates a liminal perspective from which to engage with the set of philosophical practices that emanated on the subcontinent around the figure of Guru Nanak (1469–1539) and the teachings of the Sikh gurus (gurmat). In the first part of my response, I will bring into this conversation Mandair's philosophical orientation to ask whether and how he would contribute to that debate. In the second part, I will project the haumai—one concept doing much of the work in Sikh Philosophy—as one viable path that may be able to contribute to the correction of the epistemophilia currently afflicting a judicious study of world-philosophical traditions.In my limited understanding, Mandair's rendition of the haumai may serve as one component that could be implemented fruitfully in broadening the perspective on Indian philosophy. Mandair observes that a postcolonial sensibility demands a philosophical orientation that does not continue its proprietary attitude toward philosophical positions. I share his view. Instead of parading these positions as possessions that embellish one's academic finesse, they should be considered as ways of navigating life adequately. In doing so, however, the making of such navigational routes may profit from a deliberate reflection on them from different standpoints. [End Page 348]Halting Exclusivist Historiographical Trends in PhilosophyTwo recent handbooks on Indian philosophy reflect the growing awareness that changes in the field's self-understanding are imperative, should imperialist and colonial historiographies that affect this understanding be upturned. Jonardon Ganeri's editorial introduction to the Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy—"Why Indian Philosophy? Why Now?"—argues that students of Indian philosophy should overcome the routinized fixation on the classical darśanas. In developing their accounts, they should factor in the "regionality, vernaculars, subaltern communities, [and] eccentrics" through which "scholarly networks, nodes of philosophical activity, transnational encounters, and contexts of philosophical invention" arose on the subcontinent (Ganeri 2017, p. 2). This broader approach would, in his view, not only be viable in halting the elitist and exclusivist historiography that was the default mode in the recent colonial past. In addition, it would be better equipped to grasp the richness of practices on the ground.Accordingly, his Handbook departs from the handbook genre on one core point: instead of delivering a supposedly comprehensive study of positions that would be indispensable to the reader to understand the intricacies of the field marked out as Indian philosophy, this Handbook chooses to narrate one multi-perspectival story about practices on the subcontinent that were philosophically motivated and are worthy of study today. It suggests through this move that there are other such possible stories that can be narrated. Relatedly, Purushottama Bilimoria and Amy Rayner's History of Indian Philosophy strives as well to make a case to go beyond the darśanic mold. It includes a variety of philosophical positions located on its peripheries. For example, Sikh philosophy, which notably is not included in the Ganeri volume, is incorporated here as a tradition that engaged darśanic practices. Balbinder Singh Bhogal, the author of... (shrink)

This paper focuses on Hector-Neri Castañeda's significant contributions to metaphilosophy. In his 1980 work, On Philosophical Method, Castañeda articulates a unique perspective, characterizing philosophy as fundamentally a dia-philosophical activity. By asserting the supremacy of synthesis over analysis within the metaphilosophical hierarchy, his account provides a purely theoretical defense of philosophical pluralism devoid of any relativistic inclinations. Despite Castañeda's enduring influence and profound impact on ongoing discussions in ontology, logic, and the philosophy of language, his metaphilosophical insights have (...) largely been neglected. In the context of today's increasingly diverse philosophical landscape, this paper posits that Castañeda's pluralist metaphilosophy retains substantial theoretical relevance. (shrink)

The author commences with a discussion on the connection between spiritual exercises and aestheticism. Acquiring knowledge of a certain privileged sort is the key spiritual exercise is the fundamental activity in what Hadot described as a “return to the self.” The section on philosophy and therapy talks about “spiritual exercise” as a practice of discrimination which leads to a “return to the self” in the form of the self's isolation from the perceptual world. The author then discusses returning (...) oneself to the present moment based on the philosophy of Plutarch and the Buddha. With references from Santiparvan, the author explains philosophy and the ends of life, elucidating that philosophy enables us to see through the pretences of reason, making it possible for us to direct our efforts towards living of a life free of suffering. (shrink)

The concept of person is a primary interest of the contemporary intellectual world. Modern literature, films, theater, theology and philosophy focus their attention increasingly on the meaning of person. The current interests of philosophers can activate and direct their reading of the history of philosophy. The rereading of the history of philosophy with a new interest can lead to new insights and discoveries. Through these insights and discoveries, philosophies of the past come to life in the present (...) and influence the future. One of the tasks of contemporary philosophers is to read and examine philosophies of the past under the light of the current interest in person so that errors of previous philosophers might be avoided and insights of previous philosophers might be assimilated. The rereading, examination and exposition of past philosophers is and must be a community project. Both the vastness of philosophical literature and importance of dialogue, if progress is to be made, necessitate that the project be undertaken by many. This exposition of William Torrey Harris’ philosophy is offered as part of the project. Though Harris’ philosophy has been identified as a personalism, it has not received adequate study as a personalism nor has Harris’ concept of person been sufficiently examined. Of Harris, Nicholas Murray Butler wrote. (shrink)

This article represents an analysis of the Jewish philosophy of the Modern and Contemporary as the holistic phenomenon. In contrast to antiquity and the Middle Ages, when philosophy was a rather marginal part of Jewish thought, in Modern Times Jewish philosophy is formed as a distinct part of the World philosophy. Despite the fact that representatives of Jewish philosophy wrote in different languages and actively participated in the different national schools of philosophy, their work (...) has internal continuity and integrity. The article formulates the following five criteria for belonging to Jewish philosophy: belonging to philosophy itself; reliance on Jewish sources; the addressee of Jewish philosophy is an educated European; intellectual continuity ; working with a set of specific topics, such as monism, ethics and ontology, the significance of behavior and practical life, politics, the problem of man, intelligence, language and hermeneutics of the text, Athens and Jerusalem, dialogism. The article provides a list of the main authors who satisfy these criteria. The central ones can be considered Baruch Spinoza, Moshe Mendelssohn, Shlomo Maimon, German Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Josef Dov Soloveichik, Leo Strauss, Abraham Yehoshua Heshel, Eliezer Berkovich, Emil Fackenheim, Mordechai Kaplan, Emmanuel Levinas. The main conclusion of the article is that by the end of the 20th century Jewish philosophy, continuing both the traditions of classical European philosophy and Judaism, has become an important integral part of Western thought. (shrink)

One of the most traditional ways to teach philosophy in secondary school is a historical approach”, which takes a historicist view of philosophy and uses teaching practice based on teacher-centred lessons and textbook study by students. Only recently a debate on different approaches to teach philosophy is developing, considering the discipline as practical and dialogical activity to be fostered in the classroom. What could mean “doing philosophy” in the classroom from an instructional perspective? What are (...) the premises and constraints which allow the transformation of philosophy from a discipline to a community activity? In this paper a teaching model based on cultural-historical theory is proposed and discussed. The model is composed by three level of specification of the activity, from lower to higher, which correspond to three different analysis plans of the philosophical practice in an instructional context. Each level is composed by seven fundamental dimensions which highlight the meanings, the constraints, and the tools implied and developed in philosophizing as socio-cultural activity. Finally, if and how Philosophy for Children should be considered an activity respondent to the model and its educational aims is discussed. (shrink)

My subject today is the philosophical significance of the concept of activity. I shall not be talking about philosophical consequences of empirical work done by activity theorists; there are no doubt many such consequences, but they are not my subject. I want to ask whether activity theory incorporates a fundamental philosophical vision. The activity approach obviously represents a certain way of seeing human subjects and their relation to the world. To what extent does this perspective cast (...) light on central questions of philosophy? I shall focus on the work of Eval'd Il'enkov, a philosopher whose ideas are sometimes represented as expressing the distinctive philosophical premises of the activity approach. Il'enkov is not, of course, the only thinker one might cast as a "philosopher of activity," but his association with A.N. Leont'ev makes his work the obvious starting point for an exploration of the philosophical dimensions of activity theory. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the issue of the meaning to be attributed to our talk of Korean philosophy. Of course, the answer to all the questions that can be raised concerning this issue depends on our conception of philosophy. I start by claiming that philosophy should be an ars vivendi aiming at making our life worth living. Drawing on Socrates’s saying that the unexamined life is not worth living, I try to show that (...) philosophical inquiry has to start with the reflection upon the belief-system underpinning our way of life. Through this reflective activity we are inevitably led to tackle the problem of cultural identity constituted by such belief system; there is no belief-system that is not culturally conditioned. Korean philosophy is an ongoing endeavor of the Korean people to renew their cultural identity—by way of philosophical reflection upon their cultural identity. (shrink)

This article addresses the question how philosophy should be evaluated in a research-grant funding environment. It offers a new conception of philosophy that is inclusive and builds on familiar elements of professional, philosophical practice. Philosophy systematically questions the questions we ask, the concepts we use, and the values we hold. Its product is therefore rarely conclusive but can be embodied in everything we do. This is typical of explorative research and differentiates it from exploitative research, which constitutes (...) the bulk of funded research activity. This article argues that exploratory research is crucial for long-term progress and requires a distinct evaluative regime. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to discuss Socrates’ idea of philosophy asa service to the god. First the article investigates why Chaerephon wentto Delphi and why he asked Pythia the famous question concerningSocrates. The investigation provides a basis for distinguishing two majorperiods in his activity. The one preceding the Delphic oracle consists inconducting inquiries in a group of closest friends. The one following theDelphic oracle consist in addressing a much larger audience. An analysisof both periods suggests (...) that the oracle from Delphi greatly affectedSocrates’ relations with other Athenians. While the present article dealsalso with the issue of Socrates’ daimonion, it hypothesizes that the voiceof daimonion and the voice of Pythia could be regarded as Apollo’sinterventions. (shrink)

The academy is in a mess. The cultural theorist Bill Readings claimed that it is in ruins, while the political scientist Michael Oakeshott suggested that it has all but ceased to exist. At the very least, we might argue that the current financial squeeze has distorted the University into a shape that would be all but unrecognizable to Oakeshott and others writing in the 1950s and 1960s. I will begin this paper by tracing the development of the modern Enlightenment University (...) over the past 200 years from its roots in late 18th century Berlin to its current predicament. I will then turn my attention to the introduction during the 1990s of nursing education into the University, and examine the particular difficulties and tensions encountered at the interface between a professional practice and an academic discipline. Finally, I will propose philosophy as a way of dwelling in the ruins of the Enlightenment University and of reconciling the corporate demands of the University with the obligations of the nursing profession. (shrink)

Santayana the Philosopher: Philosophy as a Form of Life highlights the far-ranging nuances of Santayana’s philosophical system, while also discussing his ever-present concern for contemporary human affairs. Santayana understood the activity of philosophy in a Greek manner, as a form of life, but his interests always included the perennial philosophical questions and how they related to the present.

The necessity of reconsidering and rethinking the aesthetics of a literary genre is not a novelty. Now that the traditional distinction between argumentative theory patterns and narrative styles of thinking has blurred, the relationship between philosophy and literature raises a principal question: the definition of philosophy itself and of philosophical activity. Modern literature, and in particular the novel of the last century, embodies a polyphonic, complex cognitive enterprise which includes both original uses of language and sophisticated patterns (...) of moral reflection. Modern literature thus represents a new model of paradigmatic thinking for philosophical activity, and both philosophy and literature can be.. (shrink)

RESUMO: O objetivo deste artigo é indagar de que maneira a filosofia pode ser compreendida como um ato de resistência. Deleuze introduz essa tese, ao aproximar a filosofia da arte, porquanto ambas são atos de criação. Nesse sentido, o método filosófico de Bergson - a intuição - já indica um tipo de atividade filosófica que se caracteriza, antes de tudo, pela criação de conceitos. Ora, como é que um conceito filosófico pode constituir um ato de resistência? Para responder a essa (...) questão, retomamos uma análise sobre a relação entre o método de intuição e a criação artística, seguida da interpretação deleuziana acerca do que significa ter uma ideia. Contudo, a passagem da ideia ao ato de resistência exige uma transposição do plano teórico para o plano concreto. Com esse intuito, focalizamos um exemplo sugerido pela filosofia de Bergson: a ideia de um possível retorno à vida simples. Isso nos permitirá avaliar até que ponto uma ideia filosófica pode ser confrontada com a realidade no mundo atual e, nesse sentido, entendida como um ato de resistência. ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is to ask how philosophy can be understood as an act of resistance. Deleuze introduces this thesis approaching philosophy to art, because both of them are acts of creation. In this sense, the philosophical method of Bergson - intuition - already indicates a kind of philosophical activity which is characterized above all by the creation of concepts. So how could a philosophical concept be an act of resistance? To answer this question, we return to an analysis of the relationship between intuition method and artistic creation, forward by Deleuze’s interpretation of what it means to have an idea. However, the passage from idea to the act of resistance requires a transposition of the theoretical field to the concrete field. With this purpose, we focus on an example suggested by the philosophy of Bergson: the idea of a possible return to the simple life. This will allow us to evaluate the extent to which an idea can be confronted with the reality in today’s world and, accordingly, be understood as an act of resistance. (shrink)

It is often observed that there is little or no moral philosophy in classical Indian Buddhist thought. This is sometimes believed to be surprising since obviously there is an ethical teaching in Buddhism and clearly there are other forms of Buddhist philosophy. In my view, there is something that can plausibly be called moral philosophy in Indian Buddhism, but it is not quite what many people have expected because they have approached the issue from a specific understanding (...) of philosophy that is too limited. I propose to defend this interpretation by reshaping Mark Siderits’ concept of fusion philosophy. The fusion I will propose reveals a form of moral philosophy that may be called self-cultivation philosophy. I will argue that this was a common activity in ancient Chinese, Greek and Indian cultures—including especially early Buddhist thought and practice. (shrink)

I argue that the reception of Hegel in the sub-field of history and philosophy of science has been in part impeded by a misunderstanding of his mature metaphilosophical views. I take Alan Richardson’s influential account of the rise of scientific philosophy as an illustration of such misunderstanding, I argue that the mature Hegel’s metaphilosophical views place him much closer to the philosophers who are commonly taken as paradigms of scientific philosophy than it is commonly thought. Hegel is (...) commonly presented as someone who conceived of philosophy as a science that relied on the solitary genius of the individual thinker, and as a science whose propositions could not and should not be made accessible to “the common people”. Against this view, I argue that Hegel in fact thought that philosophy was a thoroughly anti-individualistic activity, and that he emphasized the importance of the intersubjective accessibility of philosophical discourse. I argue that when we carefully reconstruct Hegel’s reasons for his break with Schelling, and if we pay close attention to his explicit metaphilosophical pronouncements, we can see that he in fact adhered to what I call a “proto-modernist” conception of philosophy as a science. I conclude by pointing out how the mischaracterization of Hegel has served to obscure the existence of a strand of scientific philosophy that emerged by way of an immanent critique of Hegel, namely Marxist philosophy. (shrink)

The concept of person is a primary interest of the contemporary intellectual world. Modern literature, films, theater, theology and philosophy focus their attention increasingly on the meaning of person. The current interests of philosophers can activate and direct their reading of the history of philosophy. The rereading of the history of philosophy with a new interest can lead to new insights and discoveries. Through these insights and discoveries, philosophies of the past come to life in the present (...) and influence the future. One of the tasks of contemporary philosophers is to read and examine philosophies of the past under the light of the current interest in person so that errors of previous philosophers might be avoided and insights of previous philosophers might be assimilated. The rereading, examination and exposition of past philosophers is and must be a community project. Both the vastness of philosophical literature and importance of dialogue, if progress is to be made, necessitate that the project be undertaken by many. This exposition of William Torrey Harris’ philosophy is offered as part of the project. Though Harris’ philosophy has been identified as a personalism, it has not received adequate study as a personalism nor has Harris’ concept of person been sufficiently examined. Of Harris, Nicholas Murray Butler wrote. (shrink)

This chapter is devoted to the most influential and important Soviet philosopher of the post-Stalin era: Evald Vasilevich Ilyenkov. Ilyenkov burst on the scene in the early 1950s, arguing that Ilyenkov should be understood, not as a meta-science concerned to formulate the most general laws of being, but as “the science of thought.” The chapter explores how Ilyenkov developed this idea, beginning with the controversial Ilyenkov-Korovikov theses and his unpublished “phantasmagoria,” “The Cosmology of Spirit.” Bakhurst then turns to Ilyenkov’s influential (...) writing on scientific method, which portrays cognition as an “ascent from the abstract to the concrete,” and to his now-famous solution to “the problem of the ideal,” which represents the concept of activity as the key to understanding both the nature of objectively existing ideal forms and the possibility of human minds. Bakhurst shows how Ilyenkov’s views on these issues inform his critique of scientism and positivism in Soviet thought and inspire his distinctive conception of education, exemplified by his contribution to Alexander Meshcheryakov’s work on the education of blind-deaf children. Although Ilyenkov styled himself as a dialectical materialist and a Leninist, his ideas were in tension with orthodox Soviet philosophy and he was often in trouble with the Soviet philosophical establishment, which found it hard to tolerate what it saw as Ilyenkov’s dalliance with idealism as well as his call for the cultivation of critical, free, creative thinkers. Bakhurst concludes by reflecting on the many crises Ilyenkov experienced during his career, exploring how he was frequently subject to criticism and persecution. This, combined with his disappointment over the suppression of the Prague Spring, eventually led to his untimely death by his own hand in March 1979. (shrink)

Intersubjectivity refers to one person’s awareness in relation to another person’s awareness. It is key to well-being and human development. From infancy to adulthood, human interactions ceaselessly contribute to the flourishing or impairment of intersubjectivity. In this work, we first describe intersubjectivity as a hallmark of quality dyadic processes. Then, using parent-child relationship as an example, we propose a dyadic active inference model to elucidate an inverse relation between stress and intersubjectivity. We postulate that impaired intersubjectivity is a manifestation of (...) underlying problems of deficient relational benevolence, misattributing another person’s intentions, and neglecting the effects of one’s own actions on the other person. These problems can exacerbate stress due to excessive variational free energy in a person’s active inference engine when that person feels threatened and holds on to his/her invalid beliefs. In support of this dyadic model, we briefly describe relevant neuroimaging literature to elucidate brain networks underlying the effects of an intersubjectivity-oriented parenting intervention on parenting stress. Using the active inference dyadic model, we identified critical interventional strategies necessary to rectify these problems and hereby developed a coding system in reference to these strategies. In a theory-guided quantitative review, we used this coding system to code 35 clinical trials of parenting interventions published between 2016 and 2020, based on PubMed database, to predict their efficacy for reducing parenting stress. The results of this theory-guided analysis corroborated our hypothesis that parenting intervention can effectively reduce parenting stress if the intervention is designed to mitigate the problems of deficient relational benevolence, under-coupling, and over-mentalizing. We integrated our work with several dyadic concepts identified in the literature. Finally, inspired by Arya Nagarjuna’s Buddhist Madhyamaka Philosophy, we described abstract expressions of Dependent Origination as a relational worldview to reflect on the normality, impairment, and rehabilitation of intersubjectivity. (shrink)

When discussing philosophical hermeneutics, the word »philosophical« is not just an ordinary attribute. Above all, it denotes the very activity of philosophy itself, which in itself discloses the hermeneutic question of the possibility of truth. The development of the 20th century philosophical hermeneutics thus depends on the philosophy’s historical facing the question of the possibility of its immanent truth. This »historical« dimension is not something extrinsic to philosophy, but rather an intrinsic quality of the possibility of (...) philosophical thinking itself, which implies the basic presupposition of philosophical hermeneutics we’re here trying to indicate and develop. We therefore accept in advance the historical criterion of philosophical thinking. (shrink)