This paper approaches philosophical counseling practice from the idea that philosophy itself is primarily a way of living and only secondarily a subject matter to be grasped and comprehended. Three things are shown to follow from this view: first, charging a fee for access to this practice is inimical to the practice itself; secondly, contrary to scientific ‘objectivity’ as the means to truthspeaking, this view of philosophy calls for a consciously articulated autobiographical expression or personal admission on the part (...) of the philosophical practitioner; and, finally, an understanding of philosophical counseling practice emerges from this view of philosophy that is depicted as naturally occurring therapeutic interacting. (shrink)

Critiques existing theoretical approaches and practices of philosophical counseling and presents a new model.

Philosophical counseling is an educational activity in which philosophers engage in dialogue with clients who wish to address questions or manage problems that arise during the course of everyday life. This chapter offers three contrasting perspectives on the question of what philosophical counselors do: first, an institutional scope of practice for philosophical counseling; second, an anecdotal list of common issues for which clients seek philosophical counseling; and third, a heterogeneous set of views by several pioneers of (...) philosophical counseling. From what we have seen thus far, it may already be clear that there exist both parallels and anti‐parallels between philosophical counseling and psychotherapy. First and foremost, anyone who wants to become a philosophical counselor should earn an accredited graduate degree in philosophy in whichever area of specialization captures their interest. (shrink)

In this paper, we deal with the issue of contradictory beliefs, particularly with regard to Philosophical Counseling: both voices from the philosophical tradition (with no claim of being exhaustive!) and concepts developed by philosophical practitioners will be considered, in order to make clear what a wide range of resources for dealing with contradictions is available to the philosopher who may wish to engage in Philosophical Counseling. Among the philosophical practitioners, we devote special consideration to Ben (...) Mijuskovic and Gerd Achenbach, and this for two main reasons: first, because the issue of contradiction plays a central role in their concept of Philosophical Counseling and, accordingly, it is given special consideration in their writings; second, because their approaches to Philosophical Counseling are so different that by looking at them one can get an impression of the variety of the positions one can adopt in Philosophical Counseling with respect to the issue of contradiction. (shrink)

This paper completes an argument that the problem of moral distress offers philosophical counselors an opportunity to do work that is both socially useful and philosophically interesting in its own right. A previous Philosophical Practice article answered the question, What's Philosophical About Moral Distress? by conceptualizing it as a phenomenon that arises within a moral worldview (Matchett 2018). The present paper investigates ways in which a philosophical counseling response to moral distress might differ from the strategies (...) deployed by the nursing profession to date. Though they are often quite subtle, the presence of some differences opens the possibility that philosophical counseling might be more effective than those strategies; in addition to helping individual nurses feel better, this could strengthen the nursing profession's efforts to mitigate nursing shortages and enhance quality of patient care. Though case studies are necessary to support these claims, there are reasons to think they are warranted. (shrink)

This commentary shows how philosophical counseling offers an alternative way for consultants to facilitate "closure" in bioethical disputes.

Notwithstanding recent successes of philosophical counseling, which appear to be leading to its legitimization as a professional practice in America and abroad, many forces concen to condition its emergent structure and function. This paper briefly elucidates some of the influences to which philosophical counseling is subject, that lie beyond its unilateral control. These include its portayal by the media to the public, its scope of practice, its relations with psychology and psychiatry, its foreseeable effects in particular cases, and (...) its perception by (and of) analytical philosophy. (shrink)

Various approaches and methods are used in philosophical counselling. Two main trends can be observed: the first is the use of contemplative methods and the second constitutes approaches based on dialogical critical thinking. The author defends the idea that developing philosophical counselling on the basis of critical thinking presupposes that it is possible for counsellor and client to hold a philosophical dialogue where the relationship is one of expert/lay person. J. Šulavík has described this relationship (...) in greater detail. In the Socratic model, the philosopher and the lay person hold a dialogue whereby they ascertain opinions via inductive comparison and by defining things, creating a shared concept. While the Platonic and Enlightenment models were grounded in the authority of the expert philosopher, in the Socratic and postmodern models, the expert philosopher loses the power to manipulate those who know “less”. Lay people are not passive consumers of a particular “optimal” philosophy but through their own “philosophising” create philosophy and tailor it for themselves. While philosophising, therefore, the philosopher does not take on the role of “producer” of philosophy but of “adviser” (consultant). It is therefore supposed that people have a general need for philosophy and that ultimately they should create and reflect upon their own philosophy. (shrink)

The last two and a half decades has seen the emergence of philosophical counseling. While it is practiced in many countries comparatively little has been said on its general character. In this paper I will seek to understand philosophical counseling by exploring its points of convergence to and deviation from its complimentary parts – philosophy and counseling. The practical and applied orientation of philosophical counseling seems worlds apart from what many consider to exemplify philosophy – theoretical, intellectual (...) and abstract concern with foundational questions. Given this it is worth exploring how philosophical counseling coincides with what is understood in academic circles as philosophy. On the other hand, the field of counseling has largely been the domain of psychology. Given the influence and orientation of the practice it would seem likely that philosophical counseling would be significantly different from the common conception of psychological counseling, but in what ways? Understanding how the practice lies in relation to the discipline of philosophy and psychological counseling will go some way to grasping its nature. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling, Ran Lahav and others claim, helps clients deepen their philosophical self‐understanding. The counsellor's role is the minimalist one of providing the client with the philosophical tools needed for reflective self‐evaluation. Respect for the client's autonomy entails refraining from intervening with substantive moral criticism, theories, and methods; the client's ways of working out fundamental questions like ‘Who am I and what do I really want?’cannot be assessed by the counsellor in terms of their truth‐value, but (...) only in terms of whether they reflect the client's autonomous choice to express him/herself in a certain way. I argue that this view, which is informed by an anti‐realist account of self and life‐history, undermines the distinction between self‐knowledge and self‐deception. Once interpretive and criteriological free rein is given to the client, and once personal, pragmatic and aesthetic considerations take precedence over truth‐value, then the way is left open to clients to generate the most morally convenient self‐interpretation to suit their current needs. I defend the view that truth matters in philosophical counselling; more specifically, that there is a basic distinction between true and false forms of self‐understanding. To do this, I offer a broadly realist account of self and reflective self‐evaluation. If this is right, then philosophical counsellors shoulder a significant burden of responsibility in helping their clients achieve an accurate, defensible, action‐guiding and truth‐oriented self‐understanding. (shrink)

The main aim of this essay is to open up an area of philosophical counseling that may be described as philosophical counseling for philosophers, where philosophical disabilities or impairments can be identified and treated. This is done by going to the field of mental imagery, which is the context in which the author presents his own imagery impairments and the negative impact they have had on his work in philosophy. The author also tries to show how attending (...) to differences in imaging ablity can help to settle such classic disputes in philosophy as that between Locke and Berkeley on abstract general ideas. (shrink)

I offer a method for philosophical counseling that is contrasted with Marinoffs. This version of philosophical counseling is primarily epistemic and suggests therapy as the examination of the justification of a client's beliefs, with a goal of enabling the client to change belief systems if the client so chooses.

According to Kuhn a new scientific discipline comes into existence when a group of scientists adopt a common paradigm within which to conduct research. The adoption of this paradigm senes to focus the attention of the group’s members on a common explanatory task-at-hand and leads them to adopt similar methods and aims, thus making possible the standard puzzle solving activities that allow normal science to advance rapidly. However, Kuhn argues, in pre-paradigm periods and during revolutionary phases, scientists do not engage (...) in such singleminded, puzzle-solving behavior, as the paradigm itself is put into question. Instead, during these periods, they become at least partially self-reflective in that they become interested in understanding the nature of their discipline and its relationships to other disciplines. In this paper, I argue that Philosophical Counseling is in a pre-paradigm period and is in need of a paradigm centered definition if it is to develop an identity and advance rapidly. In an Aristotelian mood, I seek this definition though an examination of the related fiends of psychotherapy and pastoral counseling. (shrink)

One promising form of philosophical practice is to conduct workshops on philosophical counseling for counselors. Since licensed professionals, such as Marriage and Family Counselors and Licensed Clinical Social Workers sometimes confront situations that raise philosophical issues and usually have a philosophical perspective that informs their practice, they could profit from a workshop on philosophical counseling; the workshop also qualifies for continuing education units (CEUs) that are typically required to renew their licenses. This paper describes the (...) principal purposes of a workshop for counselors, the structure of two such workshops, and suggestions for improvement of future workshops. (shrink)

The practice of ‘Philosophical Counselling’ (henceforth ‘PC’) is growing. But what exactly is PC? The variety of attempts to define PC can be summarised in terms of three overlapping sets of opposites: practical versus theoretical definitions; monistic versus pluralistic definitions; and substantive versus antinomous definitions. ‘Practical’ definitions of PC include descriptive accounts of its actual practice. ‘Theoretical’ definitions exclude such accounts. ‘Monistic definitions’ refers to definitions of PC that define it in terms of the work of one specific (...) philosopher or approach in philosophy. ‘Pluralistic’ definitions draw on the work of a variety of philosophers or approaches. ‘Substantive’ definitions are definitions that purport to say what PC is, while ‘antinomous’ definitions of PC say what it is not . My aim is not to define PC definitively. The aim of this article is rather to: (i) provide an overview of the wide variety of efforts to define PC; and, (ii) briefly suggest a preliminary understanding of PC that seems to cover most of the other definitions thereof. For David Fourie (1946-2013). (shrink)

Many philosophical counselors seem to be counselors who use or point to phil­osophical texts or use abstract indeed logical or rational methods when working with a client. I want to introduce the idea of a counseling philosopher, who uses the client’s own concrete experiences as the basis for philosophizing with the client about the nature of the client’s dilemma - using ‘the between’ (Buber) as that special creative space where one em­ploys the art of philosophizing to the unique situation. (...) Otherwise, the particularity of that client gets subsumed under theory or methods, much like what has happened in psychology and which gave rise to Achenbach’s criticisms of psychology/psychiatry. The dialogical of which Buber and Friedman speak is the give and take between client and counseling philosopher of understanding and expanding perceptions confirmed through the actual relationship. Philosophy as an art (and not a method) helps us restore the trust Buber talks about which allows us to engage the world directly and not through categories of thought grounded in psychological or philosophical texts and theories. (shrink)

There is currently a movement advocating “philosophical counseling.” My own development as a philosopher, then a human services professional, then a psychoanalyst, charts how I came to believe that philosophical training was underrated, and training in psychology was overrated, as an appropriate intellectual foundation for psychotherapy. However, these fields are not distinct. Laws governing the practice of psychology are arrogant in their scope, and make virtually everything out to be the practice of psychology. The scope and nature of (...) philosophy isn’t any clearer. The kind of thinking encouraged in psychology is liable to be exactly the wrong sort of thing for training therapists. Unfortunately, philosophers are liable to not be good therapists either. The lack of neat distinctions between philosophical counseling and psychotherapy provides an argument against a monopoly on therapy-like activities by psychologists. On the liberal side this is an argument in favor of freedom of speech, of belief, and trade, for the applied philosopher. On the conservative side, it may also be an argument for certification (as opposed to licensure) for both psychologists and philosophers, in the interest of protecting the vulnerable by promoting truthful self-representation. (shrink)

This essence is the philosophy of knowledge for personal and social well-being aspects of the contribution. In the Introduction to "What is philosophical counseling practice or philosophy?", I described the ancient philosophy has been caring for the soul and tradition of self, in the last twenty-five years has been the revitalization of philosophers and others up. "Philosophy of psychological analysis," "philosophical counseling hotline", and "personal well-being and Philosophy Cafe" is a contemporary German philosopher Gerd B. Achenbach, British theologian (...) Chad Varah, and the French philosopher Marc Sautet these ideas for specific application situation. In the "philosophy of charity", I argue, the possibility for all practical philosophy, the charity as a necessary test of suspicion. (shrink)

Outlined are several ways in which philosophical knowledge can contribute to personal and social well-being. In the introduction, "What is Philosophical Practice, Counseling, and Psychoanalysis" I describe how the ancient philosophical tradition of care for the soul or self has been revived among philosophers and others in the last twenty-five years. The sections "The Philosophical Counseling Hotline" and "Personal Well-being and the Philosophical Café '" are accounts of specific applications of ideas of the contemporary German (...) philosopher Gerd B. Achenbach, the founder of the international philosophical practice movement. In the conclusion "Philosophical Benevolence" I argue for benevolence as a skeptical touchstone for philosophy in practice. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I develop a theory of philosophical counseling and teaching. It is the outcome of my holding the tension of my practical and theoretical viewing points. Holding the tension is a term which Maurice Friedman coined to counter the idea of dichotomous either/or thinking and any attempt to synthesize thought into unity or fusion. ;This dissertation focuses on Buber's notion of the dialogical, which implies acknowledging the other's otherness. Buber's notion of other is diametrically opposed to the (...) post-modern notion of other. The difference lies in the fact that Buber's notion of the not-I is rooted in trust, whereas the post-modern notion of denial and exclusion is rooted in distrust. ;This difference is of great importance, especially as it affects fields like counseling and teaching. In both counseling and teaching, it is important to be able to acknowledge the other as other, and to be able to meet the other while holding one's own ground. Yet, one can only do so when one can trust the other's otherness through an act of implicitly understanding his otherness. In any field which affects learning and teaching, we deal with different styles of discourse. It is my contention that a topic-centered discourse style distrusts what is implicitly understood and requires that it be made explicit. It cannot be relied upon for any kind of accuracy or coherence. Topic-associating trusts and relies on what is implicitly understood. In my work as both philosophical counselor and teacher I try to restore the notion of working on the basis of understood trust, and on the basis of responding to people's otherness. ;In this dissertation I present illustrations of my work as philosophical counselor and as an instructor in the Upward Bound College Prep Academy at the University of Illinois. These are examples of actively bringing trust back into the interaction between teacher/student or counselor/counselee. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A new phenomenon in the philosophical discipline, philosophical practice—or counselling—is introduced to the reader through the description of three different approaches to philosophical practice. What is common to these approaches is that an academically trained philosopher philosophises together with a ‘sane’person—the visitor—on questions and problems relevant to the visitor. The essential difference between this and psychological counselling is that philosophers do not use therapeutic methods or make diagnoses. The philosophical practitioner triggers in his (...) dialogue partner a didactic philosophical process, which enables the visitor to become an authentic thinker and eventually to arrive at philosophical answers by her/himself. The effectiveness of the language used in philosophical practice is not so much in applying philosophical ideas or theories as in the philosophical knowledge, skills and attitudes attained by the visitor. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling is an approach that aims to assist people to deal with life events in an effective manner. As such, it is of interest to nurses who are concerned with helping clients who require assistance effectively to manage life events. The approach utilizes both ancient and contemporary philosophical promises and theories. On the promise side, it offers the belief that philosophy can be concerned with providing answers to the question of how people ought to live a (...) good or healthy life. On the theory side, it offers the belief that philosophical inquiry and theory can help people towards such answers. Thus the theory and practice of philosophical counselling is relevant to nurses whose practice aims to promote in their clients a good or healthy lifestyle. The practice of philosophical counselling, in a substance abuse centre, will be explored to demonstrate the theory and methods of the approach. (shrink)

Self-understanding is to a great extent defined by narrative: who we are as human beings is determined by the stories we, and others, tell about ourselves. Yet many are unable to compose coherent personal narratives, as their experiences do not fall within the scope of an accepted conceptual framework. Survivors of trauma are particularly apt to fall into this “narrative rift,” where there can be no words to describe, and hence can be no assimilation of, their experiences. Using the example (...) of child sexual abuse, and drawing on the work of Bass, Spence, Schafer, and Guignon, I propose an examination of the nature of narrative fragmentation itself. Philosophical counselling may succeed where psychoanalysis might not: for where the latter has theoretical commitments to specific narratives, the former, through its reluctance to force epistemological or metaphysical assumptions on the narrator, may well facilitate a more comprehensive self-understanding. (shrink)

In “A General Framework for Philosophical Counseling,” Hakam AI-Shawi argues that “philosophical counseling must... avoid relyingon any first-order philosophical assumptions.” In this light, I explore whether and to what extent an applied Heideggerian approach to the amelioration of human life - in this case, Daseinsanalysis - satisfies this criterion. I focus on the orienting reality of a mortal, interpreting questioner dwelling in particular circumstances. Such an approach, as I construe it here, seems largely compatible with AI-Shawi’s understanding (...) of what can properly count as philosophical counselling. (shrink)

In this paper I will move away from what has become the "traditional" approach to writing and thinking about philosophical counseling - I will not compare and contrast the virtues of the philosophical and psychological paradigms, nor will I attempt to defend philosophical counseling against its critics. Instead, I will use the methods and practices employed by philosophical counselors as a paradigm to inform and govern another philosophical practice, that is, clinical medical ethics. I will (...) show that clinical ethics and philosophical counseling share many common attributes, and argue that each discipline has much to offer to the other. (shrink)

This multi-faceted collection of women's perspectives on the renaissance in philosophical practices provides an international overview on the professional practice of philosophical counseling as rooted in the ancient philosophical discipline of life and its essential difference from modern mainstream philosophy.

This multi-faceted collection of women's perspectives on the renaissance in philosophical practices provides an international overview on the professional practice of philosophical counseling as rooted in the ancient philosophical discipline of life and its essential difference from modern mainstream philosophy.

This article aims at developing a phronesis-oriented philosophical counselling, with a focus on the idea of semantic sentiment. In Section 1, we elucidate the characteristics of phronesis-oriented approach to philosophical counselling and state our reason for adopting this approach. In Section 2, we consider three visions of phronesis-oriented philosophical counselling, i.e., the Socratic vision, the Platonic vision, and the skill-based vision, and argue for the third vision. In Sections 3 and 4, we show how (...) to practice such phronesis-oriented philosophical counselling by introducing, exploring, and applying the idea of semantic sentiment. (shrink)

The recent literature, conference and internet discussions about philosophical counseling (PC) show that it is in a state of confusion as to its definition, area of expertise and purpose. The present paper analyzes these definitions showing their limitations as well as their strong points. A proposal for a more adequate definition is then given which recommends changing the name of “Philosophical Counseling” to “Philosophy Educator and Advisor.” It is also shown that humanism contains many of the elements of (...) the definitions of PC. An analysis of emotion, and specifically anger, is then given to show its implications for PC and to exemplify the definition of PC here proposed. (shrink)

A detailed discussion of issues in philosophical counseling for the practitioner and general public.

Though there has been interest in philosophical counselling in South Africa since at least the 1990s little has been accomplished by way of formalizing and developing the practice into a profession. We ask what would be required for it to become a fully-fledged profession? We argue that in order to count as a profession, a practice must meet certain normative, cognitive, and organizational criteria, but that philosophical counselling in South Africa falls short both cognitively and organizationally. (...) This has implications for individual philosophical practitioners, it would seem, who cannot any longer consider themselves professionals. We argue that being a professional is not contingent on belonging to an established profession, but rather that to claim to be a professional is to claim that one can be trusted because one has the client’s good at heart. Exploring the idea of trust highlights again, though this time from an ethical rather than from a sociological perspective, that there is an urgent need to fill the cognitive and organizational gap that exists in South Africa. We propose that in order to facilitate the professionalization of philosophical counselling in South Africa, we should adopt an approach that focuses on the training of philosophical counsellors in the hopes that an organizational component will grow out of this rather than following previous attempts to put organizations first. (shrink)

Hume claims that judgment is the active device through which beliefs influence emotions. Without such a device, Hume reasons that beliefs and emotions would not in­teract at all, because beliefs are always about ideas while emotions are reactions to events in the world. Judgment is the link between the theoretical and the applied aspects of the human being, and is, if Hume is right, crucial for any system of philosophical counseling to be successful. No client would attempt to modify (...) his or her beliefs, or reflect on the thoughts of philosophers, without some expectation of an emotional payoff. The counseling process hinges on a link between reason and the emotions, but what is the nature of this link? Since judgment is itself (if we are lucky) a primarily rational process, the question of the connection between reason and the emotions seems to be left unanswered. The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between reason and the emotions by taking judgment to be judgment of truth or falsity. Once a belief is deemed to be true by the client, an assessment is made as to how this truth will affect the client’s well being. I argue that this is true even if the client is severely depressed or believes that he/she does not deserve good treatment or good fortune, or seems otherwise unconcerned with his/her well being. If the truth is judged to be a threat to the well being of the client, an emotional reaction ensues. Likewise, if the truth is judged to be a benefit to the client, an emotional reaction will occur. I argue further that even though different truths will be taken as either benefits or threats depending on the client, the ultimate interpretation of the true statement as either benefit or threat will automatically generate an emotional response. If this ontology is correct, then the philosophical counselor will take as his/her primary role 1) a practitioner of epistemology (determining when beliefs are justified and true) and 2) a trainer in interpretation (determining when beliefs are to be interpreted as blessings or threats.). (shrink)

현대 사회에서 일중독 증세가 있는 사회 구성원들이 많아지고 있다. 이것은 성과주의라는 가치가 시대적인 삶의 흐름이 되어가고 있음을 의미할 수 있다. 인간이 자유롭고 독립적인 주체로 살아가는 데 일은 하나의 중요한 요소이지만, 지나치게 성과주의에 집착하여 일이 자신의 존재를 구속하게 된다면 인간은 자유로운 주체로 살아가기가 힘들 것이다. 마르틴 하이데거(M. Heidegger)는 그의 주저인 『존재와 시간』에서 인간 실존이 ‘비본래성’(Uneigentlichkeit)으로부터 ‘본래성’(Eigentlichkeit)을 찾을 방법을 제시한 바 있다. 누군가가 “무엇을 찾고 있다.”라는 것은 찾고 있는 대상을 잃어버렸다는 것을 의미한다. 즉 본래적 자기를 찾는다는 것은 본래의 자기를 잃어버렸음을 말한다. 이 (...) 논문에서 필자는 일중독을 본래적 자기 존재를 스스로 상실한 채 살아가고 있는 현대인의 비본래적인 모습 중에 하나로 파악할 것이다. 또한 필자는 일중독 증세를 가진 내담자가 처해있는 세계를 분석하고, 철학상담을 통해 내담자가 스스로 본래적 자기를 찾아갈 수 있는지를 살펴보고자 한다. (shrink)

Starting from the four principles of Pólya's problem-solving method, by analogy, in this paper we propose a new method of philosophical counseling. Thus, the objectives of this study are as follows: the review of several methods of philosophical counseling; justifying the need for a new method, which we called the IPAA method; developing the four principles – the principle of identification (I), the principle of planification (P), the principle of application (A) and the principle of assumption (A). In (...) order to achieve these, we took into account the fact that the nature of the philosophical problems faced by the clients of the philosophical counselors, whether they are existential, moral or metaphysical, can be solved on their own. Therefore, we argued that if in the first instance, clients really need the input of the philosophical counselors, as long as the latter uses the IPAA method – a problem-solving method – they can offer clients the opportunity to self-counsel. The novelty of the IPAA method consists in the fact that it offers the client, assisted and guided at the beginning by the counselor, the possibility to carry out the act of counseling outside the office, being empowered to apply the four methodical principles mentioned above. The present study is relevant in that the new IPAA method, a method focused on solving everyday problems, is a useful method for both philosophical counselors, as its application in the office helps them to train the clients in researching, understanding and assuming their own lives, as well as for the clients, because if they are assisted in the first instance by the counselor's expertise, they can independently clarify and solve their daily difficulties. (shrink)