Is Agassi’s philosophy of practical affairs applicable in philosophical practice? Is it recommendable to philosophical practitioners, counselors, or counselees? A critical rational approach like his demands a prior awareness, which participants in practical philosophy programs often miss. That approach is necessary for counseling that is really philosophical, and some of his ideas are inspiring. Yet the problems that interested him and his way of solving or dissolving them on meta-levels, are not always relevant to the counselees’ concerns. His attitude to (...) the opinions, background, and concerns of others, though tolerant, is not recommendable to practitioners who have to take into account the perspectives of participants with other backgrounds, understand their “problem situations” and their “logic.”. (shrink)

Wittgenstein, in his first period, where he adopted a theory of meaning as representation, can be thought to consider language and reality as separated entities. However, in the second period, where the use theory of meaning is put forward, he can be thought to conceive language as something dependent on the human agencies that employ it, as something into which actions are interwoven. So, in his later work, Wittgenstein can be said to consider language as a unit together with reality (...) -as far as the notion of meaning is concerned. In this sense, his two theories of meaning are the opposites of one another. My claim, in this paper, is that the gist of this radical change on Wittgenstein’s position on the connection between language and reality can be found in the private language argument given in Philosophical Investigations. For, reminding that this is a semantic claim, I think, the repudiation of private language in Wittgenstein’s philosophy amounts to the repudiation of the representational relation between language and world -or reality- as distinct entities; and hence, the traditional dichotomy of mind-body or inner-outer which is inherited from Descartes. This, I think, also means the rejection of the traditional distinction of language (as a vehicle of thought) and world as two different realms where skepticism is possible. In parallel with the rejection of this dichotomy, in this paper, by focusing on Wittgenstein’s understanding of meaning by which his overall philosophy is structured, I will examine his rejection of the representational theory of meaning (to avoid skepticism) and evince the effect of it to his later understanding of meaning (or vice versa). I will come to the conclusion that the gist of the radical change in his view on meaning and language can be found in his private language argument. (shrink)

The ArgumentLike many controversies in science, the one between Freud and Jung is overloaded with ad hominem arguments despite the incompatibility of such arguments with the pretensions of both sides to attain scientific ad rem validity. Unlike natural scientists, Freud and Jung regarded their own ad hominem arguments as relevant to general and impersonal truths. They practically legitimized such a use claiming to have a clinical basis for the rejection of the opponent's objections by a de-validating analysis of the opponent's (...) personality as a whole. The argument of this paper is that the de-validating strategy was neither an inevitable psychological outcome of the intricate interpersonal relationships in analytic situations nor the logical consequence of any clinical or scientific psycho-analytical discovery. It followed from the epistemological invalid pretension to have a general theory of mind which could explain by mental analysis the existence of “unreasonable opinions,” and the application of the same principles to the opinion that the theory itself is unreasonable. Such a pretension, apparently specific to mystical traditions in theology and metaphysics, was deeply rooted in the modern epistemological tradition. The paper examines the impact of the different branches of that tradition on Freud and Jung's respective ideologies, theories, and practice, including the ad hominem malpractice. (shrink)

This book discusses the philosophical questions asked by counselees and the philosophical dilemmas faced by counselors in philosophical counseling. It illustrates the role of tacit philosophical assumptions in the creation and resolution of problems, as well as the contribution of philosophical dialogue in overcoming presuppositions.

This multi-faceted collection of women's perspectives on the renaissance in philosophical practices provides an international overview on the professional practice of philosophical counseling as rooted in the ancient philosophical discipline of life and its essential difference from modern mainstream philosophy.