O ponto de partida da Philosophia prima de Hobbes tem como referência a Física e a Metafísica de Aristóteles. O desenvolvimento posterior de sua Philosophia prima, porém, põe em marcha uma crítica da metafísica aristotélica que conduzirá a um remanejamento teórico de uma série de princípios e conceitos herdados da tradição. Considerada em seu conjunto, a filosofia primeira hobbesiana é constituída por uma definição ampla, isto é, a metafísica definida como ciência do ente enquanto ente , (...) sobre a qual duas definições strictu sensu são erigidas: a metafísica como física geral — dizer o ente é dizer o corpo — e a metafísica como representação. Este paper é um esforço no sentido de compreender essas e outras questões concernentes aos estudos hobbesianos sobre a forma como conhecemos o mundo, as coisas e nós mesmos. (shrink)

Ovim se radom želi prikazati polazna osnova Hobbesovog filozofskog mišljenja. Ona je važna jer je prisutna u svim segmentima njegove filozofije – negdje eksplicitno, a negdje implicitno. Tematizirajući o prvoj filozofiji, Hobbes je pokazao svoja osnovna gledišta kojim želi pokazati znatno razlikovanje od Aristotela i skolastike. Inspiriran dostignućima moderne znanosti svoju filozofiju usmjerava prema mehanicizmu i materijalizmu. Napuštajući tradicionalnu metafiziku, koja je u centar zbivanja stavljala bitak, Hobbes pokazuje privrženost logici i epistemologiji. Taj način filozofiranja omogućuje mu drugačije sagleda realnost (...) od onoga kako je bila poimana kod njegovih prethodnika. Hobbes stvarnost objašnjava kao gibajuću materiju koja se najvjerodostojnije razotkriva proučavajući mehaničke zakone. On nije pokazao samo svoje filozofsko razlikovanje spram prethodnika već i spram suvremenika. Osobitu pažnju plijeni njegova kritika Descartesova dualizma koji razdvaja um i tijelo na dvije metafizičke supstancije.The purpose of this paper is to show the starting point of Hobbes’ philosophy, which is important because it is present in all aspects of his philosophy – sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly. In terms of subject of the first philosophy, Hobbes presented his basic views which significantly differ from Aristotle’s and scholasticism. Inspired by the achievements of modern science, he directed his thoughts towards philosophy of mechanicism and materialism. By abandoning traditional metaphysics, which placed the concept of being in the center of attention, he showed great commitment to logic and epistemology. This mode of philosophizing allows him to perceive reality differently than his predecessors. Hobbes explains reality as moving matter which is best disclosed through study of mechanical laws. He not only demonstrated his philosophical distinctions from the predecessors, but also in relation to contemporaries. Particular attention draws his criticism of Descartes’ dualism which separated mind from the body in two metaphysical substances. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz sich mit dem Problem der objektiven Gültigkeit der metaphysischen Erkenntnis in der Wolffschen "Ontologie". Besonders bin ich interessiert an der Problemstellung und Problemlösung, d.h. nicht nur am Begriff der transzendentalen Wahrheit, aber auch am Verhältnis zwischen ihm und dem Begriff der logischen Wahrheit und der Ordnung. Die Begriffe der transzendentalen Wahrheit und der Ordnung gehören zu wichtigsten Begriffen der Wolffschen Philosophie des Seins, die als die Grundlage allen anderen (philosophischen) Wissenschaften gedacht wird. Deshalb kann man sagen, dass der (...) Begriff der transzendentalen Wahrheit ist der echten Grundbegriff der ganzen Philosophie. In dem Aufsatz versuche ich zu zeigen, worin besteht die Wichtigkeit dieses Begriffes und mit ihm verbundenen Konzeption des Seins und der Erkenntnis. Der Aufsatz besteht aus drei Teilen: in der ersten beschäftige ich mich mit dem logischen Begriff der Wahrheit (nominale und reale Definition der Wahrheit), in der zweiten – mit dem Begriff der Ordnung (ordo), in der letzten – mit dem Begriff der transzendentalen Wahrheit. (shrink)

Analisi sistematica delle citazioni, esplicite e implicite, dalla Philosophia prima di Avicenna nel commento di Alberto alla Metafisica. Fra i problemi più ampiamente discussi si ricordano la conoscenza divina, le anime motrici e il dator formarum rispetto ai quali Alberto si discosta da Avicenna appoggiandosi ad Averroè . L'esame condotto permette all'A. di individuare una sostanziale adesione di Alberto all'ontologia avicenniana e un disaccordo con la cosiddetta parte teologica. Nella parte finale dello studio l'A. esamina il De processu (...) universitatis di Alberto, nel quale l'atteggiamento critico nei confronti della parte teologica si attenua. Quest'ultima opera, il cui secondo libro è un commento al Liber de causis, sembra dipendere dalla Summa di Algazel. Secondo l'esame condotto, la Philosophia prima di Avicenna costituirebbe il modello della connessione che Alberto stabilisce fra la Metafisica di Aristotele e il Liber de causis. Nella conclusione è presentata una tavola delle citazioni. (shrink)

Avicenna's Philosophia Prima occupies a relevant place in the history of metaphysics. In its first four chapters, we find a definition of metaphysics as wisdom and the more certain philosophy that highlights the scientific character that Avicenna seeks to give metaphysics. The elucidation of the subject matter of this discipline is developed in the debate among its Arab sources, but at the same time, it extends in the historical discussion on the place of God and being in metaphysics. (...) This article presents the definition of metaphysics as the first science, and the establishment of the being as the proper subject of metaphysics, and God as what is sought. (shrink)

After having developed his theory of being, the causes and theology, Avicenna studies in chapter 7 of book IX of Philosophia prima the end of human beings. In this paper I analyze Avicenna’s considerations from a metaphysical perspective, and the importance that metaphysics has in the education of human desire. This education must be developed on metaphysical grounds because human being’s most proper desire does not match that of our sensitive desires. This kind of desire is not immediate (...) to our sensory experience, but is known through the arguments placed at the end of the Metaphysics. Thus, metaphysics as an essential feature of the education of human desire might allow us to distinguish different kinds of men. This attitude leads to the classification between ordinary souls and holy souls, i.e. those which enjoy the pleasure of knowledge and those which not. (shrink)

A dual-language edition presenting Descartes's original Latin text of his greatest work, with a facing-page authoritative English translation.

In den "Meditationes de prima philosophia" (1642) geht es Descartes um eine neue Grundlegung der Metaphysik. Dieser Neuanfang in der Philosophie, den Descartes wie wohl kaum ein anderer propagiert und durchführt, hat jedoch einen konservativen Zug: Gerade Descartes besteht darauf, daß seine Philosophie die älteste ist, die es überhaupt geben kann, und diese Aussage hat nur Sinn, wenn Metaphysik als Rekonstruktion der ursprünglichen Fragen verstanden wird, die anfänglich das philosophische und insbesondere metaphysische Geschäft ins Rollen gebracht hatten.

Rene Descartes Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Sciences by Rene Descartes The Discourse on the Method (French: Discours de la methode) is a philosophical and autobiographical treatise published by Rene Descartes in 1637. Its full name is Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences (French title: Discours de la methode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la verite dans les sciences). The (...) Discourse on The Method is best known as the source of the famous quotation "Je pense, donc je suis" ("I think, therefore I am"), which occurs in Part IV of the work. Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed; for every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that those even who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not usually desire a larger measure of this quality than they already possess. And in this it is not likely that all are mistaken the conviction is rather to be held as testifying that the power of judging aright and of distinguishing truth from error, which is properly what is called good sense or reason, is by nature equal in all men; and that the diversity of our opinions, consequently, does not arise from some being endowed with a larger share of reason than others, but solely from this, that we conduct our thoughts along different ways, and do not fix our attention on the same objects. For to be possessed of a vigorous mind is not enough; the prime requisite is rightly to apply it. The greatest minds, as they are capable of the highest excellences, are open likewise to the greatest aberrations; and those who travel very slowly may yet make far greater progress, provided they keep always to the straight road, than those who, while they run, forsake it. (shrink)

"Der Beitrag repliziert auf Bernhard Siegerts Programmtext zu »Operativen Ontologien«, hinterfragt einige grundbegriffliche Voreinstellungen des Siegertschen Technikmaterialismus und setzt sich kritisch mit dessen auf Ontologie(n) abzielenden Anspruch aus- einander – wie er sich nun am Thema des technischen Mediums als »Ding« explizit festmacht. Dabei wird nicht zuletzt das Fehlen eines Technikbegriffs vermerkt, der zwischen den Polen Medium, Praxis/Operation und »Ding« (sowie dann auch »Artikulation« und »Kultur« im Kompositum »Kulturtechnik«) in hinreichend klarer Weise vermittelt. Vor allem aber rät die Verfasserin zum (...) Verzicht auf die ontologische Perspektive, weil diese weder für medien- oder technikorientierte mikrologische Analysen noch für einen Technikmaterialismus erforderlich ist. The article responds to Bernhard Siegert’s programmatic text on “operative ontologies,” questions some fundamental preconceptions of Siegert’s “Technikmaterialismus,” and critically deals with his ontological aims as manifested in the theme of the technical medium as “thing.” Not least, the lack of a precise concept of technique is noted that would mediate between media, practice/operation and “thing” (as well as “articulation” and “culture” in the composite term “cultural tech- nique”) in a sufficiently clear manner. Above all, however, the author advocates to abandon the ontological perspective as it is necessary neither for media or technology-oriented micrological analyses nor for “Technikmaterialismus.” ". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Concordance to Descartes’ “Meditationes de Prima Philosophia.” by Katsuzo Murakami, Meguru Sasaki, Tetsuichi NishimuraTuomo Aho and Mikko YrjönsuuriKatsuzo Murakami, Meguru Sasaki, and Tetsuichi Nishimura. Concordance to Descartes’ “Meditationes de Prima Philosophia.” Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann, 1995. Pp. v + 355. Cloth, DM 198.00.This is a product from the Descartes database of Tokyo University scholars. It gives an account of the occurrences and contexts of words in (...) the Meditationes (the main text only), aiming at a complete survey of vocabulary. The work keeps strictly to the form of a lexical concordance; in addition to the word lists, there is only a brief instruction. (A bibliographical note about editions might be useful.) Technical realization is excellent. But concordances like this are big and expensive books; could they possibly be published more easily in electronic format?Most words of Descartes’s text are included in the main concordance. There they are listed following the alphabetic order of standard dictionaries, and in each entry the total amount of occurrences of the word is announced. Then every occurrence is quoted in its context (one line = approximately two in the Adam-Tannery standard edition). Quotes within each entry are arranged and their places identified by digits showing the page and line in AT edition.Some function words and most indeclinables are placed in an index which gives only the numbers and locations of their occurrences. In most cases this is certainly reasonable, but some choices are problematic. For example, why have the 638 + 36 occurrences of qui in its two senses (‘who’, ‘what’; ‘how’, ‘whereby’) been printed with full contexts, while the philosophically interesting adverb plane (‘plainly’, 55 times) is to be found merely in the index?Concordances are uncommon for modern philosophy, but they are familiar and valuable tools in work with ancient texts. Obviously they function in linguistic research, and even the present Descartes book has largely the same goal: to serve the study of neo-Latin language. Undoubtedly, a rigorous case study like this is important for such [End Page 135] investigations. (There remains, however, a difficulty, as the editors point out, because the AT text differs from original editions, mainly in matters of orthography and punctuation.) But also a completely nonlinguistic philosopher can benefit from this material. It is useful to see all occurrences of a word together and at once; many careless generalizations could be avoided by checking from a concordance.One can make amusing observations at random. Thus some terms have remarkably low frequencies (notitia, qualitas occur 4 times; materia 3 times; absolutus, principium 2 times; abstractus, definire, dispositio, species 1 time; intentio, possibile not at all). On the other hand, there is an overwhelming concentration on the semantic family round cogitare, cognoscere, comprehendere, concipere, percipere. Descartes has some idiosyncratic favorites, like advertere/animadvertere. One also notices his strong liking for words of seeing and light (15 arguments from lumen naturale!). It hardly is a surprise that his most cherished favorite is ego (492 times).Tuomo Aho and Mikko Yrjönsuuri University of HelsinkiCopyright © 1998 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc... (shrink)

Unter den griechischen exegetischen Werken zu den Schriften des Aristoteles kommt dem von um 200 n. Chr. wirkenden Alexander von Aphrodisias (Bücher 1-5) und einem byzantinischen Gelehrten des 13. Jahrhunderts, bekannt als Pseudo-Alexander, (Bücher 6--?14) stammenden Kommentar zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles eine überragende Bedeutung zu. Der Wert des durch fundierte Kenntnisse der Philosophie des Aristoteles ausgezeichneten Kommentars ist sowohl für die denkerische Durchdringung der aristotelischen Metaphysik als auch für die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie nicht genug hochzuschätzen. Den Denkern des Mittelalters (...) lag der Text aber nicht vor. Erst im Jahre 1527 machte der berühmte spanische Humanist Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1490?-1573) der breiten Öffentlichkeit den Kommentar zur Metaphysik erst zugänglich. Seine immer noch geschätzte, in gewissem Sinne auch unentbehrliche Übersetzung des Kommentars zu den ersten zwölf Büchern erstellte er aufgrund der Kollationierung der ihm zu Gebote stehenden Handschriften mit philologischer Gewissenhaftigkeit und ermöglichte auf diese Weise die immer noch nicht erforschte Rezeption des Textes in den folgenden drei Jahrhunderten bis zur ersten Edition des vollständigen griechischen Originals durch Hermann Bonitz 1847. Ein Nachdruck der 'editio princeps' dieser lateinischen Übersetzung, die 1561 zum fünften und letzten Mal erschienen ist, ist nicht nur ein Akt der antiquarischen Pietät, sondern kommt gerade im digitalen Zeitalter einer Forderung der Forschung nach. (shrink)

The article analyzes the status of metaphysics in relation to other sciences, especially the sense and reasons behind its priority in the system of sciences, as conveyed in the works of Thomas Aquinas. The question of what comes first in the system of sciences has led to an exploration and justification of the criteria behind this priority. According to Thomas Aquinas, metaphysics is justly considered to be the first philosophy: on the one hand it is occupied with what comes first (...) in the ontological order – the first causes of being, on the other hand, other sciences rely on it for their first principles. The article critically analyzes both substantiations of the idea of being first. The substantive criterion is questioned by the introduction of revealed theology into the system of sciences accepted by Aquinas; revealed theology is also occupied with what comes first, and does so with greater authority than metaphysics. The article focuses on the analysis of main doubts concerning metaphysics’ methodological criterion of priority: the idea that metaphysics, in relation to other sciences, is in a sense first and functions as a determinant, while also being last and determined by these very sciences. Metaphysics is first, as other sciences draw from it their first principles, and last, as it utilizes facts established by other sciences which come first in the process of knowledge acquisition. Hence the charge that Aquinas’ argumentation concerning metaphysics’ priority is circular in nature. The article analyzes various aspects of this difficulty and offers suggestions on how to overcome them. (shrink)