In this paper, the theories of the civitas maxima (universal state) in the work of Christian Wolff (1679–1754) and Michael Christoph Hanov (1695–1773) are investigated. Topics are the layers of international law, the concept and constitution of the universal state, utopian elements, the ontological status of the universal state, conversion of other states, and migration. As a critical counterpart, the idea of nation is explored in these authors as well as in the political theories of romanticism, namely in Adam Müller (...) (1779–1829) and Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768–1834). (shrink)

In his undertaking to articulate the manifold of Leibnizian thought in view of a unified focal point, Kaehler concentrates on the relation between logic and metaphysics, which was inaugurated in the beginning of metaphysical thinking and which at the same time takes on special relevance in modern metaphysics. In light of the tendency, evident in post-Leibnizian metaphysics, to deprive logic of the status of a mere organon, of an ars, and to grant it a closer relation to metaphysics, this viewpoint (...) can lay claim to eminent interest. Kaehler’s main thesis is that Leibnizian logic as the science of the formal structures of truth points beyond itself to material presuppositions that can be realized only in a theology of reason. The simple and extremely composite concepts, which are inaccessible to the finite mens, demand as their correlate the establishment of the concept of a perfect reason. The ground of the investigation is laid by situating Leibniz’s logic within the framework of his metaphysics and by working out the ambivalence of the independence, “autonomy”, and reliance of natural reason on an infinite reason: “for natural reason, which metaphysically represents it, the ultima ratio has to be not only the cause of its being, but in the end also the ground of its knowledge”. A comprehensive and detailed reconstruction of Leibniz’s logic constitutes the main part of this work, a reconstruction which is centered on the aforementioned transition from the scientia generalis to metaphysics. The reconstruction of the systematic context of the logical forms, in that it articulates the genesis of these from one another out of their mere juxtaposition, goes beyond, on the one hand, what Leibniz himself achieved, but remains, on the other hand, within the bounds of the Leibnizian position insofar as the claim to a unified organization of the totality of natural reason’s knowledge of the forms of truth lies in the validity of the principium rationis itself—the fundamental presupposition of his logic. Kaehler surveys the region of Leibniz’s logic as a singular exposition of the natura veritatis; it must in the end always be possible to trace the forms of truth back to the relation of the containedness : “The predicate or the consequent is always in the subject or the antecedent. And the natura veritatis in general, or the connection between the terms of the statement, consists therein.” The procedure of the reconstruction is revealed in nucleo already in the presentation of the principal fundament of logic. It is easy to follow Kaehler’s reading of the principle of reason as the unfolding of the nature of truth. Yet the reconstructive intention first becomes manifest in the presentation of the principle of non-contradiction. Although Leibniz does not extensively discuss the interconnection of these principles, Kaehler takes the principle of non-contradiction to be a further determination of the principle of reason insofar as identity can be thought as identity only via its relation to contradiction: “The negation of the negation of truth, as the latter’s contradiction, first achieves the principal affirmation of reason as identity”. Kaehler’s systematization of Leibniz’s logic thus seems to pursue two objectives. First, it aims at the reduction of the entirety of logical knowledge to the natura veritatis—first of all at the reduction of the “two great principles” to the latter, then at the reduction of the inferences to statements and of statements to concepts. But second, the manifold of logical forms is not merely reduced to its principle; rather, their interrelation is posited as one of reflection, and here reflection means: the more developed and differentiated forms make explicit that which the simple forms contain. In order to indicate how these two objectives of the reconstruction intersect, we shall take up the elementary transition from categorical to hypothetical statements. (shrink)