KANT’S GOAL IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION was to demonstrate that the categories are applicable to objects of sensible intuition. He carried out this task by disclosing the necessity of a transcendental synthesis. In the Transcendental Deduction in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason transcendental synthesis has two subspecies: synthesis intellectualis and synthesis speciosa. The distinction between the two types of transcendental synthesis is also mirrored in the structure of the proof of the (...) B Deduction. As several commentators have noted, the B Deduction in fact contains two parts. Each part seems to provide an account of a distinctive kind of transcendental synthesis. The first part provides an account of intellectual synthesis while the second part provides an account of figurative synthesis. (shrink)

Talk at University of Turin, 'Kant, oltre Kant, May 5th 2023. --- -/- It is useful, while keeping in mind a holistic approach, to concentrate on a common theme in Kant’s text, which it will turn out is the quintessential element of his novel ‘way of thinking’, as he himself put it in preface of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. This common theme is the idea of synthesis, which is what holds together, and is the (...) entryway to, all the other familiar aspects of Kant’s thought: his concept of self-consciousness or how mind is involved in cognition, his ideas about the role of the imagination, his theory of knowledge and his metaphysics of experience, and not unimportantly, its relation to what is probably the most Kantian element here: the categories of the understanding as the first principles of knowledge. But the meaning of synthesis and its role in its various facets, though frequently the subject of discussion in papers and monographs alike, is hardly understood in contemporary Kant scholarship. Most readings of the text of the Deduction, the part in which Kant elucidates his concept of synthesis, exhibit a shallow, mechanical understanding of it. -/- A compounding factor is that synthesis can’t really be understood independently of the other aforementioned elements of Kant’s thought. Grasping the meaning of synthesis implies coming to grips with his concept of self-consciousness and the way both self-consciousness and the categories are intricately and intimately involved. Most interpretations consider these aspects too much as if they were indeed separable faculties or entities that serve separable functions, undercutting an important feature of Kant’s metaphysics: the possibility of a priori unified cognition, for which an indivisible self-legislating subject is responsible. Rather, they are expressions of various aspects of a singular function of the mind as the ground of possible unified knowledge. -/- One striking example of such a superficial reading of the text is the way the relation between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis—or in the case of the A-Deduction the threefold synthesis—is standardly interpreted, as if the two are independent or quasi-independent functions of different faculties of the mind, the imagination and the understanding. In this paper, I focus on the relation between figurative and intellectual synthesis, while arguing that failing to understand this properly, indeed the relation between the imagination and the understanding, leads to a vicious regress in the explanation of the ground of knowledge, for which a priori synthesis is specifically designed. In other words, failing to see the intimate relation between the imagination and the understanding, the very identity that lies at their root, risks losing sight of the primary aim of Kant’s thought: the possibility of a priori unified knowledge. (shrink)

This paper is the second part of the investigation. Chr. A. Crusius in the “Way to the Certainty and Adequacy of Human Knowledge” introduced the most developed alternative view to Wolffian position regarding symbolic and contemplating correlation. He preferred the contemplating cognition and tied its functioning with imagination. Kant in the “Critique of Pure Reason” brings about a terminology revolution and changes the style of the problem consideration. He turns the proceeding from F. Viet and G.W. Leibniz’s art “speciosa generalis”, (...) which was earlier thought as symbolic, into a priori figurative synthesis. Following the changes in the nature of sensibility and understanding treatment, Kant rejects the opposition of intuitive or contemplative and symbolic in favour of the following oppositions: intuitive is opposed to discursive, while the contemplation is opposed to the understanding concept. The figurative synthesis as a result of transcendental faculty of imagination instead of the former empirical imagery creates the schematic possibility of the empirical image per se. This well-developed Kant’s position unwittingly put aside Wolff’s program of reduction of the symbolic cognition to quasi-intuitive one. However, today this program can have a practical importance and enrich the problem of the cognition visibility. (shrink)

Huxley coined the phrase, the “evolutionary synthesis” to refer to the acceptance by a vast majority of biologists in the mid-20th Century of a “synthetic” view of evolution. According to this view, natural selection acting on minor hereditary variation was the primary cause of both adaptive change within populations and major changes, such as speciation and the evolution of higher taxa, such as families and genera. This was, roughly, a synthesis of Mendelian genetics and Darwinian evolutionary theory; it (...) was a demonstration that prior barriers to understanding between various subdisciplines in the life sciences could be removed. The relevance of different domains in biology to one another was established under a common research program. The evolutionary synthesis may be broken down into two periods, the “early” synthesis from 1918 through 1932, and what is more often called the “modern synthesis” from 1936-1947. The authors most commonly associated with the early synthesis are J.B.S. Haldane, R.A. Fisher, and S. Wright. These three figures authored a number of important synthetic advances; first, they demonstrated the compatibility of a Mendelian, particulate theory of inheritance with the results of Biometry, a study of the correlations of measures of traits between relatives. Second, they developed the theoretical framework for evolutionary biology, classical population genetics. This is a family of mathematical models representing evolution as change in genotype frequencies, from one generation to the next, as a product of selection, mutation, migration, and drift, or chance. Third, there was a broader synthesis of population genetics with cytology, genetics, and biochemistry, as well as both empirical and mathematical demonstrations to the effect that very small selective forces acting over a relatively long time were able to generate substantial evolutionary change, a novel and surprising result to many skeptics of Darwinian gradualist views. The later “modern” synthesis is most often identified with the work of Mayr, Dobzhansky and Simpson. There was a major institutional change in biology at this stage, insofar as different subdisciplines formerly housed in different departments, and with different methodologies were united under the same institutional umbrella of “evolutionary biology.” Mayr played an important role as a community architect, in founding the Society for the Study of Evolution, and the journal Evolution, which drew together work in systematics, biogeography, paleontology, and theoretical population genetics. (shrink)

While there was a flurry of articles throughout the 1990s in philosophy of education on Lyotard, there are still several key concepts in his oeuvre that have import for but remain largely underdeveloped or absent in the field. One of the most interesting of these absent concepts is Lyotard’s notion of the figural. In this paper, I take the figural as an educational problematic and ask what new educational insights it can generate in regard to the existing literature. As such, (...) this article begins with a survey and synthesis of educational literature on Lyotard and the primary work on which most of it is based, exploring the relationship between knowledge, performativity, the differend, and “the system.” I then examine conceptions of education oriented toward defending the differend and disrupting the system and claim that, while helpful, these conceptions are limited in that they do not mention how educators and students might engage the alterity that the system seeks to repress. I believe that it is here that Lyotard’s notion of the figural can be productively engaged. The next section of the paper performs a partial and educationally partisan reading of Discourse, Figure. After this reading I move to formulate a figural education, which is composed of three educational processes and modes of engagement: reading, seeing, and blindness. A figural education, I argue, holds each of these practices in an uncertain and unsettling relation and, in so doing, can help educators defend the figural and the differend against the discursive demands of the system. (shrink)

The modern synthesis in evolutionary biology is taken to be that period in which a consensus developed among biologists about the major causes of evolution, a consensus that informed research in evolutionary biology for at least a half century. As such, it is a particularly fruitful period to consider when reflecting on the meaning and role of chance in evolutionary explanation. Biologists of this period make reference to “chance” and loose cognates of “chance,” such as: “random,” “contingent,” “accidental,” “haphazard,” (...) or “stochastic.” Of course, what an author might mean by “chance” in any specific context varies. -/- In the following, we first offer a historiographical note on the synthesis. Second, we introduce five ways in which synthesis authors spoke about chance. We do not take these to be an exhaustive taxonomy of all possible ways in which chance meaningfully figures in explanations in evolutionary biology. These are simply five common uses of the term by biologists at this period. They will serve to organize our summary of the collected references to chance and the analysis and discussion of the following questions: • What did synthesis authors understand by chance? • How did these authors see chance operating in evolution? • Did their appeals to chance increase or decrease over time during the synthesis? That is, was there a “hardening” of the synthesis, as Gould claimed (1983)? (shrink)

This article discusses the work of George Udny Yule in relation to the evolutionary synthesis and the biometric-Mendelian debate. It has generally been claimed that (i.) in 1902, Yule put forth the first account showing that the competing biometric and Mendelian programs could be synthesized. Furthermore, (ii.) the scientific figures who should have been most interested in this thesis (the biometricians W. F. Raphael Weldon and Karl Pearson, and the Mendelian William Bateson) were too blinded by personal animosity towards (...) each other to appreciate Yule's proposal. This essay provides a detailed account of (i.), maintaining that Yule's 1902 proposal is better understood as a reduction, not a synthesis of the two programs. The results of this analysis are then used to evaluate (ii.), where I will instead argue that Bateson and the biometricians had good reasons to avoid endorsing Yule's account. (shrink)

In the received view of the history of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, paleontology was given a prominent role in evolutionary biology thanks to the significant influence of paleontologist George Gaylord Simpson on both the institutional and conceptual development of the Synthesis. Simpson's 1944 Tempo and Mode in Evolution is considered a classic of Synthesis-era biology, and Simpson often remarked on the influence of other major Synthesis figures – such as Ernst Mayr and Theodosius Dobzhansky – on (...) his developing thought. Why, then, did paleontologists of the 1970s and 1980s – Stephen Jay Gould, Niles Eldredge, David M. Raup, Steven Stanley, and others – so frequently complain that paleontology remained marginalized within evolutionary biology? This essay considers three linked questions: first, were paleontologists genuinely welcomed into the Synthetic project during its initial stages? Second, was the initial promise of the role for paleontology realized during the decades between 1950 and 1980, when the Synthesis supposedly "hardened" to an "orthodoxy"? And third, did the period of organized dissent and opposition to this orthodoxy by paleontologists during the 1970s and 1980s bring about a long-delayed completion to the Modern Synthesis, or rather does it highlight the wider failure of any such unified Darwinian evolutionary consensus? (shrink)

It is said that the theory of relativity and quantum theory are independent of each other. Their relationship is like water and oil. Now, it is very important for modern physics to synthesize them. In Physics and mathematics, Super String theory is studied, but instead of it, the tendimensional world appears. Our world is a three-dimensional world. What is the ten-dimensional world? It is more difficult than the string which is of Plank length. In the ten dimensional world, physics is (...) facing darkness and nothingness which man can not explain with the traditional physical words.The solution depends upon philosophy. I tried to synthesize themand succeeded.The following is an outline of my synthesis. 1. Utility and relativity of mathematical truth Mathematical truth is not absolute but relative. In the universe ( outside the solar system ), there is no perfect line. Because, by the gravitation of large astronomical bodies, space and lines are curved. Mathematical figure and numeration depend upon the promise of mankind. These are not absolute. Physics, which is grounded upon mathematics in certainty, is also relative. It expresses not the whole of the universe but a part of the universe. 2. Community and difference between the theory of relativity and quantum theory Community is the negation of absoluteness of physical attributes. Difference is the assessment for mathematics. The theory of relativity relies on mathematics but quantumtheory does not always rely on it. According to circumstances, Niels Bohr and quantum physicists abandoned a frame of reference. 3. The origin of the theory of relativity 4. The origin of quantum theory In short, the theory of relativity and quantum theory are not perfect, they only irradiate a part of the universe. Man can reach the whole of the universe only by the philosophical intuition of nothingness and infinite (the principle of nothingness and love). (shrink)

The ardent antagonism between two aesthetic parties, figuration and abstraction, which for more than half a century has stamped art history in old Europe, with increasingly overlapping implications for youthful America, Japan and many other places, today tends to reduce itself to being simply the anecdotal imprint of an era: in the final analysis it seems already condemned to disappear in favor of a notion of complementarity and even synthesis.

The role of mathematics in scientific practice is too readily relegated to that of formulating equations that model or describe what is being investigated, and then finding solutions to those equations. I survey the role of mathematics in: 1. Exact solutions of differential equations, especially conformal mapping; and 2. Simulations of solutions to differential equations via numerical methods and via agent-based models; and 3. The use of experimental models to solve equations (a) via physical analogies based on similarity of the (...) form of the equations, such as Prandtl’s soap-film method, and (b) the method of physically similar systems. Two major themes emerge: First, the role of mathematics in science is not well described by deduction from axioms, although it generally involves deductive reasoning. Creative leaps, the integration of experimental or observational evidence, synthesis of ideas from different areas of mathematics, and insight regarding analogous forms are required to find solutions to equations. Second, methods that involve mappings or transformations are in use in disparate contexts, from the purely mathematical context of conformal mapping where it is mathematical objects that are mapped, to the use of concrete physical experimental models, where one concrete thing is shown to correspond to another. (shrink)

The 1920-1960 period saw the creation of the conditions for a unification of disciplines in the area of evolutionary biology under a limited number of theoretical prescriptions: the evolutionary synthesis. Whereas the sociological dimension of this synthesis was fairly successful, it was surprisingly loose when it came to the interpretation of the evolutionary mechanisms per se, and completely lacking at the level of the foundational epistemological and metaphysical commitments. Key figures such as Huxley, Simpson, Dobzhansky, and Rensch only (...) paid lip service to the conceptual dimension of the evolutionary synthesis, as they eventually realized that a number of evolutionary phenomena could not be explained by its narrow theoretical corpus. Apparently, the evolutionary synthesis constituted a premature event in the development of evolutionary biology. Not only are the real achievements of the evolutionary synthesis in need of reevaluation, but this reassessment also has important implications for the historiography of Darwinism and the current debates about the darwinian movement. (shrink)

During the decades following World War II diverse groups of American biologists established a variety of distinctive approaches to organismal biology. Rhetorically, organismal biology could be used defensively to distinguish established research traditions from perceived threats from newly emerging fields such as molecular biology. But, organismal biologists were also interested in integrating biological disciplines and using a focus on organisms to synthesize levels of organization from molecules and cells to populations and communities. Part of this broad movement was the development (...) of an area of research variously referred to as physiological ecology, environmental physiology, or ecophysiology. This area of research was distinctive in its self-conscious blend of field and laboratory practices and its explicit integration with other areas of biology such as ecology, animal behavior, and evolution in order to study adaptation. Comparing the intersecting careers of Knut Schmidt-Nielsen and George Bartholomew highlights two strikingly different approaches to physiological ecology. These alternative approaches to studying the interactions of organisms and environments also differed in important ways from the organismal biology championed by leading figures in the modern synthesis. (shrink)

This paper explores the complex relationship between the plant evolutionist G. Ledyard Stebbins and the animal evolutionist Theodosius Dobzhansky. The manner in which the plant evolution was brought into line, synthesized, or rendered consistent with the understanding of animal evolution (and especially insect evolution) is explored, especially as it culminated with the publication of Stebbins's 1950 book Variation and Evolution in Plants. The paper explores the multi-directional traffic of influence between Stebbins and Dobzhansky, but also their social and professional networks (...) that linked plant evolutionists like Stebbins with Edgar Anderson, Carl Epling, and the 'Carnegie team' of Jens Clausen, David Keck, and William Hiesey with collaborators on the animal side like I. Michael Lerner, Sewall Wright and L.C. Dunn and other 'architects' of the synthesis like Ernst Mayr, Julian Huxley and George Gaylord Simpson. The compatibility in training, work styles, methodologies, goals, field sites, levels of analysis, and even choice of organismic systems is explored between Stebbins and Dobzhansky. Finally, the extent to which coevolution between plants and insects is reflected in the relationship is explored, as is the power dynamic in the relationship between two of the most visible figures associated with the evolutionary synthesis. (shrink)

This article takes the suggestions by Jameson and Žižek that Hardt and Negri's recent Empire is an important `new theoretical synthesis' and a challenge to a politically complacent Cultural Studies as its starting point to explore Negri's understanding of `production'. It opens out Negri's apparent synthesis to consider the formative elements of his work: operaismo's `social factory', Marx's `Fragment on Machines' and Deleuze's figure of `control society'. The article argues that whilst Negri develops the important analytic categories of (...) socialized and affective labour, he breaks with operaismo's and Deleuze's `cramped' and `minor' interrogation of the intricacies of capitalized production to develop a problematic understanding of an emerging autonomy-in-production. In this Negri makes a strange return to the orthodox Marxian and - in an inverted way - neo-Gramscian positions which operaismo had sought to undermine; so making Empire less a synthesis of, than a break with some of the core theoretical principles of operaismo, Marx and Deleuze. (shrink)

Although Whitehead’s particular style of philosophizing--looking at traditional philosophical problems in light of recent scientific advances--was part of a trend that began with the scientific revolutions in the early 20th century and continues today, he was marginalized in 20th century philosophy because of his outspoken defense of what he was doing as “metaphysics.” Metaphysics, for Whitehead, is a cross-disciplinary hermeneutic responsible for coherently integrating the perspectives of the special sciences with one another and with everyday experience. The program of such (...) a meta-discipline is challenging to philosophical orthodoxy because it enlarges, rather than narrows, the range of empirical evidence that philosophy must acknowledge. This places Whitehead’s philosophy in a perennial tradition that seeks to resolve fundamental antinomies through synthesis and reconciliation rather than reduction or elimination. (shrink)

This paper aims at discussing a quite specific aspect of Husserl’s phenomenology, i.e., the notion of synthesis of identification, and the role it plays in the arguments set forward in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation during the discussion of the constitution of the other, hence of the monadological inter-subjectivity. The case will be made for considering the very heart of the Meditation to be what we will refer to as Husserl’s “transcendental argument”, consisting in the claim that there can be (...) only one inter-subjectivity, hence, the “world” being the correlate of the transcendental monadological inter-subjectivity, only one real and actual world. This will also give us the opportunity to critically approach a series of views lately held by some leading figures of the “continental” and “analytic” tradition, which, as the first part of the essay will show, pursue views directly opposed to Husserl’s. (shrink)

Edith Stein’s life and thought intersect with many important movements of life and thought in the twentieth century. Through her life and eventual martyrdom, she gave witness to the primacy of truth and faith in the face of political totalitarianism, and in her philosophical works, she contributed to a synthesis of phenomenological thought with the thought of Thomas Aquinas and the living philosophy of Thomism, while also progressively advancing a compelling form of philosophical personalism. As a result, Stein represents (...) one of the most important Catholic thinkers of the twentieth century and is a figure of growing fascination and devotion among believers and nonbelievers alike. The Personalism of Edith Stein is an investigation of Stein’s mature philosophical anthropology, exploring her engagement with the thought of Aquinas and Thomism while maintaining the phenomenological mode of investigation. Through a careful examination of Stein’s later works under the themes of human nature, the human individual, and the human being’s relation to God, the author shows that Stein’s mature personalism is considerably expanded and substantiated by her assimilation of key anthropological and metaphysical teachings of Aquinas and Thomism, and, conversely, that Stein significantly develops and deepens these same teachings through a phenomenological reconsideration of each from a personalist perspective. As a whole, the study reveals the profound accord between Stein’s mature thought and the received teachings of Aquinas, while yet carefully attending to the remaining differences between them. Ultimately, the author proposes that Stein imbues the teachings of Aquinas with a fundamental personalization such that her mature anthropology can be understood as a Thomistically informed personalism which represents a significant, original contribution to the anthropological dimension of the philosophia perennis. (shrink)

The processing of metaphors and idioms has been the subject of neuroscientific research for several decades. However, results are often contradictory, which can be traced back to inconsistent terminology and stimulus control. In this systematic review of research methods, we analyse linguistic aspects of 116 research papers which used EEG, fMRI, PET, MEG, or NIRS to investigate the neural processing of the two figurative subtypes metaphor and idiom. We critically examine the theoretical foundations as well as stimulus control by (...) performing a systematic literature synthesis according to the PRISMA guidelines. We explicitly do not analyse the findings of the studies but instead focus on four primary aspects: definitions of figurative language and its subtypes, linguistic theory behind the studies, control for factors influencing figurative language processing, and the relationship between theoretical and operational definitions. We found both a lack and a broad variety in existing definitions and operationalisation, especially in regard to familiarity and conventionality. We identify severe obstacles in the comparability and validation potential of the results of the papers in our review corpus. We propose the development of a consensus in fundamental terminology and more transparency in the reporting of stimulus design in the research on figurative language processing. (shrink)

In contemporary Chinese art the national traditions and modern trends of the art world are especially relevant. Since the 1980s, in the works of a number of authors, interest began to manifest itself in the techniques of silk work, which was characteristic of ancient and medieval painting on scrolls, which was later replaced by more accessible drawings on paper. At the present stage, such painting has reached its heyday and is highly appreciated in the art market. The most famous masters (...) engaged in silk painting are Mu Yilin and Dong Wenzheng. The analysis of their creations allows us to see how the artists discovered the expressive possibilities of this material, including its transparency, refraction, color and tone saturation. The object of attention is the Chinese tradition of painting on silk, and the subject is the features of its development at the beginning of the XXI century on the example of the work of famous artists and the options they take into account in the compositions of techniques, figurative structure and expressive means of the old masters. The purpose of the article is to identify the main themes and artistic means that modern artists use in their silk works, as well as the option of integrating an ethno-cultural component into their work. (shrink)

The need for new models of social development capable of increasing the resilience of society and of counteracting the destructive processes that ruined a once-powerful state edifice has led to an interest in Eurasianism-a philosophical-historical, culturological, and intellectual-political movement that arose in Russian émigré circles in the early 1920s. Eurasianism made itself known by the publication in 1921 in Sofia of a collection with the symbolic title Exodus to the East [Iskhod k Vostoku]. The initiators of this work were the (...) economist and geographer P.N. Savitskii, the linguist N.S. Trubetskoi, the theologian and philosopher G.V. Florovskii, and the art critic P.P. Suvchinskii. The legal scholar N.N. Alekseev, the historian and philosopher L.P. Karsavin, the historian G.V. Vernadskii, and other eminent Russian émigré scholarly and cultural figures also took part in the movement. (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on Kant’s doctrine of figurative synthesis. Figurative synthesis is the result of the activity of productive transcendental imagination. This is the chief problem of the so-called “second proof step” in Kant’s deduction of the categories according to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. The pure original synthetic apperception forms in the inner and outer sense - i. e. in time and space - by self-affection structures of order that (...) make it possible to cognize empirical objects. The order of space and time through figurative syntheses must be distinguished on the one hand from space and time as forms of intuition and on the other hand from the order of the manifold given in space and time. This clarifies the differences and relations between the constitutive noetic faculties of our knowledge apparatus. (shrink)

Given the renewed interest in Dionysian scholarship in the last decade, one wonders what new things can be said of the enigmatic figure known as "Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite." Rorem's book has much to add to the present state of scholarship. The author intends to present the treatises of the Areopagite--The Divine Names, The Mystical Theology, The Celestial Hierarchy, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, and The Epistles--as a coherent whole. He rightfully maintains that medieval readers often "ripped" their favorite material from the Dionysian (...) garment resulting in a patchwork unreflective of the whole. Accordingly, traditional interpretations of the corpus areopagiticum, to switch metaphors, often lost the forest for the trees. Rorem contends that the treatises' material unity results from Dionysius' pervasive concern for the symbols of the liturgy and of the Bible, whether in its names for God or in its descriptions of the angels. These symbols, as outlined in the Mystical Theology, are painted on the backdrop of the Neoplatonic notions of "Procession" and "Return." Hence: "Christian symbolism, whether ritual acts or scriptural language in general, is a divine self-revelation which proceeds 'down' into the human categories of thought and sense perception." This procession allows for a return which uplifts the faithful: initially, to a higher conceptual realm, through the negation and interpretation of all perceptual symbols; then, to the very Godhead, through the negation of all interpretations, all language, and even all thought. (shrink)

:Recently, Allais, Hanna and others have argued that Kant is a nonconceptualist about intuition and that intuitions refer objectively, independently of the functions of the understanding. Kantian conceptualists have responded, which the nonconceptualists also cite as textual evidence for their reading) that this view conflicts with the central goal of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I argue that the conceptualist reading of KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. is unfounded. Further, I argue (...) that the nonconceptualists are wrong to believe that intuitions as such refer objectively and that they are mistaken about the relation between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis. (shrink)

이 논문의 목표는 『순수이성비판』제2판 「선험적 감성론」의 공간론과 통각의 종합적 통일의 관계를 규명하는 것이다. 논문의 내용은 다음 테제들의 정당화이다. 1. 「선험적 감성론」에서 전개된 공간론은 세 단계로 이루어진 하나의 논증이다. 첫 단계는 공간의 근원적 표상은 아프리오리한 순수 직관임(1)을 증명하고, 둘째 단계는 공간은 우리의 외감 일반의 형식 혹은 외적 직관의 형식임(2)을 증명하고, 셋째 단계는 공간은 사물 자체도 사물들 자체의 관계도 아니며 오직 외적 현상의 형식일 뿐임(3)을 증명한다. 이 공간론 전체 논증은‘(1)이다, 그러므로 (2)이다, 그러므로 (3)이다’라는 추론 형식의 증명 구조를 갖는다. 2. 공간론 전체 논증의 (...) 대전제인 (1)을 증명하는 첫 단계는 다시금 네 개의 논증으로 이루어져 있다. 이 중 첫째와 둘째 논증은 공간 표상의 아프리오리함을 대상 인식에서 공간 표상이 갖는 역할을 분석하여 증명하고, 셋째와 넷째 논증은 공간 표상의 직관임을 공간 자체의 본성을 분석하여 증명한다. 3. 이 셋째와 넷째 논증의 증명은 ‘공간은 유일하고 무한히 큰 전체로 표상됨’을 전제한다. 4. 이 전제는 최종적으로 통각의 종합적 통일에 근거해서만 가능하다. 왜냐하면 공간의 통일(유일성과 무한성)은 공간의 형식적 직관의 통일과 같은 것으로서 하나의 종합적 통일이고, 이 통일은 형상적 종합에 의해 가능하고, 이 종합은 다시금 통각의 종합적 통일에 따라서만 가능하기 때문이다. 5. 그러므로 통각의 종합적 통일은 공간론 전체 논증의 최종근거이다. 왜냐하면 공간론 논증 첫 단계의 네 가지 논증은 모두 다 유일하고 무한히 큰 전체로 표상(생각)된 공간을 다루기 때문이다. (shrink)

Among the extensive literature on the first Critique, very few commentators offer a thorough analysis of Kant's conception of inner sense. This is quite surprising since the notion is central to Kant's theoretical philosophy, and it is very difficult to provide a consistent interpretation of this notion. In this paper, I first summarize Kant's claims about inner sense in the Transcendental Aesthetic and show why existing interpretations have been unable to dissolve the tensions arising from the conjunction of these claims. (...) Secondly, I present my own reconstruction of Kant's model of inner sense, relying essentially on Kantian considerations found in the B-version of the Transcendental Deduction. My main idea is that inner sense, for Kant, is a passive faculty that gets affected by the understanding performing its figurative synthesis on material given in outer sense. In the remainder of the paper, I highlight a few consequences of my interpretation and outline ways to deal with some objections. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new nonconceptual reading of the B-Deduction. As Hanna correctly remarks (Int J Philos Stud 19(3):399–415, 2011: 405), the word “cognition” (Erkenntnis/cognition) has, in both editions of the first Critique, a wide sense, meaning nonconceptual cognition, and a narrow meaning, in Kant’s own words “an objective perception” (A320/B377). To be sure, Kant assumes the first meaning to account for why the Deduction is unavoidable. If we take this meaning as a premise of the B-Deduction, then (...) there is a gap in the argument since the categories are certainly not conditions for non-conceptual cognition (Kantian nonconceptualism). Still, I believe it is not this wide meaning but rather the narrow one that figures in any premise of the B-Deduction. Thus, in the reading that I am proposing, categories are not conditions for representing something (I call this the intentionality thesis), or even conditions for representing something objectively (I call this the objectivity thesis). Instead, they are conditions for the recognition that what we represent through the senses exists mind-independently. In the first step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of propositional thinking (transcendental apperception) that the nonconceptually represented object of the sensible intuition exists objectively. In contrast, in the second step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of the apprehension (figurative synthesis) of what our human senses represent nonconceptually as existing objectively. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the debate on Kant and nonconceptual content. Inspired by Kant’s account of the intimate relation between intuition and concepts, McDowell (1996) has forcefully argued that the relation between sensible content and concepts is such that sensible content does not severally contribute to cognition but always only in conjunction with concepts. This view is known as conceptualism. Recently, Kantians Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, among others, have brought against this view the charge that it neglects the (...) possibility of the existence of essentially nonconceptual content that is not conceptualised or subject to conceptualisation. Their critique of McDowell amounts to nonconceptualism. However, both views, conceptualist and nonconceptualist, share the assumption that intuition is synthesised content in Kant’s sense. My interest is not in the validity of the philosophical positions of conceptualism or nonconceptualism per se. I am particularly interested in the extent to which the views that McDowell and Hanna and Allais respectively advance are true to Kant, or can validly be seen as Kantian positions. I argue that although McDowell is right that intuition is only epistemically relevant in conjunction with concepts, Hanna and Allais are right with regard to the existence of essentially nonconceptual content (intuitions) independently of the functions of the understanding, but that they are wrong with regard to non-conceptualised intuition being synthesised content in Kant’s sense. Kantian conceptualists (Bowman 2011; Griffith 2012; Gomes 2014) have responded to the recent nonconceptualist offensive, with reference to A89ff./B122ff. (§13)—which, confusingly, the nonconceptualists also cite as evidence for their contrary reading—by arguing that the nonconceptualist view conflicts with the central goal of the Transcendental Deduction, namely, to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I contend that the conceptualist reading of A89ff./B122ff. is unfounded, but also that the nonconceptualists are wrong to believe that intuitions as such refer strictly to objects independently of the functions of the understanding, and that they are mistaken about the relation between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis. I argue that Kant is a conceptualist, albeit not in the sense that standard conceptualists assume. Perceptual knowledge is always judgemental, though without this resulting in the standard conceptualist claim that, necessarily, all intuitions or all perceptions per se stand under the categories (strong conceptualism). I endorse the nonconceptualist view that, for Kant, perception per se, i.e. any mere or ‘blind’ intuition of objects (i.e. objects as indeterminate appearances) short of perceptual knowledge, does not necessarily stand under the categories. Perception is not yet perceptual knowledge. In this context, I point out the common failure in the literature on the Transcendental Deduction, both of the conceptualist and nonconceptualist stripe, to take account of the modal nature of Kant’s argument for the relation between intuition and concept insofar as cognition should arise from it. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defends the mathematically deterministic world of physics by arguing that its essential features arise necessarily from innate forms of intuition and rules of understanding through combinatory acts of imagination. Knowing is active: it constructs the unity of nature by combining appearances in certain mandatory ways. What is mandated is that sensible awareness provide objects that conform to the structure of ostensive judgment: “This (S) is P.” -/- Sensibility alone provides no such objects, so (...) the imagination compensates by combining passing point-data into “pure” referents for the subject-position, predicate-position, and copula. The result is a cognitive encounter with a generic physical object whose characteristics—magnitude, substance, property, quality, and causality—are abstracted as the Kantian categories. Each characteristic is a product of “sensible synthesis” that has been “determined” by a “function of unity” in judgment. -/- Understanding the possibility of such determination by judgment is the chief difficulty for any rehabilitative reconstruction of Kant’s theory. I will show that Kant conceives of figurative synthesis as an act of line-drawing, and of the functions of unity as rules for attending to this act. The subject-position refers to substance, identified as the objective time-continuum; the predicate-position, to quality, identified as the continuum of property values (constituting the second-order type named by the predicate concept). The upshot is that both positions refer to continuous magnitudes, related so that one (time-value) is the condition of the other (property-value). -/- Kant’s theory of physically constructive grammar is thus equivalent to the analytic-geometric formalism at work in the practice of mathematical physics, which schematizes time and state as lines related by an algebraic formula. Kant theorizes the subject–predicate relation in ostensive judgment as an algebraic time–state function. When aimed towards sensibility, “S is P” functions as the algebraic relation “t → ƒ(t).”. (shrink)

The externalist interpretation of Kant allows for a ratumal reconstruction of what is fundamental to transcendental idealism: action. Kant resorts to action several times in the Critique of Pure Reason. The very notion of "synthesis," which plays a vital role in his philosophy, is presented as a Handlung. The externalist interpretation endeavours to expiam what Kant means by action in those contexts so as to make philosophical sense of Kant's thought and at the same time to prevent it from (...) being turned into a flawed internalism. Whereas internalism struggles to present synthesis as a mental act that is as private as thinking quietly, or even as an unconscious activity, externalism shows that, according to Kant, human knowledge depends on the ability to carry out observable actions that involve human body in a very particular way. In this article, externalism will be vindiicated in relaticm to (1) the foundations of Kant's conception of figurative synthesis of transcendental imagmation, and (2) the nature of transcendental esquemata in his critical speculative philosophy. (shrink)

In histories of Serbian painting Sreten Maric is listed among the protagonists of socialist realism, and that on the basis of a single article - his criticism of an exhibition staged by the Association of Visual Artists of Serbia to the benefit of wounded veterans. Without denying the historical basis for this judgment, the author of the present paper pleads for a more nuance approach and propounds the thesis that socialist realism was primarily a complex pattern of social relations, and (...) only in the second place a substantively defined doctrine. On the basis of an insight into the relevant sources it is argued that Maric was not a theorist of socialist realism; on the other hand, an ideologue of social painting he was indeed, believing in a synthesis of Art and Revolution. By way of comparison, the figures of Miroslav Krleza and Georg Luk?cs are referred to: neither of the two was a protagonist of socialist realism, though both belonged firmly to the so-called leftist thought. U istorijama srpskog slikarstva Sreten Maric vazi za protagonistu socijalistickog realizma, i to na osnovu jednog clanka - kritike na izlozbu Udruzenja likovnih umetnika Srbije u korist ranjenih boraca. Ne poricuci istorijsku ocenu, autor pledira za nijansiraniji stav i izlaze tezu da je socijalisticki realizam bio u prvom redu jedan sklop drustvenih odnosa, pa tek onda i neka sadrzinski odredjena doktrina. Uvidom u izvore, zakljucio je da Maric nije bio teoreticar socijalistickog realizma, ali ideolog socijalnog slikarstva jeste bio, uz veru u sintezu Umetnosti i Revolucije. Za poredjenje su mu posluzili Miroslav Krleza i Georg Luk?cs: ni jedan, ni drugi nije bio protagonista socijalistickog realizma, mada su obojica pripadala cvrsto tzv. levoj misli. (shrink)

There is today much debate about the contents of perceptual experience relative to our capacity to make them figure in judgments. There is considerably less interest, however, in how we subsume perceptual contents in judgments, that is, what judging about a perception is like for us. For Kant and Husserl, this second question is as important as the first. Whereas Kant tries to answer it in the schematism section of the first Critique, Husserl addresses it at length in Experience and (...) Judgment. This paper draws new attention to this ‘forgotten’ transcendental problem by comparing both accounts of it. I will first discuss Kantian conceptualism in section two and schematization in section three. In section four I then turn to the Husserlian notion of type, which is today often juxtaposed to Kant’s schema. After rejecting one commonly held view that they are functionally identical, I turn to Husserl’s work on active synthesis, where I distinguish three different acts of judgment and their respective contents. (shrink)

This book offers a concise survey of basic probability theory from a thoroughly subjective point of view whereby probability is a mode of judgment. Written by one of the greatest figures in the field of probability theory, the book is both a summation and synthesis of a lifetime of wrestling with these problems and issues. After an introduction to basic probability theory, there are chapters on scientific hypothesis-testing, on changing your mind in response to generally uncertain observations, on expectations (...) of the values of random variables, on de Finetti's dissolution of the so-called problem of induction, and on decision theory. (shrink)

After coining the term “philopsychy” to describe a “soul-loving” approach to philosophical practice, especially when it welcomes a creative synthesis of philosophy and psychology, this article identifies a system of geometrical figures (or “maps”) that can be used to stimulate reflection on various types of perspectival differences. The maps are part of the author’s previously established mapping methodology, known as the Geometry of Logic. As an illustration of how philosophy can influence the development of psychology, Immanuel Kant’s table of (...) twelve categories and Carl Jung’s theory of psychological types are shown to share a common logical structure. Just as Kant proposes four basic categories, each expressed in terms of three subordinate categories, Jung proposes four basic personality functions, each having three possible manifestations. The concluding section presents four scenarios illustrating how such maps can be used in philosophical counseling sessions to stimulate philopsychic insight. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Reviews PASSION AND PARADOX L G Religious Studies / McMaster U. Hamilton, , Canada   @. Joan Cocks. Passion and Paradox: Intellectuals Confront the National Question. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton U. P., . Pp. . .; pb .. ccording to an ancient legend, four Rabbis ventured into the garden of Aphilosophy. One, it is said, went insane, another became a heretic, a third died and only the (...) fourth emerged unscathed. A modern variation of this story might go like this. Four or perhaps  philosophers entered the jungle of nationalism and for the most part went insane. There were those who embraced nationalism and consequently abandoned the universality of philosophy for the promotion of xenophobia, racism and even Nazism. Others remained internationalist and hence became futile—philosophical Canutes—commanding the raging beasts of nationality to be still. No one struggled harder with nationalism than Bertrand Russell. In , writing as an internationalist, he announced the demise of the principle of nationality only to see nationalisms explode in every region of the world (see his “National Independence and Internationalism”, Papers ). He opposed it relentlessly and without compromise until near the end of his life when he found himself endorsing wars of national liberation. Nationalism is often depicted as a howling beast. It would be better to think of it as an anaconda that wraps itself around everyone who ventures into its domain. Joan Cocks’ Passion and Paradox is an important book on nationalism and the intelligentsia. She traces the intellectual encounter with nationalism of a number of figures—Karl Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, Isaiah Berlin and the Scottish nationalist Tom Nairn, among others. All are exiles, most are Jews, and all try to hack their way through a jungle of conundrums of nationalist thought. Her accounts of these thinkers sometimes read like complex legal briefs, but are always illuminating. Though an internationalist, she sees the power of nationalist imperatives. Her approach to the contradictory strains of nationalism and hostility to nationalism echoes that of Hegel. She presents critical but sympathetic accounts of each side of the nationalist problematic and shows how their difficulties might be resolved in a higher synthesis. Alas! her resolution suffers from the unworldliness that she finds in other versions of internationalism. Her argument begins with a personal experience. In the early ’s she joined a group of Arabs and Jews against the Gulf War. In the course of their associ- Reviews  ation she learned that the Jews were all internationalists, while the Arabs were outspoken nationalists. This experience presumably demonstrated that a happy collusion of nationalism and internationalism was possible. But, of course, there was another side: those prosecuting the war she opposed were also nationalists. Her central thesis addresses the tragedy of opposition. It states that nationalism is “dilemmatic”, that is, that “all paths of thought obscured equally telling contrary thoughts; all courses of action were strewn with causes for regret and remorse” (p. ). The horns of the dilemma are the valid claims of the internationalist who sees the underlying self-destructive deep structures of nationalism on one side, and the claims of the national particularistic who is engaged in the compelling theatre of national liberation and the protection of local customs and roots on the other. Her book is an account of how her thinkers are framed by this dilemma, locked in by the imperatives of either side. In the period between the Gulf War and the composition of this book in  Cocks was able to observe what she identifies as the destructive logic of nationalism. The ’s were a period of postmodernist celebration of the local, a sensibility that helped to legitimate nationalism. The explosion of nationalism that followed the breakup of the Communist imperium was a time of liberation of the imprisoned nations—a springtime when it was good to be alive. But as the decade wore on the concealed pit bulls came out—in Yugoslavia, in Rwanda and elsewhere. In Cocks’ view nationalism showed an inner logic, of a sort that Russell called attention to in the early ’s—a logic that led from euphoria to self-destruction (see his Prospects). Her aim is to revive the half-remembered internationalist tradition as formulated by Marx and Luxemburg—but also to show... (shrink)

The literature on the Cambridge Platonists abounds with references to Neoplatonism and the Alexandrian Fathers on general themes of philosophical and theological methodology. The specific theme of the spiritual senses of the soul has received scant attention however, to the detriment of our understanding of their place in this important tradition of Christian speculation. Thus, while much attention has been paid to the clear influence of Plotinus and the Florentine Academy, far less has been given to important theological figures that (...) also form a vital part of the tradition the Cambridge Platonists find irresistible. Similarly, scholarship on the spiritual senses has tended to ignore early modern Protestant developments in this tradition focusing instead on patristic, medieval, and later modern figures. In response to these oversights, the present chapter provides a close reading and analysis of the reception and modification of Origen of Alexandria’s (185-252) doctrine of the spiritual senses in the “Discourse on the True Way or Method of Attaining to Divine Knowledge” by the Cambridge Platonist, John Smith (1618-1652). Although Smith accepted much of the doctrine as he found it in Origen his allegiance to modern notions of methodology, derived especially from Descartes, as well as his Protestantism, made taking the doctrine on authority or antiquity alone unacceptable. Smith therefore offered his own case for the spiritual senses, at once intentionally mimicking the Alexandrian’s interpretive synthesis of Platonism and Scripture (“Origen as model”) and echoing Origen’s own words (“Origen as source”). Whereas Origen made spiritual sensibility intelligible by means of Middle Platonic thought, Smith’s Neoplatonism provided the conceptual tools needed to make sense of biblical passages without suggesting a merely metaphorical meaning for sensory language concerning the awareness of spiritual realities. In this way, both tradition and innovation guide Smith’s reformulation of the doctrine of the spiritual senses. In addition to demonstrating Smith’s debt to patristic thought, this chapter also discusses his influence on such leading figures in modern theology as John Wesley (1703-1791) and Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758). The chapter thus presents an important moment in the development of Christian speculation about the spiritual senses that begins to bridge scholarship on the Patristic and Enlightenment periods. (shrink)

In this synthesis, we summarize studies that yielded evidence of jealousy in young infants. To shed light on this phenomenon, we present evidence that jealousy’s foundation rests on history of dyadic interactions with caregivers which engender infants’ expectations of exclusivity, and on maturation of sociocognitive capacities that enable infants to evaluate whether an exchange between their caregiver and another child represents a violation of that expectation. We conclude with a call for greater study of the antecedents and sequelae of (...) both normative and atypical presentations of jealousy. In addition, we recommend approaches that address jealousy across a range of relationships, both within and beyond those which include attachment figures. (shrink)

Prophethood (nubuwwah) is a divine institution that teaches the healthy progression of relations between Allah and humans, as well as between humans and the universe. However, from another perspective, it is also considered a human institution. Some opponents of religion, lacking strong evidence to challenge the existence of Allah, direct their objections towards prophethood, which is seen as a manifestation of Allah’s attribute of speech (kalām). To counter the rejection of prophethood, scholars of theology (kalām), hadith, and Prophetic biography (sīrah) (...) have compiled a body of literature known as Dalāʾil al-nubuwwah (Proofs of Prophethood). Their aim has been to collect proofs supporting prophethood as a response to these refutations and to dispel doubts regarding it. All extraordinary events occurring from before the birth until the death of Prophet Muhammad are considered evidence.During the fifth century, a notable figure in this tradition was the Shāfiʿī scholar al-Māwardī, who defended prophethood in his book Aʿlām al-nubuwwah (The Signs of Prophethood). Aʿlām al-nubuwwah has inspired subsequent works in this field due to its clarity and robust proofs. It became known by both names, Aʿlām al-nubuwwah and Dalāʾil al-nubuwwah, as it encompassed methods of narration and debate. Within his work, al-Māwardī mentions figures like Barāhimah, Dahriyyah, and certain philosophers as representatives of the idea rejecting prophethood. According to him, Barāhimah, of Indian origin is a sect that denies prophethood despite accepting the unity of Allah. Dahriyyah is a denialist sect attributing eternity to the universe and creativity to nature. Al-Māwardī considers these philosophers as infidels due to their comments on prophethood rather than outright denial. The basis of these movements' idea of denying prophethood lies in their efforts to portray reason (ʿaql) as an alternative to revelation (waḥy). Jews and Christians, on the other hand, are portrayed as groups that accept the concept of prophethood, however they reject Muḥammad’s. prophecy. Their objection stems from the fear of their religions being superseded. Al-Māwardī counters those rejecting prophethood by addressing the public interest (maṣlaḥah) of humans, the necessity of prophets, and the role of miracles. He illustrates that prophet charged with the duty of prophethood proves it through spectacular events orchestrated by Allah but carried out through his own hand. The prophet serves the public interest by conveying matters beyond human intellect and presenting them in a comprehensible manner, thereby ensuring the worldly and eternal felicity of humanity. Furthermore, he provides evidence for the Prophet Muḥammad’s prophethood through his moral character, prophetic biography, and accounts of miracles. The biography of Prophet Muhammad’s begins before his birth, and the method of proof is used to demonstrate his prophethood. In essence, al-Māwardī’s method of proving prophethood in Aʿlām al-nubuwwah can be seen as a synthesis of the approaches used by scholars of theology and hadith. One prominent figure in this tradition during the fifth century was the Shafi'i scholar al-Māwardī who defended prophethood through his book " ʿA'lām al-Nubuwwa" (The Signs of Prophethood). In his work, al-Māwardī mentions figures like Barahima, Dahriyya, and certain philosophers as representatives of the idea rejecting prophethood. While the Jews and Christians accept the concept of prophethood, they reject the prophecy of Muhammad (P.B.U.H). These groups attempt to present logic as an alternative to divine revelation (Wahy), as their objection stems from their concern that their religions may be abrogated. Al-Māwardī responds to those who reject the institution of prophethood by addressing the public interest (maslaha) of humans, the necessity of prophets, and the role of miracles. He also provides evidence for Muhammad's (P.B.U.H) prophethood through his moral character, prophetic biography, and accounts of miracles. In short, al-Māwardī's method of proving prophethood in "A'lām al-Nubuwwa " can be seen as a synthesis of the approaches used by scholars of theology (Kalam) and hadith. (shrink)

Novalis was a central figure in early German Romantic philosophy. Whilst the importance of both Fichte and Spinoza for the development of Romanticism is well established, the vital influence of the Platonic tradition in allowing the Romantics to synthesise these divergent philosophies merits closer attention. Essential to the development of Novalis’ thought was his exposure to Plotinus. This examination first sets out the religious and philosophical problems in Germany at the close of the eighteenth century and situates Novalis in relation (...) to this intellectual environment. Following this, a brief survey of Plotinus-scholarship at the close of the eighteenth century in Germany frames how Novalis came into contact with Plotinus through Dieterich Tiedemann. The examination proceeds to consider how Tiedemann shaped Novalis reception of Plotinus and allowed him to develop a synthesis of Spinoza and Fichte. Finally, it briefly examines the poetic realisation of this synthesis through Novalis’ late poetic work. (shrink)

In this work, author evaluated past theories and perspectives behind the definitions of science and/or branches of science. Also some of the philosophers of science and their specific philosophical interests were expressed. Author considered some type of interactions between some disciplines to determine, to solve the philosophical/scientific problems and to define the possible solutions. The purposes of this article are: (i) to define new synthesis method, (ii) to define new perspective for the philosophy of science, (iii) to define relation (...) between new philosophy perspective and philosophy of science, (iv) to define and organize name, number, relations, and correct structure between special science branches and philosophy of science, (v) to define necessary and sufficient number of branches for philosophy of science, (vi) to define and express the importance and place of new philosophy of science perspective in the new system, (vii) to extend the definition/limits of philosophy of science, (viii) to re-define meanings of some philosophical/scientific theories, (ix) to define systematic solution for the conflicts, problems, confusions about philosophy of science, sciences and branches of science, (x) to define new branches of science, (xi) to re-construct branches and hierarchy of science, (xii) to define new theories about science and branches of science. Author considered R-Synthesis as a method for the evaluation of the philosophy, philosophy of science, sciences and branches of science. This R-Synthesis includes evaluation of eight categories of general/specific perspective, 21-dimensions, and 12 general subjects (with related scope and contents) for the past 12,000 years. It is a kind of synthesis of science and non-science, physical science and non-physical science, religious science and non-religious science, and others. In this article, author defined 27 possible definitive/certain result cases for this new synthesis. Author defined the possible formation stages shortly to express new disciplines, new constructional and/or complementary theories. These theories are considered to define 21 major effective disciplines. New philosophy perspective is defined (R-Philosophy) shortly. New perspective and sub branches are defined for the philosophy of science. Major sciences are defined due to new basic philosophies. 42-basic components are defined for each science branch. New and/or re-constructed sciences, branches of science, basic sciences, and new hierarchy of science are defined with figure. Electromagnetic sciences, information sciences, and system sciences are defined specifically. Hybrid Sciences, New Era Science, and Ideal Scientific System are defined with general/specific figure. Relation between the some old branches and new branches of science was expressed generally due to new perspective of philosophy of science. (shrink)

A powerful work of moral and political philosophy.The idea which I shall present here came to me more or less out of the blue. I was on a train some five years ago, on my way to spend a day at Headingley and I was reading a book about the death camp at Sobibor... The particular, not very appropriate, conjunction involved for me in this train journey... had the effect of fixing my thoughts on one of the more dreadful features (...) of human coexistence, when in the shape of a simple five-word phrase the idea occurred to me. In The Contract of Mutual Indifference, Norman Geras discusses a central aspect of the experience of the Holocaust with a view to exploring its most important contemporary implications. In a bold and powerful synthesis of memorial, literary record, historical reflection and political theory, he focuses on the figure of the bystander -- the bystander to the destruction of the Jews of Europe and the bystander to more recent atrocities -- to consider the moral consequences of looking on without active response at persecution and great suffering. Geras argues that the tragedy of European Jewry, so widely pondered by historians, social scientists, psychologists, theologians and others, has not yet found its proper reflection within political philosophy. Attempting to fill the gap, he adapts an old idea from within that tradition of enquiry, the idea of the social contract, to the task of thinking about the triangular relation between perpetrators, victims and bystanders, and draws a somber conclusion from it. Geras goes on to ask how far this conclusion may be offset by the hypothesis of a universal duty to bring aid. The Contract of Mutual Indifference is an original and challenging work, aimed at the complacent abstraction of much contemporary theory. It is supplemented by three shorter essays on the implications of the Jewish catastrophe for conceptions of human nature and progress and for certain types of Marxist explanation. (shrink)

The writings of the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser and his associates have figured prominently in the development of contemporary social theory. The Althusserian school of Structural Marxism is a startlingly original synthesis of Marxism and Modernism, which has produced a large body of work that extends across the human sciences and the humanities to engage a wide variety of cultures, theoretical problems, and political issues. Despite the fact that Althusser himself is widely recognized as a major figure, the (...) breadth, coherence, and achievements of Structural Marxism as a whole have gone largely unrecognized. In this, the most systematic and wide-ranging assessment of Structural Marxism in any language, Resch provides a comprehensive and thematic introduction to the work of Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas, Pierre Macherey, Etienne Balibar, Emmanuel Terray, Terry Eagleton, Göran Therborn, Renée Balibar, Perry Anderson, Pierre-Philippe Rey, Michel Pêchaux, Guy Bois, and others. Resch's sympathetic and critical study demonstrates the enormous significance of Althusser's modernist renewal of Marxist social theory and its ongoing challenge to post-Marxist movements such as postmodernism and neo-liberalism. (shrink)