One standard criticism of the doctrine of continuous creation is that it entails the occasionalist position that God alone is a true cause and that the events we commonly identify as causes are merely the occasions upon which God brings about effects. I begin by clearly stating Malebranche's argument from continuous creation to occasionalism. Next, I examine two strategies for resisting Malebranche's argument – strong and weak concurrentism – and argue that weak concurrentism is the more (...) promising strategy. Finally, I argue that weak concurrentism requires a necessitarian approach to secondary causation. (shrink)

One standard criticism of the doctrine of continuous creation is that it entails the occasionalist position that God alone is a true cause and that the events we commonly identify as causes are merely the occasions upon which God brings about effects. I begin by clearly stating Malebranche's argument from continuous creation to occasionalism. Next, I examine two strategies for resisting Malebranche's argument ??? strong and weak concurrentism ??? and argue that weak concurrentism is the more (...) promising strategy. Finally, I argue that weak concurrentism requires a necessitarian approach to secondary causation. (shrink)

This paper examines Leibniz’s views on the theistic doctrine of continual creation and considers their implications for his theory of finite substance. Three main theses are defended: (1) that Leibniz takes the traditional account of continual creation to involve the literal re-creation of all things in a successive series of instantaneous states, (2) that a straightforward commitment to the traditional account would give rise to serious problems within Leibniz’s theory of finite substance and his metaphysics more generally, (...) and (3) that Leibniz does not straightforwardly affirm the continual creation doctrine, despite certain texts that initially seem to suggest otherwise. I also present a more speculative interpretive hypothesis about what Leibniz’s considered view of creation might have been, namely that in a single act, God creates and conserves substances that are non-spatial and atemporal at the deepest level of reality. (shrink)

‘God needs no instruments to act,’ Malebranche writes in Search 6.2.3; “it suffices that He wills in order that a thing be, because it is a contradiction that He should will and that what He wills should not happen. Therefore, His power is His will”. After nearly identical language in Treatise 1.12, Malebranche writes that “[God's] wills are necessarily efficacious … His power differs not at all from His will”. God exercises His causal power, here, via His volitions; what He (...) causes depends not merely on the fact that He wills, but specifically on the content of His volitions, on “what He wills.” Yet despite the obviously key role the ordinary notion of volitional content plays for Malebranche, recent writers have paid surprisingly little attention either to it or its exegetical implications. I hope partly to rectify this situation here.The plan of this paper is this: to borrow current work in the philosophy of mind to sketch the notion of an incomplete volition, i.e. one whose content is ‘incomplete’ in a sense to be explained; to note that Malebranche accepts and uses something like this notion. (shrink)

Originally published in 1950, this book challenged the basis of our beliefs about the relation of life to matter. Already aware that chalk, limestone and coal seams are the residues of ancient life, the author suggests that this knowledge may also be applied to the rest of matter. In that case, he argues, the origin of the world was not cosmic upheaval which broke down at last into life, but organic life itself.

‘God needs no instruments to act,’ Malebranche writes in Search 6.2.3; “it suffices that He wills in order that a thing be, because it is a contradiction that He should will and that what He wills should not happen. Therefore, His power is His will”. After nearly identical language in Treatise 1.12, Malebranche writes that “[God's] wills are necessarily efficacious … His power differs not at all from His will”. God exercises His causal power, here, via His volitions; what He (...) causes depends not merely on the fact that He wills, but specifically on the content of His volitions, on “what He wills.” Yet despite the obviously key role the ordinary notion of volitional content plays for Malebranche, recent writers have paid surprisingly little attention either to it or its exegetical implications. I hope partly to rectify this situation here.The plan of this paper is this: to borrow current work in the philosophy of mind to sketch the notion of an incomplete volition, i.e. one whose content is ‘incomplete’ in a sense to be explained; to note that Malebranche accepts and uses something like this notion. (shrink)

The concept of continuous creation is now widely used in the context of reflections on the dialogue between science and religion. The first part of this research work seeks to understand its meaning through a twofold elaboration: (1) the historical setting of the three philosophical trends in which this concept was developed: scholastic (conservation), Cartesian (conservation through repetition of the creative act at each instant), and dynamic (interpreting the emergence of radical and contingent novelty in nature as a (...) sign of the continuity of creation); (2) a philosophical and theological critique of the concept of continuous creation regarding the question of the relationship between change and creation, in the light of its highly polymorphous contemporary use, and, in opposition, its absence within the Catholic Magisterium. This work opens the field a further step toward reflection on a renewed concept of continuous creation. (shrink)

René Descartes with his theory of continued creation occupies an exceptional place in the philosophy of Henri Bergson: Descartes is subjected to Bergson’s repeated criticism like no other philosopher. Yet, in L’évolution créatrice Bergson appears to oscillate in his criticism of Descartes. Bergson discovers in the theory of continued creation a thought of freedom, of an indeterminate future, which is not far from his own thought of duration. Bergson thus advances a thesis in accordance with which Descartes’ theory (...) of continued creation has two irreconcilable aspects: continued creation and continuous creation. The difference between these two aspects, however, is not just about the choice between a participle and an adjective. The aim of this article is to show how Descartes’ theory of continued creation lends itself to such a double interpretation. While the former aspect originates in Descartes’ project of mechanistic physics, the latter aspect is accessible but from the standpoint of human freedom, as well as Descartes’ critique of finalism. The article thus shows that Descartes’ theory of continued creation constitutes a point of convergence between the questions of mechanism and human freedom, where the latter is an exception to the former. However, the exceptional status of human freedom in Descartes’ philosophy renders Bergson’ thesis about Descartes’ oscillation between two aspects somewhat problematic. (shrink)

The renewal of the concept of continuous creation follows two steps: (1) an establishment of the concept of novelty in an exercise of philosophy of nature, as a means of interpreting the scientific discourse concerning the evolution of life; (2) starting out from philosophical and theological critiques and from the concept of novelty, this work proposes a reformulation of the concept of continuous creation in its dynamic perspective. If the universe of possibilities of creation proceeds (...) from the Divine Word by the will of the Father, as the first timeless ex nihilo creative moment, the Holy Spirit allows, in a second creative moment, the universe of possibilities to proceed continuously through a creative partnership in which all creatures are involved. Created novelty is the expression of a procession of one possibility among others, which has been selected by creatures during the evolutionary process, due to the interdependence of constitutive interactions and the propensities in which creatures are situated. (shrink)

Malebranche presents two major arguments for occasionalism: the “no necessary connection” argument (NNC) and the “conservation is but continuous creation” argument (CCC). NNC appears prominently in his Search After Truth but virtually disappears and surrenders the spotlight to CCC in his later major work, Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion . This paper investigates the possible reasons and motivations behind this significant shift. I argue that the shift is no surprise if we consider the two ways in which (...) the CCC is preferable to NNC: it is not only more effective against opponents but also more consistent with his own views on freedom. (shrink)

Vladimir Solov’ëv, Sergej Bulgakov, Nikolaj Berdjaev, and Semën Frank shared the conviction that Creation is incomplete: humanity must arrive at organizing social life on an “eighth day.” Thus they prophesied the Universal Church, “social Christianity,” “personalist socialism,” and “spiritual democracy.” Their attempt to avoid any illegitimate confusion between independent rational thought and Christian faith prompted Bulgakov to become an ordained theologian, Berdjaev a “philosophical poet,” and Frank a “Christian realist.” Solov’ëv’s theosophical attempt to philosophically substantiate faith and consequently eschatological (...) prophecy finds itself in the same tragic predicament as Christian faith in general when amalgamated on a one to one basis with the world. I am to show that this is not the case for any of the three other authors discussed, however, much they did adhere to some of Solov’ëv’s major lines of thought. (shrink)

Vladimir Solov’ëv, Sergej Bulgakov, Nikolaj Berdjaev, and Semën Frank shared the conviction that Creation is incomplete: humanity must arrive at organizing social life on an “eighth day.” Thus they prophesied the Universal Church, “social Christianity,” “personalist socialism,” and “spiritual democracy.” Their attempt to avoid any illegitimate confusion between independent rational thought and Christian faith prompted Bulgakov to become an ordained theologian, Berdjaev a “philosophical poet,” and Frank a “Christian realist.” Solov’ëv’s theosophical attempt to philosophically substantiate faith and consequently eschatological (...) prophecy finds itself in the same tragic predicament as Christian faith in general when amalgamated on a one to one basis with the world. I am to show that this is not the case for any of the three other authors discussed, however, much they did adhere to some of Solov’ëv’s major lines of thought. (shrink)

In the article, I present the main assumptions of the natural-order theodicy and the free-will theodicy defended by William Hasker. Next, I pose the question of whether Hasker’s theodicies are compatible with the Christian doctrine of continuous creation accepted by Hasker himself. I consider several different ways of how the doctrine of continuous creation can be understood and the difficulties associated with them. Finally, I propose a modified conception of continuous creation and I claim (...) that it is consistent with the main assumptions of William Hasker’s theodicies. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 3, Page 452-457, May 2022.

Malebranche’s so-called conservation is continuous creation (CCC) argument has been celebrated as a powerful and persuasive argument for Occasionalism—the claim that only God has and exercises causal powers. In this paper I want to examine the CCC argument for Occasionalism by comparing it to Jaegwon Kim’s so-called Supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism. Because the arguments have deep similarities it is interesting and fruitful to consider them in tandem. First I argue that both the CCC argument and the Supervenience (...) argument turn on the same general principle, what Kim calls Edward’s Dictum. It is doubtful that Malebranche or Kim succeed in grounding Edward’s Dictum, though Malebranche, I think, has more resources at his disposal to make his case. Even if this worry is waived, however, I argue that the completion of Stage 1 of the Supervenience argument can be used to raise a further worry for the CCC argument that cannot easily be resolved. (shrink)

The traditional view of divine conservation holds that it is simply a continuation of the initial act of creation. In this essay, I defend the continuous-creation tradition against William Lane Craig's criticism that continuous creation fundamentally misconstrues the intuitive distinction between creation and conservation. According to Craig, creation is the unique causal activity of bringing new patient entities into existence, while conservation involves acting upon already existing patient entities to cause their continued existence. (...) I defend continuous creation by challenging Craig's intuitive distinction and by showing that the alternative account of creation and conservation he bases upon it is fraught with serious internal difficulties. (shrink)

The traditional view of divine conservation holds that it is simply a continuation of the initial act of creation. In this essay, I defend the continuous-creation tradition against William Lane Craig's criticism that continuous creation fundamentally misconstrues the intuitive distinction between creation and conservation. According to Craig, creation is the unique causal activity of bringing new patient entities into existence, while conservation involves acting upon already existing patient entities to cause their continued existence. (...) I defend continuous creation by challenging Craig's intuitive distinction and by showing that the alternative account of creation and conservation he bases upon it is fraught with serious internal difficulties. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 61 Heft: 2 Seiten: 184-206.

Louis de La Forge and the Development of Occasionalism: Continuous Creation and the Activity of the Soul STEVEN NADLER THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE CONSERVATION is a dangerous one. It is not theologi- cally dangerous, at least not in itself. From the thirteenth century onwards, and particularly with the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas, the notion of the continuous divine sustenance of the world of created things was, if not univer- sally accepted, a nonetheless common feature of theological (...) orthodoxy, Chris- tian and otherwise. Rather, the danger is philosophical in nature . The philosophical problem I am concerned with is not some logical incoherence at the heart of the doctrine; nor does it lie in any objections that can be raised against the arguments that, historically, have been given for the thesis that God, as a causa secundum esse, must continually act in order to conserve the world in being. The question I address -- and it is a pressing one for any seventeenth-century Cartesianmis whether the doctrine of divine conservation establishes too much. I believe that, under certain circumstances, it does, and that the ultimate ramifications of the doctrine for natural causality must be unacceptable to an orthodox Cartesian such as Louis de La Forge , perhaps the most strict follower of Descartes of the.. (shrink)

Value Co-Creation plays a major role in engaging knowledgeable individuals in a community via innovation, problem solving, and new service/product development. This study investigates the personal factors that influence individuals’ engagement in value co-creation in Higher Education Institutions through the use of online platforms. Some higher education institutions have successfully established or used appropriate online platforms, such as online forums, web applications, and mobile applications to engage their community in ideation or crowdsourcing as a part of the value (...) co-creation process. On the other hand, some HEIs have failed to engage their community in value co-creation activities, and even if they managed to engage some individuals in value co-creation once, they failed to sustain these individuals’ engagement in value co-creation using online platforms. Using the Stimulus Organism Response framework, this study examines the relationship between relevant personal factors and other motivational factors that provide perceived benefits with value co-creation engagement. Data was collected from 308 respondents at five Malaysian research universities. The software analysis tool Smart PLS is used for data analysis and validation. The results demonstrate that personal factors and perceived benefits as a motivational factor has a significant effect on individual engagement in value co-creation. However, the significance of these findings varies from one individual to another. The implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

In this article, the idea that the accidents (a’rād) do not have continuity for two consecutive periods of time and that they are recreated in the second moment of their existence is analyzed within the framework of al-Juwayn¬ī's approaches. For this purpose, first of all, the place of the theory of continuous creation in the thought system of mutakallimūn, and then the consequences of al-Juwaynī's acceptance of continuous creation in terms of the effectiveness of divine intervention (...) and the understanding of the universe (al-‘ālam) are touched upon. Continuous re-creation (Tajaddud al-amthal) is an understanding that is considered as the disappearance of accidents moment by moment and their re-creation with similar ones. In this way, mutakallimūn tried to explain the continuity and change in the universe, as well as the constants that do not change in things. This understanding, which is associated with the renewal of accidents at every moment, is handled by al-Juwayn¬ī within the framework of the principles that the accidents are finite and that they cannot subsist by themselves (qāim bi-nafs). Accordingly, the accident cannot carry another accident because it does not occupy space (mātahayyaza); nor does it have continuity because it cannot be self-subsisting (al-qāim) with invariability (baqā) which is an accident like itself. As a matter of fact, if the existence of the accident had continued for the second time, it would not have been possible for its like to exist in the same place. Likewise, if the accident had the characteristic of continuity, its nonexistence would be impossible. Because what is continuous at two consecutive moments would not be able to perish in the third and subsequent moments. However, senses reveal that the accidents have disappeared. Thus, the accident, which has a discontinuous and impermanent structure, becomes the subject of creation at the same time whenever it loses its existence. The understanding of continuous creation, accepted by most of the mutakallimūn, is systematized over accidents and does not include the renewal of substances. It is striking that al-Juwayn¬ī also made a distinction with regard to the renewal of the accidents and the continuity of the substances. However, by associating the persistence of the substance with the continuous creation of accidents, al-Juwayn¬ī explains this issue in a way that does not contradict the absolute power of Allah. According to him, the condition of continuity of the substance depends on the existence of the accident which subsists with it. As long as Allah wishes for the continuity of the existence of the substance, he creates the accident of baqā in it one after the other. If the accident disappears, the substance also loses its existence. Thus, God's intervention by continuous re-creation has a direct effect on the accident; the substance, depending on the accident, which is the condition of its continuity, is in need of God's intervention. Therefore, the universe as a whole is not independent of the Creator even for a moment. This understanding of creation of al-Juwayn¬ī, on the one hand, hinders the idea of necessary causality, on the other hand, it draws a model of God-world (al-‘ālam) relationship that foresees the constant intervention of the Creator, who is the Free Agent (Fā‘il Mukhtār). The idea that everything that exists before and after is dependent on Allah's creation also invalidates the idea that the objects in the world stem from the qualities they have in their own nature. (shrink)

One of the particular problems in the debate between science and theology regarding human origins seems to be an apparent controversy between the continuous character of evolutionary processes leading to the origin of Homo sapiens and the punctual understanding of the act of creation of man seen as taking place in a moment in time. The paper elaborates scientific arguments for continuity or discontinuity of evolution, and what follows, for the existence or nonexistence of a clear borderline between (...) our species and the rest of the living world. It is argued that, due to the conventional character of the notion of species, anthropology is unable to point to a moment in time or a place on Earth when or where Homo sapiens came into existence as a ‘really new’ species. The argument of the non˗specificity of humans is reinforced by considering emotional homologies between man and apes, “cultural” transmission of the patterns of behaviour in animals, or their mental and communicational abilities. All this is in line with a more general philosophical view of ontological continuity of the world. However, the argument is counterbalanced by pointing to such human characteristics as the ability to use abstract notions, or those forms of human behaviour which do not seem to have their animal analogues. In turn, various possibilities of theological interpretations of the act of creation of man are pointed out and a question is considered as to what extent theology is interested in a "momentary" account of this act. By pointing to theological accounts proposed as early as the 2nd century, it is argued that a vision of God – the craftsman who ‘builds’ its creation step by step, or even less restrictive forms of divine interventionism, are theologically inadequate. The original opposition between the continuity of evolutionary processes and ‘punctual’ character of creation is thus weakened and, from that perspective, a solution to the controversy in question is sought. One of such solutions, an “evolutionary model of creation”, a form of evolutionary creationism, proposed by a Polish philosopher Kazimierz Kloskowski, is presented. This model is based on two assumptions, stemming from process philosophy and evolutionary epistemology. The need to apply them in constructing a coherent view on evolution and creation is critically considered in the paper. (shrink)

This paper will be a limited attempt to make sense of divine causation in Leibniz. I will not be able to discuss whether divine causation is immanent causation, nor explore the metaphysics of creation, emanation, and miracles in detail. Rather, I will focus on adjudicating the degree to which Leibniz’s famous denial of the interaction of substances bears on his views of divine causation. (edited).

In this paper I argue that the hoary theological doctrine of divine concurrence poses no deep threat to Leibniz’s views on theodicy and creaturely activity even as those views have been traditionally understood. The first three sections examine respectively Leibniz’s views on creation, conservation and concurrence, with an eye towards showing their sys­tematic compatibility with Leibniz’s theodicy and metaphysics. The fourth section takes up remaining worries arising from the bridging principle that conservation is a continued or continuous (...) class='Hi'>creation, and argues that they can be allayed once two readings of the prin­ciple are distinguished. What emerges from the discussion as a whole is, I hope, a clearer picture of Leibniz’s views on the nature of monadic causation, his understanding of the relationship between divine and creaturely activity, and his position with respect to later medieval and early modern debates over secondary causation. (shrink)

Introduction : points of departure -- A genealogy of the Christian colonial mindset : ex nihilo from disputed beginnings to orthodox origins -- Ex nihilo and the origin of an empire -- Ex nihilo, erasure and discovery? -- The cogito, ex nihilo, and the legacy of John Locke -- The creation ex nihilo of terra nullius lands : omnipotent nations and the logic of global-colonization -- From epistemologies of domination to grounded thinking -- Opening words about God onto creatio (...) continua -- Creatio continua "all the way down": a post-colonial, planetary understanding of continuing creation -- Conclusion : a brief thought after. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the hoary theological doctrine of divine concurrence poses no deep threat to Leibniz’s views on theodicy and creaturely activity even as those views have been traditionally understood. The first three sections examine respectively Leibniz’s views on creation, conservation and concurrence, with an eye towards showing their sys­tematic compatibility with Leibniz’s theodicy and metaphysics. The fourth section takes up remaining worries arising from the bridging principle that conservation is a continued or continuous (...) class='Hi'>creation, and argues that they can be allayed once two readings of the prin­ciple are distinguished. What emerges from the discussion as a whole is, I hope, a clearer picture of Leibniz’s views on the nature of monadic causation, his understanding of the relationship between divine and creaturely activity, and his position with respect to later medieval and early modern debates over secondary causation. (shrink)

Niels H. Gregersen seeks to illuminate the nature of continuing divine action in the world and to show that the classical theistic doctrine of continuous creation is consonant with some recent scientific theories of self‐productive (“autopoietic”) systems. Central to these theories is the concept of co‐operation; central to Gregersen's theological appropriation of these theories is also the notion of structuring causality developed by philosopher Fred Dretske. While supportive of Gregersen's overall aims and emphases, we find significant disanalogies between (...) co‐operation as a theological construct and as an evolutionary strategy. We also doubt the utility of Dretske's notion for his project. (shrink)

How to reconcile monadic simplicity with the successive plurality of the monadic states ? The doctrine of continued creation seems to entail the existence of independent temporal parts and thus lead to the thesis that the world contains only transitory things. I try to show how Leibniz has the resources to get out of this quandary. The analysis of the concept of extension shows that a plurality of states does not constitute a divisible aggregate. Then I examine the Leibnizian (...) interpretation of continued creation, by com- paring it to the scholastic and Cartesian Background. From thence I conclude that Leibniz’s final thesis is that monads are wholly present at each moment of their duration. (shrink)

God is conceived in the Western theistic tradition to be both the Creator and Conservor of the universe. These two roles were typically classed as different aspects of creation, originating creation and continuing creation. On pain of incoherence, however, conservation needs to be distinguished from creation. Contrary to current analyses (such as Philip Quinn's), creation should be explicated in terms of God's bringing something into being, while conservation should be understood in terms of God's preservation (...) of something over an interval of time. The crucial difference is that while conservation presupposes an object of the divine action, creation does not. Such a construal has significant implications for a tensed theory of time. (shrink)

Le présent essai se propose d'appréhender la doctrine cartésienne selon laquelle ce qui existe ne saurait subsister sans que Dieu le soutienne dans l'être par une activité créatrice continuée. Comment Dieu soutient-il l'existence et pourquoi lui est-il nécessaire de le faire ? L'auteur analyse l'apparente contradiction, qui fait problème, entre la doctrine de la création continuée et l'affirmation par Descartes que le mouvement se poursuit à moins que n'intervienne quelque force extérieure. Il examine ensuite, pour la récuser, la thèse (défendue (...) par Gilson et par Gueroult) selon laquelle la doctrine de la création continuée impliquerait la discontinuité du temps. This essay seeks to understand Descartes's doctrine that what exists cannot continue to exist unless God sustains it by continuous creative activity. How does God sustain existence and why is it necessary for Him to do this ? The essay explores a puzzling apparent contrast between the doctrine of continuous creation and Descartes's claim that motion continues unless an external force interferes. Further, it considers and rejects the thesis (maintained by Gilson and Gueroult) that the doctrine of continuous creation entails that time is discontinuous. (shrink)

Le présent essai se propose d'appréhender la doctrine cartésienne selon laquelle ce qui existe ne saurait subsister sans que Dieu le soutienne dans l'être par une activité créatrice continuée. Comment Dieu soutient-il l'existence et pourquoi lui est-il nécessaire de le faire ? L'auteur analyse l'apparente contradiction, qui fait problème, entre la doctrine de la création continuée et l'affirmation par Descartes que le mouvement se poursuit à moins que n'intervienne quelque force extérieure. Il examine ensuite, pour la récuser, la thèse selon (...) laquelle la doctrine de la création continuée impliquerait la discontinuité du temps. This essay seeks to understand Descartes's doctrine that what exists cannot continue to exist unless God sustains it by continuous creative activity. How does God sustain existence and why is it necessary for Him to do this ? The essay explores a puzzling apparent contrast between the doctrine of continuous creation and Descartes's claim that motion continues unless an external force interferes. Further, it considers and rejects the thesis that the doctrine of continuous creation entails that time is discontinuous. (shrink)

This incisive study concerns the ways in which theological claims about creation's original and final perfection shape social ethics. Schuurman argues that prominent 20th century theologians Emil Brunner and Jurgen Moltmann wrongly envision the eschaton as radically discontinuous with creation, and that this discontinuity coheres with serious inadequacies in their social ethics. His thesis is that continuity between creation and eschaton is necessary if Christian social ethics is to avoid dualistic understandings of love and justice, personal and (...) impersonal values, church and world, revolutionism and conservatism. Schuurman establishes theological groundwork for a social ethic that calls for continuous transformation of social institutions and structures.". (shrink)