In his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately two core assumptions—in fact (...) two contradictory strands within the concept of epistemic support—which jointly create a powerful challenge for our pursuit of paramount epistemic values. (shrink)

Some commentators maintain that Spinozistic active ideas are judgements. I shall call this view the common interpretation, since it is popular to interpret Spinoza as reacting against Descartes's theory of ideas. According to this reading, Spinozistic ideas are considered not as Cartesian ideas but as Cartesian judgements. One clear difference between Descartes and Spinoza is that Spinoza holds that ideas are active, while Descartes does not. According to the common interpretation, Spinoza and Descartes use the concept of activity in the (...) same way. Since Descartes holds that judgements are active, it is maintained that Spinozistic active ideas are like Cartesian judgements. I find this an overly superficial interpretation of Spinoza. I argue that, for Spinoza, activity denotes more than mere Cartesian activity. Whereas Spinoza wants to say that active ideas incorporate the property of truth or certainty, Descartes does not consider judgements in that way. In this way, Spinozistic active ideas can be called truth-expressing. (shrink)

Some commentators maintain that Spinozistic active ideas are judgements. I shall call this view the common interpretation, since it is popular to interpret Spinoza as reacting against Descartes’ theory of ideas. According to this reading, Spinozistic ideas are considered not as Cartesian ideas but as Cartesian judgements. One clear difference between Descartes and Spinoza is that Spinoza holds that ideas are active, while Descartes does not. According to the common interpretation, Spinoza and Descartes use the concept of activity in the (...) same way. Since Descartes holds that judgements are active, it is maintained that Spinozistic active ideas are like Cartesian judgements. I find this an overly superficial interpretation of Spinoza. I argue that, for Spinoza, activity denotes more than mere Cartesian activity. Whereas Spinoza wants to say that active ideas incorporate the property of truth or certainty, Descartes does not consider judgements in that way. In this way, Spinozistic active ideas can be called truth-expressing. (shrink)

According to necessitarianism, all truths are logically necessary, and the modal doctrine of anecessitarian philosopher is in a sharp contrast with something that seems manifest—the view that thereare contingent truths. At least on the face of it, then, necessitarianism is highly implausible. RenéDescartes is usually not regarded as a necessitarian philosopher, but some of his philosophical viewsraise the worry as to whether he is committed to the necessity of all truths. This paper is an appraisal ofthis worry.

According to necessitarianism, all truths are logically necessary, and the modal doctrine of a necessitarian philosopher is in a sharp contrast with something that seems manifest—the view that there are contingent truths. At least on the face of it, then, necessitarianism is highly implausible. René Descartes is usually not regarded as a necessitarian philosopher, but some of his philosophical views raise the worry as to whether he is committed to the necessity of all truths. This paper is an appraisal of (...) this worry. (shrink)

In his excellent introduction to metaethics, Alexander Miller argues that there are affinities between G. E.Moore's open-question argument and Socrates’ argumentation in Euthyphro dialogue. Miller is also led toask how Moore's argument can be disdained without being unsympathetic to Socrates’ argument. Thispaper answers to Miller's question by showing that the two arguments are quite different. It is also arguedthat the two arguments merit different assessments: one may well appreciate Socrates’ reasoning and yetbe unconvinced by Moore's.

Review: LADESMAN, Charles. Skepticism: The Central Issues.

In this paper I argue that Descartes's earliest proclamation of his curious modal theory supports the conceptualist analysis of it, according to which the eternity of the eternal truths is a conceptual matter, not something more profound than that.

This paper tackles the famous predicament known as the Cartesian Circle. This notorious problem can be understood as manifesting an ancient dilemma—the diallelus, or the problem of the criterion. Now, the problem of the criterion can be approached from either particularistic or methodistic standpoint. In a nutshell, a particularist accepts instances of knowledge prior to criteria of knowledge, and the methodist goes the other way around. In this paper Descartes's struggle with the problem receives a particularistic reading. Using James Van (...) Cleve's and Jaakko Hintikka's thoughts as my main leverage, I argue that the particularist Descartes can reach knowledge without circularity. However, problems will remain and I shall bring out those that to me seem most pressing. (shrink)