Deprivation of liberty in psychiatric hospitals is common world-wide. The aim of this study was to find out whether patients had experienced deprivation of their liberty during psychiatric hospitalization and to explore their views about it. Patients (n = 51) in two acute psychiatric inpatient wards were interviewed in 2001. They were asked to describe in their own words their experiences of being deprived of their liberty. The data were analysed by inductive content analysis. The types of (...) deprivation of liberty in psychiatric hospital care reported by these patients were: restrictions on leaving the ward and on communication, confiscation of property, and various coercive measures. The patients' experiences of being deprived of their liberty were negative, although some saw the rationale for using these interventions, considering them as part of hospital care. (shrink)

Abstract: In this brief article, I claim that the Contribution Principle invoked by Christian Barry as a key principle for determining who owes what to the global destitute is mistaken as a definitive principle and unjustified as a provisional principle for dealing with global poverty. This principle assumes that merely causing, or contributing to the cause of, a state of affairs may be sufficient to have a special responsibility to bear the costs that this state of affairs entails. I argue (...) that an agent will only have such a special responsibility if he or she has caused a state of affairs (for example, acute destitution) by violating a duty not to do so. Therefore, the Contribution Principle is mistaken. Finally, I tackle two possible responses to my argument. The first claims that states have a duty not to undertake actions that may cause, or contribute to the cause of, acute deprivations. The second claims that although the Contribution Principle may be mistaken as a definitive principle for dealing with global destitution, it is nonetheless correct as a provisional principle. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to observe whether aerobic exercise is able to alleviate the impairment of cognitive control ability in college students by sleep deprivation through cognitive control and blood-based markers. Taking 30 healthy college students as participants, using a random cross-over design within groups, respectively perform one night of sleep deprivation and one night of normal sleep. The exercise intervention modality was to complete a 30-min session of moderate-intensity aerobic exercise on a power bicycle. Change (...) in cognitive control was assessed using the Go/NoGo task paradigm; 5-ht and blood glucose contentwere determined by enzyme-linked immuno sorbent assay and glucose oxidase electrode Measurement, respectively. The results showed that sleep deprivation could significantly reduce the response inhibition ability and response execution ability, and significantly reduce the blood 5-ht content. Thirty minutes of moderate intensity aerobic exercise intervention significantly increased response inhibition ability and response execution ability, significantly increased blood 5-ht content, and did not change serum glucose levels. Conclusion: An acute aerobic exercise can alleviate the cognitive control impairment caused by sleep deprivation, and 5-ht may be one of the possible mechanisms by which aerobic exercise alleviates the cognitive control impairment caused by sleep deprivation. (shrink)

Understanding the effect of stress, fatigue, and sleep deprivation on the ability to maintain an alert and attentive state in an ecologically valid setting is of importance as lapsing attention can, in many safety-critical professions, have devastating consequences. Here we studied the effect of close-quarters battle exercise combined with overnight military training with sleep deprivation on cognitive performance, namely sustained attention and response inhibition. In addition, the effect of the CQ battle and overnight training on cardiac activity [heart (...) rate and root mean square of the successive differences ] during the cognitive testing and the relationship between cardiac activity and cognitive performance were examined. Cognitive performance was measured with the psychomotor vigilance task and the sustained attention to response task. Altogether 45 conscripts participated in the study. The conscripts were divided into control and experimental groups. The CON completed the training day after a night of sleep and the EXP after the overnight military training with no sleep. Results showed that the effect of the overnight training on cognitive performance and the between-group difference in heart rate and heart rate variability depended on the cognitive test. Surprisingly, the cognitive performance was not largely affected by the CQ battle. However, as expected, the CQ battle resulted in a significant decrease in RMSSD and an increase in HR measured during the cognitive testing. Similarly, the HR parameters were related to cognitive performance, but the relationship was found only with the PVT. In conclusion, fatigue due to the overnight training impaired the ability to maintain sufficient alertness level. However, this impairment in arousal upregulation was counteracted by the arousing nature of the SART. Hence, the conscripts' cognitive performance was mainly preserved when performing a stimulating task, despite the fatigue from the sleep loss of the preceding night and physical activity. (shrink)

When are we responsible for addressing the acute deprivations of others beyond state borders? One widely held view is that we are responsible for addressing or preventing acute deprivations insofar as we have contributed to them or are contributing to bringing them about. But how should agents who endorse this “contribution principle” of allocating responsibility yet are uncertain whether or how much they have contributed to some problem conceive of their responsibilities with respect to it? Legal systems adopt (...) formal norms that set the burden of proof, the standard of proof, and the constraints on admissible evidence, which help courts to apply liability rules in cases where there are significant evidential uncertainties. Applying principles for determining ethical responsibilities, too, require such norms. Their content, however, should be much different from that found in criminal and even civil legal settings, where the moral costs of falsely holding those responsible for bringing about some harm are more worrisome. Instead of demanding that an agent be shown to have contributed to some deprivation “beyond a reasonable doubt,” we should express a willingness to err in favor of the acutely deprived subjects, demanding that even those agents who merely suspect that they may have substantially contributed to these deprivations undertake efforts to address them. (shrink)

The profound changes in personality, mood, and other features of the self that neural interventions can induce can be disconcerting to patients, their families, and caregivers. In the neuroethical debate, these concerns are often addressed in the context of possible threats to the narrative self. In this paper, I argue that it is necessary to consider a dimension of impacts on the narrative self which has so far been neglected: neural interventions can lead to a loss of meaning of actions, (...) feelings, beliefs, and other intentional elements of our self-narratives. To uphold the coherence of the self-narrative, the changes induced by neural interventions need to be accounted for through explanations in intentional or biochemical terms. However, only an explanation including intentional states delivers the content to directly ascribe personal meaning, i.e., subjective value to events. Neural interventions can deprive events of meaning because they may favor a predominantly biochemical account. A loss of meaning is not inherently negative but it can be problematic, particularly if events are affected one was not prepared or willing to have stripped of meaning. The paper further examines what it is about neural interventions that impacts meaning by analyzing different methods. To which degree the pull towards a biochemical view occurs depends on the characteristics of the neural intervention. By comparing Deep Brain Stimulation, Prozac, Ritalin, psychedelics, and psychotherapy, the paper identifies some main factors: the rate of change, the transparency of the causal chain, the involvement of the patient, and the presence of an acute phenomenological experience. (shrink)

This article studies the chronic and acute anomic social impacts of the development of market societies in Europe over the past few decades. Focusing on the firm but linking micro and macro levels, it argues that the passage from the welfare state to disembedded markets and neoliberal governance has generated individual and collective anomie by depriving social actors of agency and voice while caging them in the disciplinary constraints of an ideal competition society. Promoted by public and private governors (...) animated by visions of managerial omnipotence, this reconfiguration has hollowed out the cluster of rights that was the basis of democratic and social citizenship in Europe. The article discusses the manifestations of anomie, stressing the violence flowing from the radical uncertainty to which atomized employees and more broadly citizens are facing in the reification of collective goals, which have been reduced to participation in market society. Drawing on the classical literature (Durkheim, Parsons, Merton) but expanding upon it, the article examines exit solutions, at the individual and collective levels, involving violence against the self (suicide) and others (mobbing, xenophobia, fascism), and concludes that Europe seems to be heading towards a protracted period of danger-laden chronic and acute anomie. (shrink)

Information on the risks and benefits related to surgical procedures is essential for patients in order to obtain their informed consent. Some disciplines, such as sociolinguistics, offer insights that are helpful for patient—professional communication in both written and oral consent. Communication difficulties become more acute when patients make decisions through an informed consent document because they may sign this with a lack of understanding and information, and consequently feel deprived of their freedom to make their choice about different treatments (...) or surgery. This article discusses findings from documentary analysis using the sociolinguistic SPEAKING model, which was applied to the general and specific informed consent documents required for laparoscopic surgery of the bile duct at Torrecárdenas Hospital, Almería, Spain. The objective of this procedure was to identify flaws when information was provided, together with its readability, its voluntary basis, and patients’ consent. The results suggest potential linguistic communication difficulties, different languages being used, cultural clashes, asymmetry of communication between professionals and patients, assignment of rights on the part of patients, and overprotection of professionals and institutions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Art Subjects: Making Artists in the American UniversityTheodore GracykArt Subjects: Making Artists in the American University, by Howard Singerman. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1999, 296 pp., $19.95 paper.Howard Singerman's Art Subjects is a study of the training of visual artists in American universities from 1912 to the present. More precisely, the book is an account of how two philosophies ofeducation have competed to inform (...) that training. At the outset, Singerman announces that the book explores a long-standing "struggle between vision and language" (p. 10) that culminates with a decisive privileging of language. The book mimics its putative subject in at least one interesting way. As it was for art and the training of American artists in the twentieth century (at least on Singerman's account of them), so it is with the book. Each moves from a practice grounded in objective reality to a jargon-ridden discourse that limits entry to anyone outside of its acutely self-regarding disciplinary field. Although the book's acknowledgments segment thanks one individual for demanding thatSingerman "come to a real conclusion" for the book, readers should note Singerman's subsequent admission that it may not have one. At times it even appears that Singerman goes out of his way to avoid drawing one.Art Subjects appears to have started life as Singerman's doctoral dissertation, but it only occasionally displays the dull by-the-numbers writing of such documents. The book has a clear organization and its numerous quotations are carefully documented. The overall argument is framed, beginning and end, with Singerman's autobiography of his own time as a university art student. It provides him with his framing question: if he has a M.F.A. in sculpture but never learned to sculpt, what does his professional degree signify? The answer is that it indicates that his work is no longer facile. He has progressed from the realm of the artist whose work is professional, displaying facility, to the stage where he is professional. He has progressed to the point where being an artist is theartist's true subject: "Artists are the subject of graduate school; they are both who and what is taught" (p. 3). If this progression is best indicated by an artist's lack of facility in producing works of art, that is the price of professionalism. In the post-World War II university, art training is "founded on the primacy of theory over practice" (p. 181). Yet the result is professionalism without a clear profession other than as an employee of the post-World War II university: the M.F.A. prepares artists for the university discipline of art. Citing Foucault, Singerman seems satisfied that artists have taken command of a theoretical field. Disciplinary boundaries are created and policed by its rules of professional discourse. At the same time, Singerman declares his intention to "use the concept of the discipline as it constrains and structures discourses to keep from having to judge whether or not art is a profession" (p. 201). He likewise mentions [End Page 119] but does not take any stand on the "putative decline of recent art" (p. 210). This ongoing refusal to judge deprives the book of potentially interesting conclusions. It also calls into question Singerman's repeated references to the "self-criticality" of the discipline.Singerman's neutrality might berefreshing were it not for his use of Foucault to introduce the notion that each new "proposition" within the disciplinary discourse represents progress in a "theoretical field," moving "knowledge" forward. Talking about art (and not, to be sure, talking all that much about specific works of art) and talking about being an artist may or may not represent progress. For instance, Singerman's early chaptersmake the case that the triumph of artistic modernism must be understood as a repudiation of a "female" aesthetic and even of women as artists. Singerman returns to the topic ofwomen artists only once, to note Griselda Pollock's approval of the entry of feminism into the academic discipline of art. Thus Singerman is silent on the question of whether progress is made when the number of women is... (shrink)

Restraint has recently become an important legal and clinical issue in England and Wales with the introduction of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards introduced by the Mental Health Act 2007. The requirements of these two new pieces of legislation are complex, and therefore pose major challenges to the provision of high quality and patient-centred care, support and treatment in a range of health and social care settings. In this paper, the legal and ethical (...) aspects of physical restraint in an acute medical care environment are considered, and practical guidance is provided to individuals adopting methods of restraint to care for general hospital patients. Aspects of the Introduction below are written in the first person to reflect the personal experiences of the lead author. (shrink)

Rachlin introduces a new theory before exhausting its predecessor. His earlier model of future-discounting may be developed by integrating over the duration of extended rewards and punishers. The difference in value of an event within a pattern over the event in isolation derives from the deprivation provided by the pattern; yet the pattern attracts because acute rewards are more potent than incremental deprivations.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Princess and the Philosopher: Letters of Elisabeth of the Palatine to Rene DescartesRichard A. WatsonAndrea Nye. The Princess and the Philosopher: Letters of Elisabeth of the Palatine to Rene Descartes. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. Pp. xiii + 187. Cloth, $57.95. Paper, $18.95.Princess Elisabeth was an acute, persistent critic of Descartes's philosophy. Because he liked her and she was a princess, Descartes did not dismiss (...) her criticisms as he did those of Gassendi and Hobbes. How can an immaterial mind interact with a material body? How can God determine all our actions and yet give us free will? Elisabeth was dissatisfied with Descartes's answer that an all-powerful God can do anything even if we cannot understand how.Andrea Nye analyzes the correspondence between Elisabeth and Descartes to support the thesis that Elisabeth developed and defended a worldly philosophy of life in opposition to the unworldly rules Descartes offered for living a tranquil and happy life. Descartes said she should focus on the separation of the mind from the body to avoid disturbing the intellect with sensory matters. Think positively about such nice things as birds and flowers and not of bad things that happen to one. Descartes told Elisabeth that "there are no events so dreadful, nor so absolutely bad in the judgments of people, that a person of spirit cannot look on them with a bias that makes them appear favorable" (48). If we do our best to find out the right course of action and act accordingly, then even if the results are bad, we have no reason for remorse or recrimination, but can be happy that we have done the best we can. Descartes even says that a person who follows his rules can view everything that happens to him, even the worst, as though these events were taking place in a theatre, for in the end they do not impinge upon the ultimate happiness of one's immortal soul.Elisabeth, earnestly. sardonically, and sometimes with annoyance responds that this is perhaps possible for a single man of independent means with few civil and personal relationships, but for someone engaged in family affairs, royal politics, and social interaction with other human beings, Descartes's philosophy of life is both impossible and wrong. One never knows what is best; even if one did know, it is difficult to carry it out; and finally, if the results are bad, then one is after all responsible. One would be inhuman to deny fault, monstrous to deny moral responsibility. Above all, Elisabeth says, one should not view one's own life as theatre. One must be responsible for oneself and others.Nye casts this as a difference between Descartes's abstract and Elisabeth's particularist approaches to life, but also as a contrast between those who can live a disengaged life and those who cannot. Some of the amusement in Nye's perceptive discussions comes from her showing how Descartes's passions often run away with him, and how Elisabeth gently turns his own rules back onto him. [End Page 277]Nye's analyses of the correspondence are excellent, but she makes some mistakes about the lives of Descartes and Elisabeth. Nye explains Descartes's coolness by his having suffered from a "motherless infancy" (129), even speaking of "the mother's milk denied him as a child" and calling him an "orphan" (156), which he was not. His mother died thirteen months after his birth, but he had a wet nurse. Descartes may never have tasted his own mother's milk, but he was never deprived of nursing. Children were often sent to live with wet nurses for as long as four years, although Descartes is traditionally said to have been raised by his grandmother. In any event, such psychoanalyzing is off the mark.Nye also says that Descartes was asked by Queen Christina to write a ballet. She cites the wrong ballet and attributes a verse from the right ballet incorrectly, but beyond that, there is no evidence either that Descartes wrote verses for a ballet or that Christina asked him to.Then Nye speaks of Descartes's daughter Francine... (shrink)

Representative organizations of employers massively occur in Russian Empire in the post-reform period as a form of protection of the interests of industrialists and businessmen in terms of development of capitalist relations. One of the issues related to the common interests of entrepreneurs in the First World War were rail transportation. Transport problems during the war was most acute for business associations, and became for them some kind a test of the efficiency. Analysis of periodicals and record keeping documentation (...) of representative organizations, "Bulletin" departments of railways show in article representative organizations of employers understanding the causes of the crisis in the Donbass railway during the First World War and shows what is needed and the government measures to overcome the negative effects of transport system. The article shows problems of Donbass rail transport during war years: low capacity and carrying capacity of the network, its lack of branching, shortage of rolling stock, the inefficiency of freight traffic and as a consequence of the rapid deterioration of equipment downtime and freight. Solving these problems entrepreneurs have seen in the additional construction of railways and roads, increasing the capacity of transport engineering factories and repair shops, using captured locomotives and wagons, technical upgrading of the railway network and station management. The paper emphasizes that the inefficiency of transport created a vicious circle of problems in the region - untimely delivery of goods to industrial enterprises of Donbass, deprived railways revenues from transport and fuel, metallurgical and engineering products, without which the operation of highways could not be successful. The article concludes that the war uncovered the underlying socio-economic problems in the country only grew, conflicts between different groups of businessman became deeper, Donbass railway crisis has become one of the most destructive processes in whole economy. (shrink)

In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Karl Marx outlined his idea of a material 'base' and politico-cultural 'superstructure'. According to this formula, a material reality - wealth, income, occupation - determined your politics, leisure habits, tastes, and how you made sense of the world. Today, the importance of material deprivation, in terms of threats to life, health and prosperity, are as acute as ever. Despite the continued importance of inequality and disadvantage, the identities apparently generated (...) by these realities are increasingly detached from material circumstances. In many casesthe identity has become a powerful signifier in its own right, and is now instrumentalised, idealised and imitated. People attempt to police the boundaries and determine the significance of the identity, so that the identity matters more than the lives of the individuals concerned. These powerful identities can be used for various purposes, from the commercial to the aesthetic to the political. This trend has accelerated in recent years, with increasing precarity and increasingly obvious inequality fuelling anger, and the internet acting as a perfect mechanism for identity theft. Identity Theft covers four different kinds of identity most susceptible to these trends - class, race, sex and age - considering how the boundaries of different identities are policed, and how different versions of the same identity can be deployed to different ends. Ultimately, the argument is not just that 'identities are more complex' than they appear, but rather that there are more important commonalities. Many totemic 'culture war' issues are not particularly contested, but have broad appeal, or little concern for most people. In the UK at least, what might be called a 'culture war' is waged largely on the periphery by crank politicians, social media groups and newspaper columnists. If there is one argument to be taken from this book, it is a call for conscientious objection in the culture wars.,. (shrink)

Epicurus argued that death can be neither good nor bad because it involves neither pleasure nor pain. This paper focuses on the deprivation account as a response to this Hedonist Argument. Proponents of the deprivation account hold that Epicurus’s argument fails even if death involves no painful or pleasurable experiences and even if the hedonist ethical system, which holds that pleasure and pain are all that matter ethically, is accepted. I discuss four objections that have been raised against (...) the deprivation account and argue that this response to Epicurus’s argument is successful once it has been sufficiently clarified. (shrink)

Epicurus argued that death can be neither good nor bad because it involves neither pleasure nor pain. This paper focuses on the deprivation account as a response to this Hedonist Argument. Proponents of the deprivation account hold that Epicurus’s argument fails even if death involves no painful or pleasurable experiences and even if the hedonist ethical system, which holds that pleasure and pain are all that matter ethically, is accepted. I discuss four objections that have been raised against (...) the deprivation account and argue that this response to Epicurus’s argument is successful once it has been sufficiently clarified. (shrink)

This study examined the cognitive mechanism underlying acute stress in creative cognition among individuals with high and low trait anxiety. Specifically, cognitive inhibition was assessed using the flanker task during acute stress. Fifty-two participants (26 high trait anxiety, 26 low trait anxiety) (mean age = 18.94 years) underwent stress induction via the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST). They all completed the Alternative Uses Test (AUT) and the Remote Associates Test (RAT) before and after the TSST. Biochemical markers (salivary (...) cortisol and salivary alpha amylase) were recorded at regular intervals. The results showed that cognitive inhibition was influenced by trait anxiety and acute stress. Compared to before experiencing acute stress, there was a lack of cognitive inhibition in low trait anxious individuals and they performed better in AUT (fluency) after acute stress, whereas high trait anxious individuals showed a decreased interference effect and reduced performance in AUT (fluency, flexibility, and originality). In the RAT, there were shorter response times and increased accuracy after acute stress in both high and low trait anxiety groups. Thus, we suggest that cognitive control, which modulates changes in acute stress, influences creative cognition. These findings provide evidence that inhibition control mediates the effect of stress on the creativity of individuals with different trait anxiety. (shrink)

There remains no consensus among social scientists as to how to measure and understand forms of information deprivation such as misinformation. Machine learning and statistical analyses of information deprivation typically contain problematic operationalizations which are too often biased towards epistemic elites' conceptions that can undermine their empirical adequacy. A mature science of information deprivation should include considerable citizen involvement that is sensitive to the value-ladenness of information quality and that doing so may improve the predictive and explanatory (...) power of extant models. (shrink)

A long history of research has revealed many neurophysiological changes and concomitant behavioral impacts of sleep deprivation, sleep restriction, and circadian rhythms. Little research, however, has been conducted in the area of computational cognitive modeling to understand the information processing mechanisms through which neurobehavioral factors operate to produce degradations in human performance. Our approach to understanding this relationship is to link predictions of overall cognitive functioning, or alertness, from existing biomathematical models to information processing parameters in a cognitive architecture, (...) leveraging the strengths from each to develop a more comprehensive explanation. The integration of these methodologies is used to account for changes in human performance on a sustained attention task across 88 h of total sleep deprivation. The integrated model captures changes due to time awake and circadian rhythms, and it also provides an account for underlying changes in the cognitive processes that give rise to those effects. The results show the potential for developing mechanistic accounts of how fatigue impacts cognition, and they illustrate the increased explanatory power that is possible by combining theoretical insights from multiple methodologies. (shrink)

In order to at least begin addressing the extensive the problem of moral clarity in aiding the deprived to some degree, I first argue that the duty to aid the deprived is not merely a charitable one, dependent on the discretion, or the arbitrary will, of the giver (1). Then, before further analysing the individual duty to aid, I critically examine whether deprivation is better alleviated or remedied through the duties of corrective justice. I argue that the perspective of (...) corrective justice is important, but not sufficient when it comes to dealing with deprivation (2). I then argue that non-domination cannot serve as a first-order principle of justice. It is too minimalistic, since it would not require duties of justice where deprivation exists, but dominating relations and institutions do not. (3). Going back to the individual duty to help, I argue that the duties to aid the needy must be assessed according to the situation at hand (4). In order to avoid meaninglessness and morality’s excessive demands, one should be able to identify the responsible agents by constructing a shared and, in the last resort, institution-based duty to help (5). The institutional approach in this paper argues that we should create and reform institutions in order to realize the pre-existing requirement to alleviate global deprivation. This is a form of “global political justice” that does not start with politics, but ends with global political institutions. (shrink)

Deprivation offers a plausible explanation for the badness of death, so fear is not unreasonable. But horror at the prospect of one's death is not just extreme fear because horror is structurally different than fear. Horror requires a different explanation. For Sartre, horror is possible only in unique circumstances. I argue that Sartre's view, when combined with the subjective incomprehensibility of one's annihilation, can explain horror and other negative emotions that are not contingent on deprivation. Further, I argue (...) that while fear can be reasonable if one's death will deprive, Lucretius's Symmetry Argument shows that horror is unreasonable. (shrink)

This article challenges the use of social deprivation as a punishment, and offers a preliminary examination of the human rights implications of exile and solitary confinement. The article considers whether a human right against coercive social deprivation is conceptually redundant, as there are recognised rights against torture, extremely cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment as well as rights to basic health care, education, and security, which might encompass what this right protects. The article argues that the right is not (...) conceptually redundant, but that, even if it were, there would be significant reasons to articulate it. (shrink)

While many theories of well-being are able to capture some of our central intuitions about well-being, e.g. avoiding alienation worries, they typically do so at the cost of not being able to capture others, e.g. explaining deprivation. However, both of these intuitions are important and any comprehensive theory of well-being ought to attempt to strike the best balance in responding to both concerns. In light of this, I develop and defend a theory of well-being which holds that our well-being (...) depends, in part, on the nature of our well-being qua person, a class whose members are defined by their possessing certain cognitive and volitional capacities including those capacities constitutive of autonomy. I argue that this theory of well-being is able to address concerns about alienation and deprivation, along with capturing the importance of autonomy to well-being, better than many popular subjective and objective theories of well-being. (shrink)

Eyal et al have recently argued that researchers should consider conducting severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) human challenge studies to hasten vaccine development. We have conducted (J. L.) and overseen (L. D.) human challenge studies and agree that they can be useful in developing anti-infective agents. We also agree that adults can autonomously choose to undergo risks with no prospect of direct benefit to themselves. However, we disagree that SARS-CoV-2 challenge studies are ethically appropriate at this time, (...) for 3 reasons: (1) current scientific knowledge of SARS-CoV-2 infection is insufficient to manage risks; (2) autonomous decision making, while necessary, does not override concerns about risk; and (3) undertaking challenge studies now would imperil confidence in the research enterprise, potentially undermining the global response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. (shrink)

Two recent discussions concerning punishment of the socially deprived reach conflicting conclusions. Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth argue that we should sympathize with the predicament of the poor and therefore mitigate their sentences. Peter Chau disputes von Hirsch and Ashworth’s conclusion, contending that having to face strong temptations is not an appropriate ground for reducing anyone’s punishment for their crimes. I argue that neither von Hirsch and Ashworth’s account nor Chau’s critique of it is persuasive. I then take up (...) the challenge of showing why social deprivation renders punishment problematic. I contend that it establishes a perverse incentive structure that is persistent and powerful, requiring the disadvantaged to exercise self-control on an ongoing basis. Repeated acts of self-control are difficult, especially for youths whose skills at it are not yet fully developed. Also, in a variety of more and less subtle ways, social deprivation reduces the incentives for self-control and may work to stunt its development. In closing, I briefly consider the options for responding to the crimes of the chronically disadvantaged. (shrink)

Scholars have addressed restrictions on individual liberty, or deprivations thereof, that do not entail prison or jail—including area restrictions, revoking driver’s licenses, and GPS bracelets. In all legal domains, the effects of these measures on the lives of targeted individuals can be significant, primarily with respect to their capability to guide their own behavior. Some are applied categorically rather than individually, do not involve a fair trial or hearing, or are applied preventively or after the targeted individual has completed a (...) prison sentence. My aim in this article is to extend our view from prison as the quintessential method of depriving individuals of their liberty to control of individuals without locking them up. I address degrees of individual liberty and inquire into legal protections for individuals who are partially free but deprived of liberty in some areas of life. (shrink)

Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in (...) nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes. (shrink)

_Deprivation and Freedom _investigates the key issue of social deprivation. It looks at how serious that issue is, what we should do about it and how we might motivate people to respond to it. It covers core areas in moral and political philosophy in new and interesting ways, presents the topical example of disability as a form of social deprivation, shows that we are not doing nearly enough for certain sections of our communities and encourages that we think (...) differently about how we should best organize our societies in the future. The book develops a comprehensive yet accessible account of human freedom, which shows how the ability to realise our freedom is partly definitive of freedom itself. That account conclusively illustrates how many deprivations represent remediable inequalities of important and very basic human freedoms, posing the question as to why societies continue to do so little about them. In answering that question, Richard J. Hull shows how the idea of social exclusion is misleading and, instead, tackles the far more pertinent and challenging issue of societies' failure to include. The moral seriousness of non-inclusion, the failure to provide for freedom, is evaluated via critical discussion of a variety of central themes and distinctions in ethical and political theory. The author shows how such themes and distinctions comprise a framework for evaluating a raft of social issues, in turn providing a unique resource for students of moral, political and applied philosophy. The book concludes with an innovative, challenging and effective combination of analytic and continental styles, so to address the critical question of how we might actually motivate constructive social change. In doing so, it shows how a variety of approaches can work successfully together to provide an emphatic case for greater social inclusion. _Deprivation and Freedom _shows how even fairly modest claims about social provision illustrate that we should be doing a lot more about social deprivation than we are now. It should be of interest to anyone who is concerned with questions about the type of society in which they live, what it says about us to continue as we are – and how we might motivate realistically achievable social change. (shrink)

In my essay, Why abortion is immoral, I criticised discussions of the morality of abortion in which the crucial issue is whether fetuses are human beings or whether fetuses are persons. Both argument strategies are inadequate because they rely on indefensible assumptions. Why should being a human being or being a person make a moral difference? I argued that the correct account of the morality of abortion should be based upon a defensible account of why killing children and adults is (...) wrong. I claimed that what makes killing us wrong is that our premature deaths deprive us of our futures of value, that is, the goods of life we would have experienced had we survived. This account of the wrongness of killing explains why killing is one of the worst of crimes and how killing greatly harms the victim. It coheres with the attitudes of those with cancer or HIV facing premature death. It explains why we believe it is wrong to kill infants. It does not entail that it wrongs a human being to end her life if she is in persistent vegetative state or if her future must consist only of unbearable physical suffering and she wants to die. This account of the wrongness of killing implies that abortion is immoral because we were fetuses once and we know those fetuses had futures of value. Mark Brown claims that this potential future of value account is unsound because it implies that we have welfare rights to what we need to stay alive that most people would reject. I argue that Brown is incorrect in two ways: a welfare right to what we need to stay alive is not directly implied by my account and, in addition, most of us do believe that dependent human beings have substantial welfare rights to what they need to stay alive. Brown argues that depriving us of a future of value of which we have mental representations both is a better explanation of the wrongness of killing and does not imply that abortion is immoral. I reply that if Brown's arguments against my view were sound, those arguments could be easily adapted to show that his view is unsound as well and Brown's view is both ambiguous and unsound on any interpretation. The most popular class of pro-choice argument strategies appeals to the view that some or all fetuses lack either a mental state or function or a capacity for a mental state or function necessary for possession of the right to life. Desires, interests, sentience, various concepts, moral agency, and rationality have all been suggested as candidates for this crucial mental role. Brown's analysis is one member of this class of strategies. I believe that it is possible to show that none of these strategies is reasonable. However, there are so many of these strategies that the required argument demands something more like a book and less like a short essay. The argument of the following essay is a piece of this larger argument. (shrink)

ObjectiveThe study is an explorative investigation aimed to assess the differences in acute stress response patterns of health workers facing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) during Italy’s first lockdown.MethodsA cross-sectional investigation using convenience sampling method was conducted in Italy during April 2020. Eight hundred fifty-eight health workers participated in the research filling out self-report measures including Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9), Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD-7), Insomnia Severity Index (ISI), and Impact of Event Scale–Revised (IES-R).ResultsModerate/severe depression was found in 28.9% (95% CI, (...) 25.8–32.04), moderate/severe anxiety in 55.4% (95% CI, 51.9–58.8), insomnia in 15% (95% CI, 12.5–17.5), and distress in 52.5% (95% CI, 48.5%–56.6) of participants. The 3% of health workers reported frequent suicidal thoughts. Female sex, working for >15 h/week in a COVID-19 unit, and living apart from family were associated with a significantly higher risk of distress, anxiety, insomnia, depression, and functional impairment. Four profiles were identified on the basis of psychopathological measures: Profile_0 included 44% (N= 270); Profile_1, 25.6% (N= 157); Profile_2, 19.1% (N= 117); and Profile_3, 11.3% (N= 69) of participants. Results showed a significant effect for Profiles X IES-R (η2= 0.079;f= 0.29), indicating that in all profiles, except for Profile_0, avoidance scale is lower than hyperarousal and intrusion symptoms scales of the IES-R. This characteristic could be a probable index of the control exerted by the responders to not fly away from their job.ConclusionThe identification of specific profiles could help psychiatrists and emergency psychologists to build specific interventions in terms of both primary and secondary prevention to face future waves of the COVID-19 outbreak. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the deprivation of patients’ liberty while undergoing psychiatric treatment, with special reference to the situation in Finland. It is based on a review of Finnish law, health care statistics, and empirical and theoretical studies. Relevant research findings from other countries are also discussed. In Finland, it is required that patients are cared for by mutual understanding with themselves; coercive measures may be applied only if they are necessary for the treatment of the illness, or (...) for safeguarding patients’ safety or the safety of others. Involuntary psychiatric hospitalization is closely regulated by the Mental Health Act. However, the rules concerning the deprivation of liberty during inpatient treatment (by seclusion, restraint and restricted leave) are formulated in very general terms. Therefore, Finnish psychiatric hospitals have their own policies concerning when and how seclusion may be used. The practice of seclusion and the use of restraint therefore vary among the psychiatric hospitals in Finland. (shrink)

The most plausible pro-life argument claims that abortion is seriously wrong because it deprives the foetus of something valuable. This paper examines two recent versions of this argument. Don Marquis's version takes the valuable thing to be a 'future like ours', a future containing valuable experiences and activities. Jim Stone's version takes the valuable thing to be a future containing conscious goods, which it is the foetus's biological nature to make itself have. I give three grounds for rejecting these arguments. (...) First, they lead to unacceptable inequalities in the wrongness of killing. Second, they lead to counterintuitive results in a range of imaginary cases. Third, they ignore the role of psychological connectedness in determining the magnitude or seriousness of deprivation-based harms: because the foetus is only weakly psychologically connected to its own future, it cannot be seriously harmed by being deprived of that future. (shrink)

Two studies employed a dissociative detachment induction technique to examine if experiences of dissociation increased acute shame feelings. Study 1 recruited college participants, while Study 2 enlisted adults attending treatment for childhood sexual abuse. Two hypotheses were explored: (1) more shame would be reported following a dissociative detachment induction than a relaxation induction; and (2) shame would increase when detachment was induced in the relationship context of a close other than when alone. Study 1 (N = 81) effectively induced (...) detachment and participants reported higher shame in this condition compared to the relaxation condition. This effect was maintained when state anxiety was controlled. The relationship context produced no impact on dissociation or shame. Attributions around feeling flawed predominantly linked detachment experiences with subsequent shame feelings. In Study 2 with clinical participants (N = 28), regression analyses showed state shame was predicted by acute detachment after controlling for state anxiety, gender, and trait shame and dissociation. The most common appraisals offered for why detachment led to feelings of shame was being flawed and exposed. Collectively, our findings suggest that increased acute shame results from detachment experiences, making more specific the relationship between shame and dissociation. (shrink)

In his ‘The Identity Objection to the future‐like‐ours argument’ (Bioethics, 2019, 33: 287–293), Brill argues that Marquis's 'future of value' account of the wrong of abortion is still vulnerable to the identity objection—the claim that the foetus and the later person are not numerically identical, so the later person's valuable experiences are not the foetus's future experiences—even if it is conceded that the future organism, as well as the person, has experiences. This is because the organism has these experiences in (...) a different way from the person. The person has them directly, and the organism has them only derivatively. This implies, he maintains, that the organism cannot be deprived of those experiences in a way that is wrong. Only the person can be deprived in this morally relevant way. But, I argue, if the organism genuinely has those experiences, it is not at all clear why its being deprived of them would be permissible. I argue that the reason why Brill can claim that having those experiences derivatively makes this moral difference is because the sense in which the organism has experiences is not a genuine sense. But that is a problem for this theory of personal identity, not for Marquis's account of the wrong of abortion. I also argue that supposing that one cannot morally harm the human organism has various implausible implications, which cast doubt on the idea that having experiences derivatively means that the organism is not morally harmed by being deprived of them. (shrink)

Deprivation and Freedom investigates the key issue of social deprivation. It looks at how serious that issue is, what we should do about it and how we might motivate people to respond to it. It covers core areas in moral and political philosophy in new and interesting ways, presents the topical example of disability as a form of social deprivation, shows that we are not doing nearly enough for certain sections of our communities and encourages that we (...) think differently about how we should best organise our societies in the future. The book develops a comprehensive yet refreshingly simple account of human freedom, which shows how the ability to realise our freedom is partly definitive of freedom itself. That account conclusively illustrates how many deprivations represent remediable inequalities of important and very basic human freedoms, posing the question as to why societies continue to do so little about them. In answering that question, Hull shows how the idea of social exclusion is misleading and, instead, tackles the far more pertinent and challenging issue of societies' failure to include. The moral seriousness of non-inclusion, the failure to provide for freedom, is evaluated via critical discussion of a variety of central themes and distinctions in ethical and political theory. The author shows how such themes and distinctions comprise a framework for evaluating a raft of social issues, in turn providing a unique resource for students of moral, political and applied philosophy. The book concludes with an innovative, challenging and effective combination of analytic and continental styles, so to address the critical question of how we might actually motivate constructive social change. In doing so, it shows how a variety of approaches can work successfully together to provide an emphatic case for greater social inclusion. Deprivation and Freedom shows how even fairly modest claims about social provision illustrate that we should be doing a lot more about social deprivation than we are now. It should be of interest to anyone who is concerned with questions about the type of society in which they live, what it says about us to continue as we are - and how we might motivate realistically achievable social change. (shrink)

Acute aerobic exercise has been shown to improve fine motor skills and alter activation of the motor cortex. The intensity of exercise may influence M1 activation, and further impact whole-body motor skill performance. The aims of the current study were to compare a whole-body motor skill via a piano task following moderate-intensity training and high-intensity interval training, and to determine if M1 activation is linked to any such changes in performance. Nine subjects, aged 18 ± 1 years completed a (...) control, MIT, and HIIT trial followed by administration of a piano performance task. M1 activation was evaluated by measuring oxyhemoglobin and hemoglobin difference changes during post-exercise piano performance using functional near-infrared spectroscopy. The results indicate that piano performance scores were higher after the MIT trial, but not HIIT trial, compared to the control trial. A negative relationship was detected between heart rate during HIIT and post-HIIT piano scores. M1 activation was significantly increased after the HIIT trial. M1 activation was also positively associated with piano performance when exercise trials and all trials were combined. We found that acute moderate-intensity exercise led to an improvement in complex motor skill performance while higher-intensity exercise increased M1 activation. These results demonstrate that moderate-intensity exercise can prime the nervous system for the acquisition of whole-body motor skills, suggesting that similar exercise protocols may be effective in improving the outcomes of other motor tasks performed during regular routines of daily life. In addition, it appears that improvements in motor task performance may be driven by M1 activation. Our findings provide new mechanistic insight into the complex relationship between exercise intensity, M1 activation, and whole-body motor skill performance. (shrink)

In 1943, a distinguished child psychiatrist at Johns Hopkins University, Leo Kanner, published what would become a landmark article: a description of 11 children who suffered from a distinct disorder he called ‘infantile autism’. While initially quite obscure, in the early 1950s Kanner’s report garnered much attention, as clinicians and researchers interpreted these case studies as exemplifying the ill-effects of maternal deprivation, a new theory that rapidly gained currency in the United States. Sensory deprivation experiments, performed in the (...) mid-1950s, further complicated the picture, as experts debated whether maternal deprivation was unique or simply a form of environmental stimulation. As experts strove to make sense of this new disorder, they relied on concepts of maternal and sensory deprivation, both to promote their own theories and to critique or refute those of their colleagues. This interplay between the two theories also informed new forms of intervention, including ‘rage reduction therapy’, which served as a precursor for controversial forms of therapy today termed as the ‘attachment therapies’. This article sheds light on a little-known aspect of the history of autism, and examines the far-reaching effect popular etiological theories have in shaping debates over emerging medical concerns. (shrink)

This book casts new light on the traditional disagreement between those who hold that we cannot be morally responsible for our actions if they are causally determined, and those who deny this. Klein suggests that reflection on the relation between justice and deprivation offers a way out of this perplexity.

_Deprivation and Freedom_ investigates the key issue of social deprivation. It looks at how serious that issue is, what we should do about it and how we might motivate people to respond to it. It covers core areas in moral and political philosophy in new and interesting ways, presents the topical example of disability as a form of social deprivation, shows that we are not doing nearly enough for certain sections of our communities and encourages that we think (...) differently about how we should best organise our societies in the future. The book develops a comprehensive yet refreshingly simple account of human freedom, which shows how the ability to realise our freedom is partly definitive of freedom itself. That account conclusively illustrates how many deprivations represent remediable inequalities of important and very basic human freedoms, posing the question as to why societies continue to do so little about them. In answering that question, Hull shows how the idea of social exclusion is misleading and, instead, tackles the far more pertinent and challenging issue of societies' failure to include. The moral seriousness of non-inclusion, the failure to provide for freedom, is evaluated via critical discussion of a variety of central themes and distinctions in ethical and political theory. The author shows how such themes and distinctions comprise a framework for evaluating a raft of social issues, in turn providing a unique resource for students of moral, political and applied philosophy. The book concludes with an innovative, challenging and effective combination of analytic and continental styles, so to address the critical question of how we might actually motivate constructive social change. In doing so, it shows how a variety of approaches can work successfully together to provide an emphatic case for greater social inclusion. _Deprivation and Freedom_ shows how even fairly modest claims about social provision illustrate that we should be doing a lot more about social deprivation than we are now. It should be of interest to anyone who is concerned with questions about the type of society in which they live, what it says about us to continue as we are - and how we might motivate realistically achievable social change. (shrink)

How do we explain the coincidence of religion and madness in which prophets, founders of religions and great saints often show symptoms of an excitability that is extreme and even pathological? This book attempts to address this phenomenological problem. Richard Saville-Smith argues that 'acute religious experiences' provides a novel category to the study of the non-rational. This book provides an epidemiological approach to a crisis, which is non-veridical and non-reductionist, recognizing a predisposition due to gene variation as a perennial (...) constant, whilst affirming that culture contextualizes experiences. Informed by contemporary psychiatric theory, which is passed through the lens of mad studies, this book proposes the 'sweet-spot' of 'acute religious experiences' which express the phenomenality of madness – but where mad is good. This interdisciplinary study provides a species-wide account of interest to all disciplines that encounter such anomalies in their subjects, from fine art to psychiatry. (shrink)