In this essay, I argue for the conclusion that the Chinese sentences that are regularly translated into subject-predicate sentences in English may be understood as all non-subject-predicate sentences. My argument is based on the premise that some grammatical features are crucial to yield the sense of contrast between the completeness of subject and the incompleteness of predicate. The absence of such grammatical features in Chinese makes it impossible to establish any criterion for the distinction between subject and predicate in Chinese.

The happy fish episode from the outer chapters of the Zhuangzi poses enormous difficulty for interpreters. While it may appear to surprisingly resemble the dialectic in Western philosophy, any attempt to analyse it in terms of the patterns of inference familiar to the West is often frustrated by the ostensible queerness that defies such treatment. The following examination of the dialogue in the episode is intended to address the difficulty and to provide a reasoned explanation for both the surface resemblance (...) and apparent queerness. I suggest that the dialogue becomes perfectly intelligible, if it is read against the backdrop of the disputations practiced in ancient China. My contention is that the real purpose of the dialogue is to expose the fundamental unreliability of the logic of the disputers by means of the logic itself. (shrink)

Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream story can be read as a skeptical response to the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum solution, for it presents I exist as fundamentally unprovable, on the grounds that the notion about “I” that it is guaranteed to refer to something existing, which Descartes seems to assume, is unwarranted. The modern anti-skepticism of Hilary Putnam employs a different strategy, which seeks to derive the existence of the world not from some “indubitable” truth such as the existence of myself , (...) but from the meaning of some particular assertion I make. In this paper, I argue, however, that Putnam’s argument fails to deliver on the promise of showing the self-refuting nature of the skeptical hypothesis, as it relies on a double use of “I”, a fallacy of equivocation, reflecting an unsolved tension between the argument’s general premise, which is rather Zhuangzian in spirit, and his unwitting adoption of that unwarranted notion about “I”. I try to show further that the skepticism in Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream not only can be used to refute the proofs of the existence of the empirical I , but also is effective against accounts concerning the existence of the transcendental I. (shrink)

This paper follows the tradition of treating Zhuangzi's Butterfly Dream episode as presenting a version of skepticism. However, unlike the prevalent interpretations within that tradition, it attempts to show that the skepticism conveyed in the episode is more radical than it has been conceived, such that the episode can be read as a skeptical response to Descartes' refutation of skepticism based on the _Cogito, ergo sum_ proof. The paper explains how the lack of commitment in Zhuangzi to the dubious assumption (...) about 'I' that it necessarily refers to something existing to which Descartes seems to uncritically adhere allows Zhuangzi to doubt what for Descartes is absolutely indubitable: _I exist_. (shrink)

I argue that the idea of reference failure which is frequently mentioned and occasionally argued for in the recent philosophy of language literature is a misnomer at best and incoherent when taken seriously. In the first place, there is no such thing as an empty name or name that fails to name anything, where names are understood as not replaceable by descriptions. In the case of demonstrative reference, because the speaker‘s perception fixes the referent and the speaker‘s referential intention is (...) not formed prior to the fixation of the referent, reference is guaranteed. My argument is based on an analysis of the alleged cases of reference failure. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that in addition to the three generally recognized kinds of de re thought, i.e., perception-based, memory-based and communication-based thought, there is a kind of de re thought, which is based on image and cannot be assimilated to any of these recognized kinds of de re thought. I call it simply image-based de re thought. Although image-based thought shares some similarities with the other kinds of de re thought, it should and can be distinguished from each (...) of them. The focus of this paper is on the distinction between image-based thought and perception-based thought, as it is this distinction that is either overlooked or denied by philosophers who have no difficulty seeing the distinct role of images in our thinking about things in the world. (shrink)

Feature-placing sentences are often confused with the general sentences in the canonical predicate calculus. The confusion is largely caused by their perceived commonality that both lack the subject-predicate form. In this paper, I offer some clarification of the fundamental differences between the two: the general sentences of the canonical predicate calculus contain predicates and variables which take individual objects as their values, and it is the sense of predication implied by the existence of predicates in these general sentences that is (...) completely absent in feature-placing sentences. (shrink)

Feature-placing sentences are often confused with the general sentences in the canonical predicate calculus. The confusion is largely caused by their perceived commonality that both lack the subject-predicate form. In this paper, I offer some clarification of the fundamental differences between the two: the general sentences of the canonical predicate calculus contain predicates and variables which take individual objects as their values, and it is the sense of predication implied by the existence of predicates in these general sentences that is (...) completely absent in feature-placing sentences. (shrink)

Marion contends that whereas the traditional metaphysics (“onto-theology”) poses the first ‘idolatry’ in the sense that it reduces God, who is both transcendent and infinite, to a being, albeit the highest being, Heidegger’s ontology represents a second, yet subtler ‘idolatry’ in that Being is thought as a condition of God, and as such it constitutes a ‘screen’ over Him. I argue, however, that Marion’s criticism of Heidegger with regard to his position on the relationship between Being and God is not (...) well founded, as it is based on a misinterpretation of Heidegger’s conception of Being. I attempt to show that Heidegger’s ontology accommodates the notion of God free from any ontological constraints. (shrink)

Dans le présent article, j’essaie de montrer que la théorie de la réalité sociale de Searle est fondée principalement sur sa perception de certaines caractéristiques essentielles des sociétés démocratiques et qu’elle n’est pas applicable de façon aussi universelle qu’il l’affirme. Je soutiens que son concept de consentement ou d’accord collectif, élément fondamental de sa théorie, n’explique pas pourquoi le régime dictatorial ou totalitaire en tant qu’une réalité sociale parvient à survivre pendant une période aussi considérable ni comment il parvient à (...) produire et à maintenir de façon prolongée et continue des faits institutionnels qui ne devraient avoir aucun fondement dans un consentement ou un accord collectif. (shrink)

This paper seeks to formulate the idea of subjectless change in the established conceptual scheme, which is so often thought to necessarily exclude it. The idea, first espoused by some pre-Socratic thinkers in the form of the universal flux doctrine, was subsequently abandoned due to its alleged logical incoherence. Its reintroduction in contemporary metaphysics is essentially part of a massive revolt against the established conceptual scheme; it serves as a conceptual tool to reinterpret the world and to represent it in (...) an entirely new picture. In this paper I argue, however, that the idea of subjectless change need not be associated with the dissolution of particulars or the dispensing with the concept of object, a trademark of the revolt; rather its usefulness lies in its explanatory power which renders presenting a more complete picture of the world in the established conceptual scheme possible. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explain how the Heraclitean doctrine of universal flux must be rejected, while the notion of flux should and can be preserved. Against the reductionist account of subjectless change, a modern version of the Heraclitean doctrine advocated by revisionist metaphysics, I argue that (1) the idea of subjectless change is one that can and should be formulated in the established conceptual framework, and (2) subjectlessness is a feature that most aptly characterizes material changes. In (...) essence, I seek to provide a proper accommodation for the notion of flux in a conceptual framework that is traditionally understood (or rather misunderstood) as decidedly excluding it. (shrink)

In diesem Artikel versuche ich zu beleuchten, Searles Theorie der sozialen Wirklichkeit gründe hauptsächlich auf dessen Wahrnehmung etlicher wesentlicher Eigenschaften demokratischer Gesellschaften, und sei nicht – wie er behauptet – universell verwendungsfähig. Ich halte daran fest, sein Begriff der kollektiven Akzeptanz bzw. Übereinkunft – als Grundterminus seiner Theorie – erläutere nicht, weswegen das diktatorische oder totalitäre Regime als soziale Wirklichkeit maßgeblich lange zu bestehen und institutionelle Fakten kontinuierlich zu schaffen bzw. zu erhalten vermöge, die in einer gemeinsamen Akzeptanz bzw. Übereinkunft (...) keinerlei Fundament finden sollten. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to show that Searle’s theory of social reality is largely based on his observation of some essential features of democratic societies, and is not universally applicable as it claims to be. I argue that his notion of collective acceptance or agreement, which is fundamental to his general theory, does not explain why a dictatorial or totalitarian regime as a social reality is able to survive through a significant period of time and continuously create and maintain (...) institutional facts which are supposed to have no basis of collective acceptance or agreement. (shrink)

U ovom članku pokušavam pokazati da je Searlova teorija socijalne stvarnosti uglavnom temeljena na njegovom opažanju nekih bitnih značajki demokratskih društava te da nije univerzalno primjenjiva kao što tvrdi. Tvrdim da njegov pojam kolektivnog pristanka ili dogovora, kao temeljni pojam njegove teorije, ne objašnjava zašto diktatorski ili totalitarni režim kao socijalna stvarnost uspijeva preživjeti značajno dugo i kontinuirano stvarati i održavati institucionalne činjenice koje ne bi trebale imati nikakvog temelja u kolektivnom pristanku ili dogovoru.

In this paper, I offer an examination of the two existing criteria of change, one indicated, implicitly, by Aristotle and the other proposed, quite formally, by Russell. Both criteria engender problems. While the Aristotelian criterion is both too narrow and too broad, as it includes bogus changes and excludes subjectless changes, the Russellian criterion avoids the distinction between genuine changes and bogus changes completely. The aim of the paper is to address these problems and to show how these two existing (...) criteria of change can be made to deal with the problems through revision and integration. (shrink)

It has been suggested that there may exist languages that contain only feature-placing sentences, and hence the conceptual scheme implied by such languages is radically different from the one with which we are more familiar. Contrary to what some philosophers believe, I argue that with such languages, we may not be able to say things having approximately the force of the things we actually say, that is, to express the so-called ordinary matters merely at the expense of simplicity. For one (...) thing, in such languages not only we cannot speak of change in something, e.g., that Theaetetus grows older, but also the sense of change in the expression of change in something cannot be preserved in the feature-placing translation. (shrink)

It has been suggested that there may exist languages that contain only feature-placing sentences, and hence the conceptual scheme implied by such languages is radically different from the one with which we are more familiar. Contrary to what some philosophers believe, I argue that with such languages, we may not be able to say things having approximately the force of the things we actually say, that is, to express the so-called ordinary matters merely at the expense of simplicity. For one (...) thing, in such languages not only can we not speak of change in something, but also the sense of change in the expression of change in something cannot be preserved in the feature-placing translation. (shrink)