En enero de 1974 Zubiri dio un breve curso en la Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones de Madrid sobre el tema Tres dimensiones del ser humano: individual, social e histórica. Meses después publicó la última de esas lecciones bajo el título de La dimensión histórica del ser humano. El presente volumen recoge el texto de las tres conferencias, más la versión escrita de la última de ellas. La tesis que Zubiri desarrolla en estas lecciones es que el ser humano es (...) a la vez y necesariamente individual, social e histórico, y que estas dimensiones vienen exigidas por su propia realidad específica, que es pluralizante, continuante y prospectiva. (shrink)

Apart from references to perception, words such as see and listen have shared, non-literal meanings across diverse languages. Such cross-linguistic meanings have not been systematically investigated as they appear in their natural home — informal spoken interaction. We present a qualitative examination of the semantic associations of perception verbs based on recorded everyday conversation in thirteen diverse languages. Across these diverse communities, spontaneous interaction provides evidence for two commonly-discussed extensions of perception verbs — perception~cognition, hearing~linguistic communication — as well as (...) illustrating other meanings and functions that have been less appreciated heretofore. The range of usage that is readily observable in informal conversation makes it clear that this type of data must take center stage for the empirically grounded study of semantics. Moreover, these data suggest that commonalities in polysemous meanings may rely not only on universal cognition, but also on the universal exigencies of social interaction. (shrink)

It is shown that axiomatic extensions of intuitionistic propositional calculus defining univocally new connectives, including those proposed by Gabbay, are strongly complete with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras with additional operations. In all cases, the double negation of such a connective is equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. Thus, under the excluded third law it collapses to a classical formula, showing that this condition in Gabbay's definition is redundant. Moreover, such connectives can not be interpreted in all Heyting (...) algebras, unless they are already equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. These facts relativize to connectives over intermediate logics. In particular, the intermediate logic with values in the chain of length n may be "completed" conservatively by adding a single unary connective, so that the expanded system does not allow further axiomatic extensions by new connectives. (shrink)

O texto apresenta e discute um entendimento de aprendizagem que se fundamenta na linguagem e na pesquisa. Defendendo que todo aprender constitui a reconstrução de algo já anteriormente aprendido, argumenta-se que a aceitação disso exige valorizar a linguagem e a pesquisa como elementos centrais nos processos de ensinar e de aprender. Mostra-se, ainda, que assumir esses entendimentos possibilita tornar as aprendizagens mais significativas, criando oportunidades aos alunos de se assumirem em suas autorias na reconstrução dos discursos sociais, e, assim, qualificar (...) politicamente todo o processo. (shrink)

En un diálogo continuo con la tradición filosófica, Zubiri va página a página describiendo el acto de la intelección humana y desmontando el cúmulo de hipótesis y teorías que subyacen al llamado «problema del conocimiento». Zubiri consigue descubrir, mediante el recurso a un procedimiento puramente descriptivo, en qué consiste el acto humano por excelencia, la intelección. La intelección humana, dice Zubiri, no es una síntesis trascendental, sino algo más simple a la vez que más radical, la mera actualización de lo (...) real en la inteligencia sentiente. (shrink)

It is shown that axiomatic extensions of intuitionistic propositional calculus defining univocally new connectives, including those proposed by Gabbay, are strongly complete with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras with additional operations. In all cases, the double negation of such a connective is equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. Thus, under the excluded third law it collapses to a classical formula, showing that this condition in Gabbay's definition is redundant. Moreover, such connectives can not be interpreted in all Heyting (...) algebras, unless they are already equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. These facts relativize to connectives over intermediate logics. In particular, the intermediate logic with values in the chain of length n may be "completed" conservatively by adding a single unary connective, so that the expanded system does not allow further axiomatic extensions by new connectives. (shrink)

An extensions by new axioms and rules of an algebraizable logic in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi is not necessarily algebraizable if it involves new connective symbols, or it may be algebraizable in an essentially different way than the original logic. However, extension whose axioms and rules define implicitly the new connectives are algebraizable, via the same equivalence formulas and defining equations of the original logic, by enriched algebras of its equivalente quasivariety semantics. For certain strongly algebraizable logics, all (...) connectives defined implicitly by axiomatic extensions of the logic are explicitly definable. (shrink)

An extensions by new axioms and rules of an algebraizable logic in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi is not necessarily algebraizable if it involves new connective symbols, or it may be algebraizable in an essentially different way than the original logic. However, extension whose axioms and rules define implicitly the new connectives are algebraizable, via the same equivalence formulas and defining equations of the original logic, by enriched algebras of its equivalente quasivariety semantics. For certain strongly algebraizable logics, all (...) connectives defined implicitly by axiomatic extensions of the logic are explicitly definable. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the debate between William of Ockham and his contemporary Peter Auriol on how to account for the intension and remission of forms. Peter Auriol denies that an added degree of a quality such as the theological virtue of charity could be anything other than something which is neither a universal nor an individual and which cannot be grasped by intuition, but must be posited in order to account for the possibility that an accidental form can vary (...) in intensity. Ockham aims at proving that Auriol’s account is inconsistent. In my opinion, Ockham does not succeed, nor does he succeed in defending a consistent account of the metaphysics underlying the intension and remission of forms. Indeed, he conceives of the degree of a quality as a part of the intensified quality which, while being an individual that is really distinct from the quality and can be picked out, forms a unity with it in such a way that the union of the degree and the quality is itself an individual. Ockham fails to distinguish the notion of maximal resemblance holding between a quality’s degree and the quality from the notion of maximal resemblance which holds between individuals of the same species. In the end, he is led to give up the idea that a degree is an individual that can be picked out in order to protect the core thesis of his nominalism about universals. (shrink)

La filosofía y el filosofar adquieren en la vida de Juan Bautista Ferro lasdimensiones propias de un auténtico pensar que se reflejó en cada acción,en el discurrir diario de la vida académica universitaria o en las "tertuliasrnonologantes" que el propio Ferro concertaba con sus amigos en su casao en plena calle. Ferro fue el ejemplo vivo de una tradición filosófica quecentra su acción sobre el propio filósofo, y el cultivo de la "oralidad" corno"método" para enseñar a aprender. El texto muestra (...) todo esto a través deuna reconstrucción testimonial. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to present the way in which contingency and causal determinism relate in some major late-medieval views on the metaphysics of causation. I will focus on Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and John Buridan. First, I will show that Scotus’s new insights into the metaphysics of modalities had important consequences for the way contingency was related to causality: Ockham and Buridan do not consider contingency as a by-product of the necessary emanation of God (...) any more but as a distinctive property of God as the first cause and, therefore, of the created world as a whole. Second, I will show that the growing interest from Scotus onward in explaining and justifying inductive reasoning led to an extensive analysis of the nature and function of the principle of the uniformity of nature. Third, I will explain why the progressive psychologization of final causes led to the exclusion of final explanations from physics. The consequence of this process is the development a new way of conceiving chance and hazard, and the separation between free and natural agents. We can speak here of a tendentially mechanistic picture of the world. (shrink)

The chapter published in the book ‘Contingency and Natural Order in Early Modern Science’, pages 27–59, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67378-3_3, has been retracted because it contains significant parts plagiarizing another publication.

In contrast to the robust mutual interpretability phenomenon in set theory, Ali Enayat proved that bi-interpretation is absent: distinct theories extending ZF are never bi-interpretable and models of ZF are bi-interpretable only when they are isomorphic. Nevertheless, for natural weaker set theories, we prove, including Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory $\mathrm {ZFC}^{-}$ without power set and Zermelo set theory Z, there are nontrivial instances of bi-interpretation. Specifically, there are well-founded models of $\mathrm {ZFC}^{-}$ that are bi-interpretable, but not isomorphic—even $\langle H_{\omega _1},\in (...) \rangle $ and $ \langle H_{\omega _2},\in \rangle $ can be bi-interpretable—and there are distinct bi-interpretable theories extending $\mathrm {ZFC}^{-}$. Similarly, using a construction of Mathias, we prove that every model of ZF is bi-interpretable with a model of Zermelo set theory in which the replacement axiom fails. (shrink)

The Statesman is a difficult and puzzling Platonic dialogue. In A Stranger's Knowledge Marquez argues that Plato abandons here the classic idea, prominent in the Republic, that the philosopher, qua philosopher, is qualified to rule. Instead, the dialogue presents the statesman as different from the philosopher, the possessor of a specialist expertise that cannot be reduced to philosophy. The expertise is of how to make a city resilient against internal and external conflict in light of the imperfect sociality of human (...) beings and the poverty of their reason. This expertise, however, cannot be produced on demand: one cannot train statesmen like one might train carpenters. Worse, it cannot be made acceptable to the citizens, or operate in ways that are not deeply destructive to the city's stability. Even as the political community requires his knowledge for its preservation, the genuine statesman must remain a stranger to the city. Marquez shows how this impasse is the key to understanding the ambiguous reevaluation of the rule of law that is the most striking feature of the political philosophy of the Statesman. The law appears here as a mere approximation of the expertise of the inevitably absent statesman, dim images and static snapshots of the clear and dynamic expertise required to steer the ship of state across the storms of the political world. Yet such laws, even when they are not created by genuine statesmen, can often provide the city with a limited form of cognitive capital that enables it to preserve itself in the long run, so long as citizens, and especially leaders, retain a “philosophical” attitude towards them. It is only when rulers know that they do not know better than the laws what is just or good (and yet want to know what is just and good) that the city can be preserved. The dialogue is thus, in a sense, the vindication of the philosopher-king in the absence of genuine political knowledge. (shrink)

English summary: This book attests that a study on the history of philosophy has its place in contemporary debates. This book attempts to reconstruct William of Ockham's position on the nature and function of real definitions in order to show that nominalism does not oblige a particular position on essences. French description: Guillaume d'Ockham, defenseur bien connu du nominalisme, a manifeste un interet soutenu pour les definitions reelles. Cet ouvrage s'efforce de reconstruire sa position sur la nature et la fonction (...) des definitions reelles. Un examen de ce qu'est une definition reelle appelle une etude de ce qu'est une essence et de la nature du lien a poser entre l'essentiel et le necessaire. Cet ouvrage a pour objectif de montrer que le nominalisme ne contraint pas a une position determinee sur les essences. Saul Kripke nous dit que l'essentiel se reduit au necessaire. Kit Fine, par contre, affirme qu'il faut revenir a Aristote et soutenir que l'essentiel est irreductible au necessaire. Notre examen atteste qu'une etude en histoire de la philosophie a toute sa place dans les debats contemporains. L'essentialisme de Guillaume d'Ockham incite a rendre a Aristote ce qui lui revient et a faire preuve de circonspection. En definitive, les deux positions en presence ne sont peut-etre pas incompatibles. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 O estudo tem caráter qualitativo e busca em referenciais teóricos . C ontempla uma reflexão aberta a respeito do alvorecer da razão na modernidade, que lança o ser humano ao centro do universo . Ao fazê-lo, fragmenta a formação do ethos, vórtice que alcança a contemporaneidade. Na sequência traz suportes teóricos, com base, principalmente nas concepções de Agamben, Bauman,Vaz, entre outros, acerca da ainda possibilidade formativas de construção da comunidade humana. (...) Apesar dos numerosos e diversos conhecimentos produzidos, na atualidade, crescem as dificuldades de compreensão da condição humana e do significado dos fazeres humanos. A aposta na subjetividade como uma essência, marca da metafísica, também pos em questão a identidade pessoal . A contemporaneidade ampla e complexa clama por contextos educacionais capazes de dinamizar bases ontológicas com diferentes bases conceptuais e vivenciais. Dessa forma a problemática orientadora da reflexão é: como constituiu-se a formação do ethos contemporâneo e, quais são os desafios à educação? Como resultados destacamos que a racionalidade técnico-científica gerou despreocupação com a vivência de valores éticos voltados ao bem comum; a individualização fomentou a descrença em políticas democráticas e ceifou a esperança na formação de um ethos contemporâneo solidário. Concluimos que existe uma necessidade urgente de repensar a constituição ontológica do ser humano, como pressuposto imprescindível na reconstituição da relação entre o EU/TU ou EU/HUMANIDADE; a compreensão do Outro requer aceitar a pluralidade de perspectivas de novas vivências e formas relacionais; educar é vivenciar laços de sensibilidade social para construir comunidades nas quais a amizade seja o esteio político. Palavras-chaves: Educação. Ética. Comunidade. Amizade THE FORMATION OF CONTEMPORARY ETHOS: CHALLENGES TO EDUCATION: The study is qualitative and search for theoretical frameworks. Contemplates an open reflexion about the dawn of reason in modernity, which throws the human to the center of the universe . fragments forming the ethos vortex that reaches the contemporary. Following brings theoretical supports, based mainly on the concepts of Agamben, Bauman, Vaz, among others, about the possibility of building further training of the human community. Despite numerous and diverse knowledge produced, in actuality, there are growing difficulties in understanding the human condition and the meaning of human doings. The focus on subjectivity as an essence, brand of metaphysics, also calls into question the personal identity. The broad and complex contemporary calls for educational contexts capable of stimulating ontological bases with different conceptual and experiential bases. Thus the problem of guiding reflection is: how was the formation of the contemporary ethos and what are the challenges for education? The results highlight that the scientific-technical rationality generated unconcern with the experience of ethical values ​​directed to the common good; individualization fostered disbelief in democratic politics and claimed the hope of forming a contemporary ethos supportive. We conclude that there is an urgent need to rethink the ontological constitution of the human being as an indispensable prerequisite to rebuild the relationship between I / YOU or I / HUMANITY; understanding of the Other requires accepting the plurality of perspectives and experiences of new relational forms; educate social ties is experiencing sensitivity to build communities in which friendship is political mainstay . Keywords: Education. Ethics. Community. Friendship. (shrink)

De façon très allusive dans quelques textes de Signes et dans une note de travail du Visible et l’invisible, Merleau-Ponty a indiqué qu’élucider la question d’une « chair du social » exigeait un approfondissement préalable des notions de Gestalt, d’institution et de symbolisme. L’objet de cet article est de montrer comment Simondon a repris la question au point où Merleau-Ponty l’a laissée, en décrivant l’activité ou l’invention technique comme l’inscription matérielle d’un collectif en genèse, non partagé par la dualité du (...) psychique et du social . La pensée technique, loin d’être anecdotique ou spécialisée, apparaît donc comme un moment essentiel dans l’élaboration d’une théorie générale du lien social et de la socialisation des individus. (shrink)

Este artículo es parte de un trabajo de investigación bastante más amplio, que llevó casi cinco años de duración, en el cual nos propusimos una lectura rigurosa como singular del concepto de sujeto en Alain Badiou y Jacques Lacan. En vistas a delimitar claramente el tema de estudio, la pregunta que nos formulamos como punto de partida fue la siguiente: ¿qué lugar ocupa el concepto de sujeto en la articulación lógica del pensamento de ambos autores, particularmente en sus dimensiones ontológicas (...) y políticas? Como se podrá apreciar a continuación, dicho trabajo despliega una topología conceptual que a su vez presenta ciertos hitos históricos. Pues es sabido que uno de los temas centrales en torno al cual ha girado la fi losofía política contemporánea ha sido la cuestión del sujeto, y así también, correlativamente, de los saberes y verdades que lo fundamentan. Se ha interrogado por ejemplo ¿cuál puede ser el lugar de este sujeto? ¿Es posible especifi car a priori su existencia? ¿De dónde deriva su estatuto? ¿Se trata de una función trascendental o sustancial, vacía o refl exiva? Estas preguntas responden, en cierta forma, a una concepción de sujeto más bien propia de la metafísica moderna que intentaremos desplazar. (shrink)

Since antiquity, philosophers have investigated how change works. If a thing moves from one state to another, when exactly does it start to be in its new state, and when does it cease to be in its former one? In the late Middle Ages, the "problem of the instant of change" was subject to considerable debate and gave rise to sophisticated theories; it became popular and controversial again in the second half of the twentieth century. The studies collected here constitute (...) the first attempt at tackling the different aspects of an issue that, until now have been the object of seminal but isolated forays. They do so in through a historical perspective, offering both the medieval and the contemporary viewpoints. (shrink)

Insurance is pervasive in many social settings. As a cooperative device based on risk pooling, it serves to attenuate the adverse consequences of various risks by offering policyholders coverage against the losses implied by adverse events in exchange for the payment of premiums. In the insurance industry, the concept of actuarial fairness serves to establish what could be adequate, fair premiums. Accordingly, premiums paid by policyholders should match as closely as possible their risk exposure. Such premiums are the product of (...) the probabilities of losses and the expected losses. This article presents a discussion of the fairness of actuarial fairness through three steps: defining the concept based on its formulation within the insurance industry; determining in which sense it may be about fairness; and raising some objections to the actual fairness of actuarial fairness. The necessity of a normative evaluation of actuarial fairness is justified by the influence of the concept on the current reforms of public insurance systems and the fact that it highlights the question of the repartition of the gains and burdens of social cooperation. (shrink)

On sait que sur la question des pensées imperceptibles, Nicole, bientôt suivi par le bénédictin François Lamy, heurte l’opinion d’Arnauld. L’opposition d’Arnauld à Nicole touchant la question de la grâce est bien connue. C’est plutôt de l’originalité philosophique de Nicole qu’il s’agira dans ce travail. En tirant Nicole de « l’ombre d’Arnauld et de Pascal » et en lui faisant crédit d’une consistance spéculative propre, on retrouvera la finesse de sa psychologie, mais on découvrira également l’esquisse d’une subtile anthropologie.

Cogito, ergo sum. Ce n’est pas tiré de la plume de Descartes que cet énoncé apparaît pour la première fois dans les œuvres du philosophe. C’est en effet Caterus qui, dans la première série d’Objectiones aux Meditationes l’écrit, telle que la postérité scolaire va le considérer, comme un objet textuel autonome et digne par soi-même d’intérêt. Le fait est anecdotique, mais il est révélateur. D’abord parce que ce n’est pas Descartes qui a constitué...

The Christian evaluation of homosexuality is based primarily on a model which can view homosexuality only as aberrational. From a Christian theological point of view this model articulates an inadequate vision of the dignity of human being. In its deliberations on the process of church, Vatican Council II implicitly developed a relational‐progressive model for understanding the salvific engagement of the complete gift of Godlife and creation. This model, in turn, provides a new basis for understanding human dignity and evaluating homosexuality. (...) Viewed from this perspective homosexuality is able to be considered a sacramental embodiment of Godlife. (shrink)

F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854), le plus precoce de philosophes puis l'un des plus ages, a pati, de son vivant comme apres sa mort, de la proximite de Fichte et surtout de Hegel qui l'a supplante dans le jugement de la posterite. Mais il est en passe de combler son retard grace en particulier a l'impulsion donnee depuis un demi-siecle aux recherches sur l'idealisme allemand. Le premier volume de cet ouvrage se propose de presenter le devenir de Schelling sous le signe du (...) systeme vivant. La derniere philosophie de Schelling est analysee dans le second tome. Elle est presque tout entiere posthume, a l'exception de la Preface a Cousin (1834) et de quelques autres textes brefs. La dualite philosophique, enseignee a Berlin, est l'ultime avatar de ce qui etait de facon latente une philosophie en deux. L'auteur s'attache ici a expliquer en detail les motifs et les problemes de cette dichotomie tardive, mais fondee. (shrink)

In this article we defend the inferential view of scientific models and idealisation. Models are seen as “inferential prostheses” (instruments for surrogative reasoning) construed by means of an idealisation-concretisation process, which we essentially understand as a kind of counterfactual deformation procedure (also analysed in inferential terms). The value of scientific representation is understood in terms not only of the success of the inferential outcomes arrived at with its help, but also of the heuristic power of representation and their capacity to (...) correct and improve our models. This provides us with an argument against Sugden’s account of credible models: the likelihood or realisticness (their “credibility”) is not always a good measure of their acceptability. As opposed to “credibility” we propose the notion of “enlightening”, which is the capacity of giving us understanding in the sense of an inferential ability. (shrink)

This paper tackles an open problem posed by Åqvist. It is the problem of whether his dyadic deontic systemsEandFare complete with respect to their intended Hanssonian preference-based semantics. It is known that there are two different ways of interpreting what it means for a world to be best or top-ranked among alternatives. This can be understood as saying that it is optimal among them, or maximal among them. First, it is established that, under either the maximality rule or the optimality (...) rule,Eis sound and complete with respect to the class of all preference models, the class of those in which the betterness relation is reflexive, and the class of those in which it is total. Next, an analogous result is shown to hold forF. That is, it is established that, under either rule,Fis sound and complete with respect to the class of preference models in which the betterness relation is limited, the class of those in which it is limited and reflexive, and the class of those in which it is limited and total. (shrink)