En enero de 1974 Zubiri dio un breve curso en la Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones de Madrid sobre el tema Tres dimensiones del ser humano: individual, social e histórica. Meses después publicó la última de esas lecciones bajo el título de La dimensión histórica del ser humano. El presente volumen recoge el texto de las tres conferencias, más la versión escrita de la última de ellas. La tesis que Zubiri desarrolla en estas lecciones es que el ser humano es (...) a la vez y necesariamente individual, social e histórico, y que estas dimensiones vienen exigidas por su propia realidad específica, que es pluralizante, continuante y prospectiva. (shrink)

Much has been written about medicine and the market in recent years. This book is the first to include an assessment of market influence in both developed and developing countries, and among the very few that have tried to evaluate the actual health and economic impact of market theory and practices in a wide range of national settings. Tracing the path that market practices have taken from Adam Smith in the eighteenth century into twenty-first-century health care, Daniel Callahan and (...) Angela A. Wasunna add a fresh dimension: they compare the different approaches taken in the market debate by health care economists, conservative market advocates, and liberal supporters of single-payer or government-regulated systems. In addition to laying out the market-versus-government struggle around the world -- from Canada and the United States to Western Europe, Latin America, and many African and Asian countries -- they assess the leading market practices, such as competition, physician incentives, and co-payments, for their economic and health efficacy to determine whether they work as advertised. This timely and necessary book engages new dimensions of a development that has urgent consequences for the delivery of health care worldwide. (shrink)

The decline in the interest in ethical theory is first outlined, as a background to the author’s discussion of principlism. The author’s own stance, that of a communitarian philosopher, is then described, before the subject of principlism itself is addressed. Two problems stand in the way of the author’s embracing principlism: its individualistic bias and its capacity to block substantive ethical inquiry. The more serious problem the author finds to be its blocking function. Discussing the four scenarios the author finds (...) that the utility of principlism is shown in the two scenarios about Jehovah’s Witnesses but that when it comes to selling kidneys for transplantation and germline enhancement, principlism is of little help. (shrink)

The social sciences playa variety of multifaceted roles in the policymaking process. So varied are these roles, indeed, that it is futile to talk in the singular about the use of social science in policymaking, as if there were one constant relationship between two fixed and stable entities. Instead, to address this issue sensibly one must talk in the plural about uses of dif ferent modes of social scientific inquiry for different kinds of policies under various circumstances. In some cases, (...) the influence of social scientific research is direct and tangible, and the connection between the find ings and the policy is easy to see. In other cases, perhaps most, its influence is indirect-one small piece in a larger mosaic of politics, bargaining, and compromise. Occasionally the findings of social scientific studies are explicitly drawn upon by policymakers in the formation, implementation, or evaluation of particular policies. More often, the categories and theoretical models of social science provide a general background orientation within which policymakers concep tualize problems and frame policy options. At times, the in fluence of social scientific work is cognitive and informational in nature; in other instances, policymakers use social science primarily for symbolic and political purposes in order to le gitimate preestablished goals and strategies. Nonetheless, amid this diversity and variety, troubling general questions persistently arise. (shrink)

Many if not most sperm donors in the early years of IVF donated under conditions of anonymity. There is, however, a growing awareness of the ethical cost of withholding identifying parental information from donor children. Today, anonymous donation is illegal in many jurisdictions, and some jurisdictions have gone as far as retrospectively invalidating contracts whereby donors were guaranteed anonymity. This article provides a critical evaluation of the ethics and legality of anonymous donation. We defend Australian and British legislation that has (...) outlawed donor anonymity, and we argue for the establishment of a central registry that provides donor children with the ability to easily and reliably access identifying information about their donor parents. (shrink)

The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly interest in conscientious objection in healthcare. While the literature to date has focused primarily on individual healthcare practitioners who object to participation in morally controversial procedures, in this article we consider a different albeit related issue, namely, whether publicly funded healthcare institutions should be required to provide morally controversial services such as abortions, emergency contraception, voluntary sterilizations, and voluntary euthanasia. Substantive debates about institutional responsibility have remained largely at the level of (...) first-order ethical debate over medical practices which institutions have refused to offer; in this article, we argue that more fundamental questions about the metaphysics of institutions provide a neglected avenue for understanding the basis of institutional conscientious objection. To do so, we articulate a metaphysical model of institutional conscience, and consider three well-known arguments for undermining institutional conscientious objection in light of this model. We show how our metaphysical analysis of institutions creates difficulties for justifying sanctions on institutions that conscientiously object. Thus, we argue, questions about the metaphysics of institutions are deserving of serious attention from both critics and defenders of institutional conscientious objection. (shrink)

Giubiliniet aloffer some helpful reflections on the conscientious provision of medical care and whether and in what circumstances professional associations ought to support the conscientious provision of abortion in circumstances where abortion is banned or heavily restricted. I have several reservations, however, about the argument developed in the article. First, the essay makes questionable use of the case of Savita Halappanavar to justify its central argument about conscientious provision. Second, there is an apparent inconsistency between this article and the authors’ (...) statements elsewhere about the conscientious refusal of care. Third, there are risks that attend to professional associations supporting practitioners who break the law, and yet Giubiliniet aldo not give sufficient attention to this. This response will briefly discuss these three concerns. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage confronte les pensées de Frege à Husserl à propos du psychologisme et pose la question de savoir comment ces deux penseurs ont pu à la fois lutter contre l'influence grandissante de ce courant et parvenir à une telle incompréhension mutuelle. L'auteur cherche à montrer comment la différence de perspective sur les sciences mathématiques les a conduit à s'opposer sur le statut de la logique et de son rapport à la pensée. S'ils s'accordent pour reconnaître que l'arithmétique implique le (...) recours à la pensée, l'un parvient à une logique symbolique, et l'autre à une logique transcendantale, deux perspectives qui supposent des idées très différentes de ce que signifie " penser ". Quels rapports la pensée entretient-elle avec la représentation et avec les symboles? L'esprit qui pense, aussi bien dans les mathématiques que dans la logique, n'est - il qu'un simple " automate " qui développe les conséquences de la vérité ou est-il responsable des lois qu'il découvre? Par-delà l'étude des divergences sur le statut de la logique, de la psychologie et de leur rapport aux mathématiques, il s'agit d'explorer une divergence plus profonde sur le rapport de la pensée à la nécessité et à la liberté. (shrink)

Much has been written about medicine and the market in recent years. This book is the first to include an assessment of market influence in both developed and developing countries, and among the very few that have tried to evaluate the actual health and economic impact of market theory and practices in a wide range of national settings. Tracing the path that market practices have taken from Adam Smith in the eighteenth century into twenty-first-century health care, Daniel Callahan and (...) Angela A. Wasunna add a fresh dimension: they compare the different approaches taken in the market debate by health care economists, conservative market advocates, and liberal supporters of single-payer or government-regulated systems. In addition to laying out the market-versus-government struggle around the world -- from Canada and the United States to Western Europe, Latin America, and many African and Asian countries -- they assess the leading market practices, such as competition, physician incentives, and co-payments, for their economic and health efficacy to determine whether they work as advertised. This timely and necessary book engages new dimensions of a development that has urgent consequences for the delivery of health care worldwide. (shrink)

When (if ever) may a professional deceive a client for the client's own good? Under what conditions (if any) is whistle-blowing morally required? These are just some of the questions that scholars as diverse as Michael D. Bayles, Thomas Nagel, Sissela Bok, Jessica Mitford, and Peter A. French confront in this stimulating anthology. Organized around philosophical issues such as the moral foundations of professional ethics, models of the professional-client relationship, deception, informed consent, privacy and confidentiality, professional dissent, and professional virtue, (...) the volume illuminates the complex ethical issues that arise in journalism, law, health care, counselling, education, engineering, business, politics, and social science research. A variety of pedagogical aids--including clear introductions to and study questions for each set of readings, concrete cases designed to focus discussion, and an appendix on preparing cases and position papers--makes the text invaluable for both students and teachers of professional ethics. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

A response to a critique by Roger W. Hunt of my views on the eventual likely need to use age as a standard for the allocation of expensive, high-technology, life-extending medical care for the elderly. The response encompasses three elements: 1. that while the elderly have a substantial claim to publicly-provided health care, it cannot be an unlimited claim; 2. that a health care system which provided a decent, coherent set of medical and social services for the elderly would be (...) sufficient, even if some limits had to be set; and 3. allocation and rationing decisions should not be made by individual doctors at the bedside but by regional or national policy. (shrink)

American bioethics began in the late 1960s, stimulated by a plethora of new medical technologies and biological knowledge and by a scandal-induced interest in human subject research. Although it was understood that there would be ethical debate , no one thought the disputes would be ideological in character, as if part of one's voting pattern as liberal or conservative, Democrat or Republican. There were arguments, often sharp, but no culture wars.

A response to a critique by Roger W. Hunt of my views on the eventual likely need to use age as a standard for the allocation of expensive, high-technology, life-extending medical care for the elderly. The response encompasses three elements: 1. that while the elderly have a substantial claim to publicly-provided health care, it cannot be an unlimited claim; 2. that a health care system which provided a decent, coherent set of medical and social services for the elderly would be (...) sufficient, even if some limits had to be set; and 3. allocation and rationing decisions should not be made by individual doctors at the bedside but by regional or national policy. (shrink)

**" CHAPTER * HUMAN NATURE In May, at the time when the French Civil Code was being drafted, one of the orators of the Tribunat, in seeking to justify the ...

En un diálogo continuo con la tradición filosófica, Zubiri va página a página describiendo el acto de la intelección humana y desmontando el cúmulo de hipótesis y teorías que subyacen al llamado «problema del conocimiento». Zubiri consigue descubrir, mediante el recurso a un procedimiento puramente descriptivo, en qué consiste el acto humano por excelencia, la intelección. La intelección humana, dice Zubiri, no es una síntesis trascendental, sino algo más simple a la vez que más radical, la mera actualización de lo (...) real en la inteligencia sentiente. (shrink)

The possibility of human cloning first surfaced in the 1960s, stimulated by the report that a salamander had been cloned. James D. Watson and Joshua Lederberg, distinguished Nobel laureates, speculated that the cloning of human beings might one day be within reach; it was only a matter of time. Bioethics was still at that point in its infancybioethicsand cloning immediately caught the eye of a number of those beginning to write in the field. They included Paul Ramsey, Hans Jonas, and (...) Leon Kass. Cloning became one of the symbolic issues of what was, at that time, called a biology that would be dominated by molecular genetics. Over a period of five years or so in the early 1970s a number of articles and book chapters on the ethical issues appeared, discussing cloning in its own right and cloning as a token of the radical genetic possibilities. (shrink)

Steven Pinker, a cognitive psychologist and linguist at Harvard and a savant of big ideas, is one of the latest to take on the idea of progress. He does it under the aegis of “enlightenment,” which comes down to a kind of holy trinity of reason, science, and humanism. His new book, Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, is ambitious and cantankerous and heady with hope. On the whole, Pinker makes a good case for the benefits (...) of progress, but with an overdose of feel‐good prose. His greatest failure comes in exaggerating the threats to science and in avoiding some problems altogether. He ignores its complexity, its shadows, its creation of new problems raised by its solutions to old ones. Pinker has a particular animus against bioethics, and he misses what has been, I would argue, at the heart of bioethics from its beginning fifty or so years ago. Bioethics was prompted by a new class of medical dilemmas that require a difficult balancing of harms and benefits. Most of them are still with us, and most of them are the result of the progress of postwar medical research and fast‐changing clinical practices. (shrink)

As a result of innovations, mainly new products and services, but also processes or new marketing methods, animal populations and species disappear. The massive development of technologies, products and consumer goods, both current and in the past, has a direct impact on the depletion of natural resources. Innovation is a dual‐entry device that can be called world‐innovation, on the one hand, and consequential‐innovation, on the other. In this chapter, the authors propose to review the change from a new perspective, more (...) precisely, with two major dimensions: world‐innovation and consequential innovation, which help us to understand why innovation has become what it is. Faced with the challenges of innovation in all the aspects we have been able to describe, we must now try to find answers and, it seems to us that this can only be done with philosophy. (shrink)

Feminist philosophy emerged in earnest in the 1970s. With that emergence and the latest surge of the Women's Movement now a quarter of a century old and with the turn of the century approaching quickly, the Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs and the Pacific Society for Women in Philosophy invited a group of feminist philosophers to reflect on feminism and philosophy as we approach the millennium. A roundtable was held at the 1995 meeting of the Pacific Division of the (...) American Philosophical Association, and much of the content of that session is included in this Symposium. The discussants include scholars with research interests across the traditional areas of philosophy (e.g., metaphysics and epistemology, ethics, social and political philosophy, history of philosophy, and philosophy of science), as well as not so traditional areas (e.g., lesbian philosophy). Each participant was asked to take ten minutes to focus on whatever she thought might be useful to discuss in a forum designed for taking stock of feminism and philosophy in the mid‐1990s. The contributors are Louise Antony, Joan Callahan (introduction), Claudia Card, Ruth Ginzberg, Martha Nussbaum, Naomi Scheman, Laurie Schrage, Nancy Tuana, Margaret Walker, and Charlotte Witt. (shrink)

A quintessential challenge for any perceptual system is the need to focus on task-relevant information without being blindsided by unexpected, yet important information. The human visual system incorporates several solutions to this challenge, one of which is a reflexive covert attention system that is rapidly responsive to both the physical salience and the task-relevance of new information. This paper presents a model that simulates behavioral and neural correlates of reflexive attention as the product of brief neural attractor states that are (...) formed across the visual hierarchy when attention is engaged. Such attractors emerge from an attentional gradient distributed over a population of topographically organized neurons and serve to focus processing at one or more locations in the visual field, while inhibiting the processing of lower priority information. The model moves towards a resolution of key debates about the nature of reflexive attention, such as whether it is parallel or serial, and whether suppression effects are distributed in a spatial surround, or selectively at the location of distractors. Most importantly, the model develops a framework for understanding the neural mechanisms of visual attention as a spatiotopic decision process within a hierarchy and links them to observable correlates such as accuracy, reaction time, and the N2pc and PD components of the EEG. This last contribution is the most crucial for repairing the disconnect that exists between our understanding of behavioral and neural correlates of attention. (shrink)

It is shown that axiomatic extensions of intuitionistic propositional calculus defining univocally new connectives, including those proposed by Gabbay, are strongly complete with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras with additional operations. In all cases, the double negation of such a connective is equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. Thus, under the excluded third law it collapses to a classical formula, showing that this condition in Gabbay's definition is redundant. Moreover, such connectives can not be interpreted in all Heyting (...) algebras, unless they are already equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. These facts relativize to connectives over intermediate logics. In particular, the intermediate logic with values in the chain of length n may be "completed" conservatively by adding a single unary connective, so that the expanded system does not allow further axiomatic extensions by new connectives. (shrink)

F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854), le plus precoce de philosophes puis l'un des plus ages, a pati, de son vivant comme apres sa mort, de la proximite de Fichte et surtout de Hegel qui l'a supplante dans le jugement de la posterite. Mais il est en passe de combler son retard grace en particulier a l'impulsion donnee depuis un demi-siecle aux recherches sur l'idealisme allemand. Le premier volume de cet ouvrage se propose de presenter le devenir de Schelling sous le signe du (...) systeme vivant. La derniere philosophie de Schelling est analysee dans le second tome. Elle est presque tout entiere posthume, a l'exception de la Preface a Cousin (1834) et de quelques autres textes brefs. La dualite philosophique, enseignee a Berlin, est l'ultime avatar de ce qui etait de facon latente une philosophie en deux. L'auteur s'attache ici a expliquer en detail les motifs et les problemes de cette dichotomie tardive, mais fondee. (shrink)

When the Karen Ann Quinlan case emerged in the mid-1970s and the New Jersey Supreme Court made mention of the role that ethics committees might play in such cases, no one could have predicted at the time what the consequences of that observation might be. It took a while for momentum to build, but we are now seeing the flowering of what is an important movement in the field of bioethics: the interplay of ethics committees and broader societal issues.

This book provides an overview of some of the most important critics of “Enlightenment rationalism.” The subjects of the volume—including, among others, Burke, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, T.S. Eliot, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, C.S. Lewis, Gabriel Marcel, Russell Kirk, and Jane Jacobs—do not share a philosophical tradition as much as a skeptical disposition toward the notion, common among modern thinkers, that there is only one standard of rationality or reasonableness, and that that one standard is or ought to be taken from the presuppositions, methods, (...) and logic of the natural sciences. The essays on each thinker are intended not merely to offer a commentary on that thinker, but also to place that thinker in the context of this larger stream of anti-rationalist thought. Thus, while this volume is not a history of anti-rationalist thought, it may contain the intimations of such a history. (shrink)

We study a class of [0,1][0,1]-valued logics. The main result of the paper is a maximality theorem that characterizes these logics in terms of a model-theoretic property, namely, an extension of the omitting types theorem to uncountable languages.

The radical autonomy of innovation – regardless of who it depends on – must be pursued with no external pressure to make it more suitable for contemporary challenges. The challenge is to look at innovation as a production or vector of phenomena, and therefore no longer be interested in its consequences. Just as non‐standard philosophy can be considered as an invention in philosophy, phenomenology can be perceived as a recommencing of philosophy, a renewal, a rebirth. The authors propose to focus (...) on the method of phenomenology, its detailed constitution both in its theories and in its modalities of implementation, and to compare each aspect systematically, each step of this philosophy, to measure a possible contribution to (re)thinking innovation. Science, psychology and philosophy color Husserl's phenomenology. What will transpire from its introduction is the rigor that emerges, a rigor that translates into a method, tools, almost procedures, for this phenomenology to be established. (shrink)