Resumen: Se discute las consecuencias de ajustar el diseño de investigaciones sociales al formato de las ciencias naturales. Se propone que el costo es la esterilidad de los intentos. Siendo la sociedad un sistema en desarrollo, la observación de hechos según las reglas del laboratorio o del experimento conducen a la invisibilidad del objeto y a un extravío del observador; lo que se escurre es el sentido de la investigación y en su reemplazo queda solo un hábito de precisión técnica. (...) En vez, se sugiere volver a la ciencia social según su impronta historicista y totalista: el contexto es todo y origen de las preguntas. El método son los caminos para producir las respuestas. La ciencia comienza antes y sigue después de este, en la relación sociología/sociedad. Ahí es cuando la investigación toma su sentido, que lleva a esa sociedad a esa pregunta: a investigarse. (shrink)

Resumen: Se discute las consecuencias de ajustar el diseño de investigaciones sociales al formato de las ciencias naturales. Se propone que el costo es la esterilidad de los intentos. Siendo la sociedad un sistema en desarrollo, la observación de hechos según las reglas del laboratorio o del experimento conducen a la invisibilidad del objeto y a un extravío del observador; lo que se escurre es el sentido de la investigación y en su reemplazo queda solo un hábito de precisión técnica. (...) En vez, se sugiere volver a la ciencia social según su impronta historicista y totalista: el contexto es todo y origen de las preguntas. El método son los caminos para producir las respuestas. La ciencia comienza antes y sigue después de este, en la relación sociología/sociedad. Ahí es cuando la investigación toma su sentido, que lleva a esa sociedad a esa pregunta: a investigarse.: This essay discusses the consequences of fitting social research designs to the format of natural sciences. It argues that the cost is null for trying. Being society a system in development, the observation of facts according to lab rules or experiments lead to the invisibility of the subject matter and loosing track to the observer; what is lost is the sense of research and its replacement is just technical precision habits. Instead it suggests going back the social science based on historical and totality roots: the context is everything and the origin of questions. The method is the road to produce answers. Science began before and continues after it, in the relationship between sociology and society. There is when research acquires its meaning, that leads that society to that question: to question itself. (shrink)

En esta conferencia, inédita hasta el momento, el profesor Francisco Canals establece un diálogo entre el trascendentalismo kantiano y el pensamiento de Tomás de Aquino. La pregunta acerca de la ontología del sujeto cognoscente humano, bloqueada por los presupuestos de Kant, puede en cambio ser formulada y encontrar respuesta en la metafísica del conocimiento del Aquinate. Frente a los problemas suscitados por la postulación cartesiana de una intuición intelectual perfecta del yo pensante, y frente a la escisión del yo puro (...) y el yo empírico operada en Kant, Canals propone una ontología del sujeto basada en la metafísica del conocimiento de Tomás de Aquino, donde el sujeto finito intelectual sensible compuesto que es el hombre se interpreta en el plano de la naturaleza intelectual. (shrink)

El profesor Francisco Canals propuso que la metafísica del conocimiento de Santo Tomás de Aquino, asumida por él en su obra, podía ser expresada sintéticamente con la expresión “realismo pensante”. En esta presentación se explica, por una parte, cómo desde un realismo del acto de ser como perfección se halla el lugar que le corresponde al conocer humano, como manifestativo y locutivo. Por otra parte, se da sentido al diálogo que Canals establece con el criticismo kantiano, al tener en cuenta (...) que un “realismo pensante” que afirme el conocer en su inmaterialidad se enfrenta al peligro del idealismo. (shrink)

Con este artículo tratamos de responder parcialmente a la pregunta: ¿Cómo dar lugar a lo común desde la deliberación y la toma democrática de decisiones en sistemas humanos complejos, altamente diversos desde el punto de vista económico, social y cultural? Para ello, proponemos entender los procesos de deliberación y toma democrática de decisiones en sí mismos como común. En primer lugar, ilustraremos cómo en la actualidad dichos procesos pueden incurrir en la llamada “tragedia de los anticomunes”, y señalaremos tres problemas (...) centrales a este respecto: la individualización de la responsabilidad ciudadana, la erosión de los canales de información y formación de la opinión pública y la estrechez del ámbito de la deliberación y toma democrática de decisiones. En segundo lugar, ofreceremos una salida al primero de los problemas mencionados, inspirándonos en aportaciones provenientes de la teoría asamblearia. Finalmente, responderemos a los otros dos problemas apuntados, basándonos en una serie de postulados defendidos desde la tradición republicana y el modelo de democracia deliberativa y participativa. (shrink)

Any complete account of morality should be able to account for its characteristic normativity; we show that enactivism is able to do so while doing justice to the situated and interactive nature of morality. Moral normativity primarily arises in interpersonal interaction and is characterized by agents’ possibility of irrevocably changing each other’s autonomies, that is, the possibility of harming or expanding each other’s autonomy. We defend that moral normativity, as opposed to social and other forms of normativity, regulates and, in (...) some cases, constitutes this very possibility. Agents are thus morally responsible for caring about their own and others’ autonomies in interaction. In our conception, moral normativity is embodied, situated, and deeply affective, and is constituted in social practices and maintained in interaction. We identify at least two necessary conditions for moral normativity to arise as a social practice. The first is our embodied constitution as living beings who are precarious and therefore vulnerable and in need of interaction with others and with the environment. The second is our sociolinguistic nature, which allows us to exponentially expand our possibilities for action and normatively distinguish among them. We finish by drawing a distinction between moral character and the moral content of interactions, which allows us to universally recognize the ethical dimensions of all human interaction while doing justice to the situated character of morals. (shrink)

El presente artículo desarrolla un análisis crítico de papel metodológico que desempeña la libre fantasía en Ideas I. Haciendo visible la estrecha relación entre las modalizaciones de conciencia y la estructura noético-noemática de los actos intencionales, se demostrará la necesaria complementariedad de los métodos de las reducciones eidética y fenomenológica para el proyecto de Husserl de una crítica fenomenológica del conocimiento. Con ello se busca poner de relieve que el rendimiento de la fantasía tuvo un impacto metodológico decisivo para la (...) conversión trascendental de la fenomenología. (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone explorar la noción de mundo ficcional desde la filosofía de Edmund Husserl, destacando la potencialidad de la fenomenología para los campos de la estética y la teoría de la ficción. Para ello, partiré de la descripción de las estructuras sobre las que se erige la vivencia ficcional, que aquí será tratada como una vivencia de fantasía. Bajo este enfoque, el análisis muestra primero la correlación entre conciencia de fantasía y mundo de fantasía, pasando a continuación (...) a explicitar las estructuras de cada uno de los polos de experiencia. Para Husserl, esta correlación se sustenta lógicamente en la doctrina del idealismo trascendental y en su concepción del mundo de fantasía como mundo posible. (shrink)

This paper deals with one of the first attempts to measure simple reactions in humans. The Swiss astronomer Adolph Hirsch investigated personal differences in the speed of sensory transmission in order to achieve accuracy in astronomy. His controversial results, however, started an intense debate among both physiologists and astronomers who disagreed on the nature of these differences. Were they due to different eyes or brains, or to differences in skill and education? Furthermore, they debated how to eliminate them. Some, for (...) example, wanted to eliminate the observer, and prescribed the use of new technologies like the electro-chronograph or photography, while others believed in discipline and education. By debating the nature of these differences, astronomers and physiologists sketched both different conceptions of ‘man’ and different paths to objectivity. These diverse conceptions, moreover, were tied to current nineteenth-century debates, such as the benefits or disadvantages of railroads, telegraphy and the standardization of time and longitudes. By focusing on the debates surrounding the speed of sensory transmission, this paper reevaluates the history of astronomy, physiology and experimental psychology. Furthermore, in investigating astronomy's relation to the human sciences, it uncovers profound connections in the traditionally separate histories of objectivity and the body.L'heure sera distribuée dans les maisons,comme l'eau ou le gaz.Adolph Hirsch. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that our ordinary English words man and woman are “gender terms,” and gender is distinct from biological sex. That is, they believe womanhood and manhood are not defined even partly by biological sex. This sex/gender distinction is one of the most influential ideas of the twentieth century on the broader culture, both popular and academic. Less well known are the reasons to think it’s true. My interest in this paper is to show that, upon investigation, the arguments (...) for the sex/gender distinction have feet of clay. In fact, they all fail. We will survey the literature and tour arguments in favor of the sex/gender distinction, and then we’ll critically evaluate those arguments. We’ll consider the argument from resisting biological determinism, the argument from biologically intersex people and vagueness, the argument from the normativity of gender, and some arguments from thought experiments. We’ll see that these arguments are not up to the task of supporting the sex/gender distinction; they simply don’t work. So, philosophers should either develop stronger arguments for the sex/gender distinction, or cultivate a variety of feminism that’s consistent with the traditional, biologically-based definitions of woman and man. (shrink)

During the late nineteenth century, scientists around the world disagreed as to the types of instruments and methods that should be used for determining the most important constant of celestial mechanics: the solar parallax. Venus’s 1874 transit across the sun was seen as the best opportunity for ending decades of debate. However, a mysterious “black drop” that appeared between Venus and the sun and individual differences in observations of the phenomenon brought traditional methods into disrepute. To combat these difficulties, the (...) astronomer Jules Janssen devised a controversial new instrument, the “photographic revolver,” that photographed Venus at regular intervals. Another solution came from physicists, who rivaled the astronomers’ dominance in precision measurements by deducing the solar parallax from physical measurements of the speed of light. Yet other astronomers relied on drawings and well‐trained observers. The new space emerging from this debate was characterized by a decline in faith in photography and in geometry and by the growing realization of the importance of alternative elements needed for establishing scientific truths: power and authority, skill and discipline, standardization, mechanical reproducibility, and theatricality. By examining the “cinematographic turn” in science and its alternatives, this essay brings to light unexplored multidisciplinary connections that contribute to the histories of psychology, philosophy, physics, and film studies. (shrink)

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...) and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge. (shrink)

Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S’s belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesaña, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at epistemic risk (...) just before forming her belief to the conclusion that S’s belief was formed unsafely. In light of lessons from their failure, I provide a new and successful counterexample to the safety condition on knowledge. It follows, then, that knowledge need not be safe. Safety at a time depends counterfactually on what would likely happen at that time or soon after in a way that knowledge does not. I close by considering one objection concerning higher-order safety. (shrink)

Feminism has long grappled with its own demarcation problem—exactly what is it to be a woman?—and the rise of trans-inclusive feminism has made this problem more urgent. I will first consider Sally Haslanger’s “social and hierarchical” account of woman, resulting from “Ameliorative Inquiry”: she balances ordinary use of the term against the instrumental value of novel definitions in advancing the cause of feminism. Then, I will turn to Katharine Jenkins’ charge that Haslanger’s view suffers from an “Inclusion Problem”: it fails (...) to class many trans women as women. Jenkins offers a novel norm-relevancy account of woman to avoid the Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, Jenkins’ account has serious internal problems, i.e. problems by Jenkins’ own lights: it is unintelligible, or it suffers from an Inclusion Problem of its own. After that, I will develop novel arguments for the conclusion that the project of Ameliorative Inquiry is both incoherent and also impossible to complete—at least, impossible to complete in a trans-inclusive way. Trans-inclusive feminism, therefore, would do well to move beyond Ameliorative Inquiry. Insofar as that’s not possible, trans-inclusive feminism inherits the incoherence of Ameliorative Inquiry. (shrink)

Do the facts of evolution generate an epistemic challenge to moral realism? Some think so, and many “evolutionary debunking arguments” have been discussed in the recent literature. But they are all murky right where it counts most: exactly which epistemic principle is meant to take us from evolutionary considerations to the skeptical conclusion? Here, I will identify several distinct species of evolutionary debunking argument in the literature, each one of which relies on a distinct epistemic principle. Drawing on recent work (...) in epistemology, I will show that most of these initially plausible principles are false, spoiling the arguments that rely on them. And we will see that each argument threatens only one popular view of moral psychology: a “Representationalist” view on which our moral judgments rely crucially on a mental intermediary—e.g. a sentiment, gut reaction, or affect-laden intuition—delivered by our evolved moral faculty. In the end, only one evolutionary debunking argument remains a menace: an “ Argument from Symmetry ” that I will introduce to the literature. But we will see that it should worry only all naturalists, pressuring them into a trilemma: give up moral realism, accept a rationalism that is incongruous with naturalism, or give up naturalism. Non-naturalists are free and clear. (shrink)

El presente artículo defiende que las nociones de epojé y de modificación de neutralidad, a pesar de su aparente semejanza, deben mantenerse radicalmente diferenciadas. La razón de fondo es que ambas surgen en el seno de operaciones de la conciencia que son metodológica y jerárquicamente distintas. Para tal efecto, haré una descripción de sus funciones y estructura, de modo que se hagan visibles tanto sus respectivas esferas de aplicación como el alcance operativo de sus procedimientos.

What is a woman? The definition of this central concept of feminism has lately become especially controversial and politically charged. “Ameliorative Inquirists” have rolled up their sleeves to reengineer our ordinary concept of womanhood, with a goal of including in the definition all and only those who identify as women, both “cis” and “trans.” This has proven to be a formidable challenge. Every proposal so far has failed to draw the boundaries of womanhood in a way acceptable to the Ameliorative (...) Inquirists, since not all those who identify as women count as women on these proposals, and some who count as women on these proposals don’t identify as women. This is the Trans Inclusion Problem. Is there any solution? Can there be? Recently, Katharine Jenkins, pointing to the work of Mari Mikkola, suggests that the Trans Inclusion Problem can be “deflated” rather than solved. We will investigate this proposal, and show that, unfortunately, Jenkins is mistaken: Mikkola’s project will not help us answer the Trans Inclusion Problem. After that, we’ll look at Robin Dembroff’s suggestion that we “imitate” the linguistic practices of trans inclusive and queer communities, and we will evaluate whether this would help us solve the Trans Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, this strategy also fails to solve the problem. By the end, we’ll have a better appreciation of the challenges faced by Ameliorative Inquirists in their project of redefining “woman,” and clearer view of why the Trans Inclusion Problem cannot, in fact, be solved. That’s primarily because, no matter what it means to be a woman, it’s one thing to be a woman, and another thing to identify as a woman. (shrink)

Este artículo busca establecer en primer lugar una doble distinción: de un lado, entre fantasía y conciencia de imagen; y, por el otro, entre fantasía y conciencia estética, ambas a partir de los trabajos de Edmund Husserl. Las dos series de distinciones se encuentran ligadas una con otra por el especial estatuto fenomenológico que Husserl concede a la imagen, el cual debe ser también sometido a aclaración. El artículo propone tres conclusiones: que la así llamada “conciencia estética” no es resultado (...) de ninguna “epojé”; que la experiencia de la imagen entremezcla percepción y fantasía; y que esta conciencia estética exige como contrapolo a un sujeto que habita en la irrealidad del “como si”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We exist only because we inhabit a world in common, embedded within networks of associations between humans and nonhumans. This is endlessly disclosed by our experience of the world. And yet, despite its palpability, it is clear that we have failed to mobilize a notion of the common world into something capable of guiding our modes of thought and collective forms of activity—our attitudes, our affective lives, our politics. How have we arrived here? Bruno Latour's work suggests that an (...) answer can be found in the common world's status as information—its self-evidence works to exclude it from a world of values. What, then, should be done? In his recent work on the modes of existence Latour develops a pragmatic metaphysics inspired by the speculative method of Alfred North Whitehead. Metaphysical speculation becomes a tool for moving beyond the “bifurcation of nature” through the construction of abstractions with which to interpret the pluralism of experience. Rather than thinking of the common world as either a given fact or as a totalizing universal, Latour develops a notion of a common world out of the messiness of experience and, as such, hopes to transform us into beings who would be moved to actively pursue and care for such a notion. (shrink)

In an essay recently published in this journal (“Is Safety in Danger?”), Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety condition on knowledge from a counterexample proposed by Tomas Bogardus (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012). In this paper, we will define the safety condition, briefly explain the proposed counterexample, and outline Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition. We will then raise four objections to Broncano-Berrocal’s defense, four implausible implications of his central claim. In the end, we conclude that Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety (...) condition is unsuccessful, and that the safety condition on knowledge should be rejected. (shrink)

This study deals with the failure of one of the most advanced chatbots called Tay, created by Microsoft. Many users, commentators and experts strongly anthropomorphised this chatbot in their assessment of the case around Tay. This view is so widespread that we can identify it as a certain typical cognitive distortion or bias. This study presents a summary of facts concerning the Tay case, collaborative perspectives from eminent experts: Tay did not mean anything by its morally objectionable statements because, in (...) principle, it was not able to think; the controversial content spread by this AI was interpreted incorrectly—not as a mere compilation of meaning, but as its disclosure; even though chatbots are not members of the symbolic order of spatiotemporal relations of the human world, we treat them in this way in many aspects. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo analizaré la tensión que se propone en las novelas Mano de obra de Diamela Eltit y Los cuerpos del verano de Martín Felipe Castagnet, entre la aceleración y los límites de la corporalidad, resto humano que emerge en un mundo de deshumanización y que recuerda el vínculo del cuerpo con el animal y la finitud. En este sentido, el cansancio y la depresión son consideradas patologías del sistema que necesitan corrección, en tanto estados que la sociedad (...) no tolera y de los que se hace responsable al individuo ante el peligro de significar un atasco en el proceso de producción. (shrink)

While scientists and engineers are designing and constructing ever more sophisticated space technology, and computer producers are pursuing a seemingly never ending race to store ever more knowledge on micro chips, western type democracies still live on 200 year old social and political ideas. The apparent disparity between technological innovation and socio?political innovation opens the door for a critical analysis of post modern society. How valid is Adam Smith's social paradigm on the role of self?interest in view of the fact (...) that the social and ecological external effects of the free market economy are threatening the well being of future generations? Can we much longer afford a political system that leaves the social and ecological to inefficient and bureaucratic state authorities undermining democratic virtues like political transparency and individual responsibility? The answer is no. New social paradigms have to be introduced to cope with the ruptures of post modern societies. To avoid suffocation from an overburdened state or the dissolution of society as a coherent and living community and indeed preserve freedom, social and ecological responsibility have to materialise as voluntary individual acts. Social paradigm innovation, it is argued, leads to a complete new role of individuals and institutions in modern society, where self?interest is not identified with egotism, but becomes compatible with altruism. By underlining the individuals role in bringing about change, institutional reforms are not a precondition, but the consequence of social paradigm innovation. A cultural revolution allows for changes of action now and any minute. Corporate cultures, e.g., can straightforwardly assimilate new social paradigms, leading to new forms of organisation, service philosophy, production and cooperation. (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone explorar la relación entre neutralización y conciencia del ‘como si’ en la fenomenología de Husserl, en particular, a partir de su convergencia en las intuiciones de fantasía. Partiendo de una crítica a una línea de interpretación que, en su intento de aproximarse fenomenológicamente a una «conciencia estética», homologa la modificación de neutralidad con la epojé, el artículo busca exponer la función metodológica que cumplen la modalización de la creencia en el proyecto de Ideas I, así (...) como también resaltar la importancia creciente que la fantasía y la conciencia del ‘como si’ irán adquiriendo en el desarrollo posterior de la fenomenología de Husserl. (shrink)

In this paper, I hope to solve a problem that’s as old as the hills: the problem of contingency for religious belief. Paradigmatic examples of this argument begin with a counterfactual premise: had we been born at a different time or in a difference place, we easily could have held different beliefs on religious topics. Ultimately, and perhaps by additional steps, we’re meant to reach the skeptical conclusion that very many of our religious beliefs do not amount to knowledge. I (...) survey some historical examples of this argument, and I try to fill the gap between the counterfactual premise and the skeptical conclusion as forcefully as possible. I consider the following possibilities: there are no additional steps in the argument; or there are and they concern the alleged safety condition on knowledge, or the alleged non-accidentality condition on knowledge, or the unclarity produced by disagreement. On every possibility, the argument from the counterfactual premise to the conclusion of widespread skepticism is invalid. It seems, then, that there is no serious problem of contingency for religious belief. (shrink)

There is much to admire in John Pittard’s recent book on the epistemology of disagreement. But here we develop one concern about the role that rational insight plays in his project. Pittard develops and defends a view on which a party to peer disagreement can show substantial partiality to his own view, so long as he enjoys even moderate rational insight into the truth of his view or the cogency of his reasoning for his view. Pittard argues that this may (...) happen in ordinary cases of religious disagreement—cases in which it’s a live skeptical possibility that one is misdescribing his insight, or not having insight at all—and therefore one need not be strongly conciliatory even in the face of peer disagreement. Yet Pittard agrees that one should be strongly conciliatory in cases of disagreement involving, e.g., visual perception and dim rational insight, since the sort of fallible, corrigible evidence involved in such cases may be counterbalanced by symmetrical evidence on the part of one’s disagreeing peer. We worry that there’s an inconsistency here. If it’s unreasonable to show partiality to one’s visual experience (or dim rational insight) in cases like “Horse Race” and “Restaurant Check,” it’s likewise unreasonable to show partiality in religious disagreements to one’s moderate rational insight, fallible and corrigible as it is. (shrink)

According to Ted Nannicelli, ethical disputes about art today often concern not the controversial attitudes expressed by the works but the ways in which they have been created, that is, as well as interpretation-oriented ethical criticism of art, we find production-oriented ethical criticism. The main question that I explore in this article is: are the interpretation- and production-oriented approaches to ethical art criticism essentially disconnected or can there be a connection between them? I argue that in the disjunctivist view, the (...) two approaches are disconnected, for ethical flaws in the production of artworks are never conditioned by ethical flaws in the attitudes expressed by those works and vice versa. I show that disjunctivism is mistaken and defend what I call contextual conjunctivism. In this view, the two approaches can be connected since attitudinal ethical flaws in artworks can indeed cause ethical flaws in their production and vice versa depending on context. I support this view using several examples of controversies about contemporary art. (shrink)

Argues that economics is a cultural phenomenon, rather than a strictly mathematical entity, that is found in mythology, religion, philosophy, psychology, ...

Some philosophers believe that, when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other’s assessment equal weight as her own. Other philosophers worry that this Equal-Weight View is vulnerable to straightforward counterexamples, and that it requires an unacceptable degree of spinelessness with respect to our most treasured philosophical, political, and religious beliefs. I think that both of these allegations are false. To show this, I carefully state the Equal-Weight View, motivate it, describe apparent counterexamples to it, and then (...) explain away the apparent counterexamples. Finally, I adapt those explanations to cases of religious disagreement. In the end, we reach the surprising conclusion that—even if the Equal-Weight View is true—in very many cases of religious disagreement between apparent epistemic peers, the parties to the disagreement need not be conciliatory. And what goes for religious beliefs goes for political and philosophical beliefs as well. This strongly suggests that the View does not demand an unacceptable degree of spinelessness. (shrink)

This paper addresses Arthur Danto’s claim that contemporary artworks, such as Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box, do not differ perceptually from ordinary objects, and that in order to see contemporary artworks as art the viewer has to move from mere experience to a meaning expressed by the work. I propose to supplement Danto’s thesis. I argue that, while some contemporary artworks may indeed be perceptually indistinguishable from ordinary objects, these works are distinguishable not only by means of meaning but also by (...) means of a non-perceptual aesthetic experience. I then discuss two theories that might provide a model of such an aesthetic experience. First, I focus on James Shelley’s theory of non-perceptual aesthetic experience conceived as a representation of non-perceptual aesthetic properties. Second, I discuss Jérôme Dokic’s adverbialist theory, which sees aesthetic experience as a combination of non-aesthetic attitudes. I argue that the adverbialist model is the most promising candidate for solving our problem. The model must be extended, however, if it is to account for pragmatic attitudes in response to artworks. (shrink)

This article aims to explore the relationship between neutralization and “as if” consciousness in Husserl’s phenomenology, in particular, from its convergence in intuitions concerning phantasy. Starting from a critique of a line of interpretation that, in its attempt to approach phenomenologically to an “aesthetic consciousness”, homologates the neutrality modification with the Epoché, the article seeks to expose the methodological function that the modalization of belief fulfills in the project of Ideas I, as well as highlighting the growing importance that phantasy (...) and the “as if” consciousness will acquire in the subsequent development of Husserl’s phenomenology. (shrink)

In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...) end, our prima facie justification for dualism remains undefeated. I close with one objection concerning the dialectical role of rebutting defeaters, and I argue that the prospects for a successful rebutting defeater for our dualist intuitions are dim. Since dualism emerges undefeated, we ought to believe it. (shrink)