O presente artigo objetiva realizar uma análise conjunta das obras Metamorfoses (2020) do filósofo italiano Emanuele Coccia e O mestre ignorante (1987) do filósofo francês Jacques Rancière. A análise será feita sob a luz do crescente interesse contemporâneo sobre o conceito de comum, considerado uma aposta política e filosófica de diversos movimentos sociais e intelectuais críticos tanto do neoliberalismo quanto do comunismo de Estado. Argumentaremos que as duas obras, ainda que não coloquem tal noção em primeiro plano, apresentam contribuições importantes (...) para a compreensão do comum, principalmente em sua dimensão filosófica. Argumentaremos também que o conceito de inteligência em O mestre ignorante e o conceito de metamorfose em Metamorfoses, ainda que mobilizados em edifícios conceituais diferentes, não deixam de apresentar um certo tipo de parentesco – sendo ambos dispositivos sensíveis e cognitivos que expressam uma dimensão inapropriável, transmundana e compartilhada, uma riqueza comum, uma potência imprópria que pertence a todos e a ninguém. (shrink)

This study proposes two identification cuing factors (i. e., CSR associations and CSR participation) to understand how corporate social responsibility (CSR) relates to employees' identification with their firm.The results reveal that a firm's CSR initiatives increase employee-company identification (E-C identification).E-C identification, in turn, influences employees' commitment to their company. However, CSR associations do not directly influence employees' identification with a firm, but rather influence their identification through perceived external prestige (PEP). Compared to CSR associations, CSR participation has a direct influence (...) on E-C identification. On the basis of these findings, it is argued that CSR performance can be an effective way for companies to maintain a positive relationship with their employees. (shrink)

This study proposes two identification cuing factors to understand how corporate social responsibility relates to employees’ identification with their firm. The results reveal that a firm’s CSR initiatives increase employee–company identification. E–C identification, in turn, influences employees’ commitment to their company. However, CSR associations do not directly influence employees’ identification with a firm, but rather influence their identification through perceived external prestige. Compared to CSR associations, CSR participation has a direct influence on E–C identification. On the basis of these findings, (...) it is argued that CSR performance can be an effective way for companies to maintain a positive relationship with their employees. (shrink)

Abstract This article delves into the study of the term «tark-i awlà» (abandoning performance of that which is better and doing that which is less than better) as an approach for defending the infallibility of the prophets when confronting verses from the Holy Qur‘ān that apparently prove the prophets committed sins; and after going into the semantics of «tark-i awlà», the following question has been made the focus of discussion and study: are the intellectual arguments proving the infalliblity (...) of the Prophets in agreement with the fact that the prophets committed tark-i awlà? According to the author, considering that tark-i awlà is a type of error and lapse and because the intellectual arguments for infallibility (like the trust and certitude of the people, the guiding purpose of prophet hood, the necessity of following the prophets, the principle of luṭf (grace) and absence of disinclination in the hearts of the people towards the prophets) necessitate the negation of all types of errors and lapses from the prophets, the prophets must be infallible from tark-i awlà too and this approach by Islamic theologians in justifying the verses that indicate the committing of sins by the prophets is not successful. Accepting the committing of tark-i awlà by the prophets is to accept that they committed errors and is against the belief of the Shi‘a regarding the infallibility of the prophets. As a result, Shi‘a theology will face a great challenge in justifying the verses that indicate the committing of errors and lapses by the Prophets which, according to the author, necessitates a revision of the Shi‘a theological belief in regards to the absolute infallibility of the prophets. (shrink)

van Bentham et al. (Merging frameworks for interaction: DEL and ETL, 2007) provides a framework for generating the models of Epistemic Temporal Logic ( ETL : Fagin et al., Reasoning about knowledge, 1995; Parikh and Ramanujam, Journal of Logic, Language, and Information, 2003) from the models of Dynamic Epistemic Logic ( DEL : Baltag et al., in: Gilboa (ed.) Tark 1998, 1998; Gerbrandy, Bisimulations on Planet Kripke, 1999). We consider the logic TDEL on the merged semantic framework, and its (...) extension with the labeled past-operator “ P ϵ ” (“The event ϵ has happened before which. . .”). To axiomatize the extension, we introduce a method for transforming a given model into a normal form in a suitable sense. These logics suggest further applications of DEL in the theory of agency, the theory of learning, etc. (shrink)

Deontic Logic goes back to Ernst Mally’s 1926 work, Grundgesetze des Sollens: Elemente der Logik des Willens [Mally. E.: 1926, Grundgesetze des Sollens: Elemente der Logik des Willens, Leuschner & Lubensky, Graz], where he presented axioms for the notion ‘p ought to be the case’. Some difficulties were found in Mally’s axioms, and the field has much developed. Logic of Knowledge goes back to Hintikka’s work Knowledge and Belief [Hintikka, J.: 1962, Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of (...) the Two Notions, Cornell University Press] in which he proposed formal logics of knowledge and belief. This field has also developed quite a great deal and is now the subject of the TARK conferences. However, there has been relatively little work combining the two notions of knowledge (belief) with the notion of obligation. (See, however, [Lomuscio, A. and Sergot, M.: 2003, Studia Logica 75 63–92; Moore, R. C.: 1990, In J. F. Allen, J. Hendler and A. Tate (eds.), Readings in Planning, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Mateo, CA]) In this paper we point out that an agent’s obligations are often dependent on what the agent knows, and indeed one cannot reasonably be expected to respond to a problem if one is not aware of its existence. For instance, a doctor cannot be expected to treat a patient unless she is aware of the fact that he is sick, and this creates a secondary obligation on the patient or someone else to inform the doctor of his situation. In other words, many obligations are situation dependent, and only apply in the presence of the relevant information. Thus a case for combining Deontic Logic with the Logic of Knowledge is clear. We introduce the notion of knowledge based obligation and offer an S5, history based Kripke semantics to express this notion, as this semantics enables us to represent how information is transmitted among agents and how knowledge changes over time as a result of communications. We consider both the case of an absolute obligation (although dependent on information) as well as the (defeasible) notion of an obligation which may be over-ridden by more relevant information. For instance a physician who is about to inject a patient with drug d may find out that the patient is allergic to d and that she should use d′ instead. Dealing with the second kind of case requires a resort to non-monotonic reasoning and the notion of justified belief which is stronger than plain belief, but weaker than absolute knowledge in that it can be over-ridden. This notion of justified belief also creates a derived notion of default obligation where an agent has, as far as the agent knows, an obligation to do some action a. A dramatic application of this notion is our analysis of the Kitty Genovese case where, in 1964, a young woman was stabbed to death while 38 neighbours watched from their windows but did nothing. The reason was not indifference, but none of the neighbours had even a default obligation to act, even though, as a group, they did have an obligation to take some action to protect Kitty. (shrink)

Barteld Kooi and Bryan Renne (2011). Generalized Arrow Update Logic. In K.R. Apt (editor). Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, Proceedings of the Thirteenth Conference (TARK 2011), pp. 205-211.

We investigate the process of truth-seeking by iterated belief revision with higher-level doxastic information . We elaborate further on the main results in Baltag and Smets (Proceedings of TARK, 2009a , Proceedings of WOLLIC’09 LNAI 5514, 2009b ), applying them to the issue of convergence to truth . We study the conditions under which the belief revision induced by a series of truthful iterated upgrades eventually stabilizes on true beliefs. We give two different conditions ensuring that beliefs converge to (...) “full” (complete) truth , as well as a condition ensuring only that they converge to true (but not necessarily complete) beliefs. (shrink)

In Islamic theological writings, under the heading of sustenance, the focus is generally on issues such as who is the provider of sustenance, whether haram is considered sustenance, and whether Allah’s consent exists for haram sustenance. Another issue that can be found between the lines of the subject of sustenance is whether it is haram for a person to work for sustenance or not. In fact, the pursuit of means of livelihood in order to sustain one’s life is, according to (...) the general and predominant acceptance of Muslim scholars, permissible and, in cases of necessity, wajib. According to a record in Uṣūl al-niḥal, during the formative period of itizālī thought, there were Mu‘tazilite sufis (ṣūfiyyat al-Muʿtazila) such as Bishr b. al-Mu‘tamir’s disciple Abū Imrān Mūsā b. al-Raqqāshī, al-Naẓẓām’s apostate disciple Fadl al-Hadathī, and Husayn al-Kūfī, about whom no information is available. These names, who seem to have earned their livelihood through almsgiving, defended the forbiddenness (taḥrīm al-makāsib) of all kinds of endeavour for sustenance, contrary to the acceptance of Muslim thinkers. However, it should be noted that for them, the forbiddenness in making an effort for sustenance does not cover the definition of sustenance, which is ‘all the benefits’, but only the effort in obtaining sustenance through means such as trade and agriculture. It is interesting to find such an extreme tendency among the Mu‘tazilites, who came to the fore with their rationalist discourses. “How could a Mu‘tazilite defend tahrīm al-makāsib?”, the issue of abandonment of striving for sustenance (tark al-makāsib), from which the idea of tahrīm al-makāsib is thought to have evolved, is mentioned, and then the Mu‘tazilite sufis views on tahrīm al-makāsib are tried to be based mainly on Mu‘tazilite sources and the criticisms of Mu‘tazilite authors against them are included. It has been determined that Mu‘tazilite sufis justifications for defending tahrīm al-makāsib concentrate on three points: (i) the absence of a just order due to the absence of a just imam and the possibility of supporting the oppressors (rulers) intentionally or unintentionally, and as a result of this, some of them describe the land of Islam as dār al-kufr, (ii) again in relation to the issue of imamate, in an environment where there is no justice, i.e. legal/moral order, the halāl and harām are so intertwined that they cannot be separated from each other, and in order to protect oneself from harām, the things that are subject to sustenance can only be purified through charity and become halāl, and (iii) the fact that trust in Allah is obligatory and any effort to pursue sustenance is contrary to tawakkul. The Mu‘tazilite authors criticised the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib on the grounds that it is permissible to trade while maintaining a rational and ethical attitude, that one’s intention and interest in trade are important, and that tawakkul cannot be built on the right ground. As a result, the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib disappeared because they could not gain a foothold in the Mu‘tazilite intellectual climate due to their erroneous reasoning. (shrink)

This paper expands upon the work by Wang (Proceedings of TARK, pp. 493–512, 2017) who proposes a new framework based on quantifier-free predicate language extended by a new bundled modality \(\exists x\Box \) and axiomatizes the logic over S5 frames. This paper first gives complete axiomatizations of the logics over K, D, T, 4, S4 frames with increasing domains and constant domains, respectively. The systems w.r.t. constant domains feature infinitely many additional rules defined inductively than systems w.r.t. increasing domains. (...) In the second part of the paper, we show that these rules are admissible in the systems without them by providing a general strategy for proving completeness theorems for the logics without these rules over constant domain models (also increasing domain models). (shrink)

There are several approaches implementing reasoning based on conditional knowledge bases, one of the most popular being System Z (Pearl, Proceedings of the 3rd conference on theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, TARK ’90, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco, CA, USA, pp. 121–135, 1990). We look at ranking functions (Spohn, The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) in general, conditional structures and c-representations (Kern-Isberner, Conditionals in Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Belief Revision: (...) Considering Conditionals as Agents, vol. 2087 of LNCS, Springer, Berlin, 2001) in order to examine the reasoning strength of the different approaches by learning which of the known calculi of nonmonotonic reasoning (System P and R) and Direct Inference are applicable to these inference relations. Furthermore we use the recently proposed Enforcement-postulate (Kern-Isberner and Krümpelmann, Proceedings of the 22nd international joint conference on artificial intelligence, vol. 2, IJCAI’11, AAAI Press, pp. 937–942, 2011) to show dependencies between these approaches. (shrink)

This is the proceedings of the first TARK conference, with papers by (among others) Aumann, Hintikka, Fagin, Moses, and Vardi. It includes my first overview on knowledge.

In recent years, the human ability to reasoning about mental states of others in order to explain and predict their behavior has come to be a highly active area of research. Researchers from a wide range of fields { from biology and psychology through linguistics to game theory and logic{ contribute new ideas and results. This interdisciplinary workshop, collocated with the Thirteenth International Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XIII), aims to shed light on models of (...) social reasoning that take into account realistic resource bounds. People reason about other people's mental states in order to understand and predict the others' behavior. This capability to reason about others' knowledge, beliefs and intentions is often referred to as theory of mind. Idealized rational agents are capable of recursion in their social reasoning, and can reason about phenomena like common knowledge. Such idealized social reasoning has been modeled by modal logics such as epistemic logic and BDI (belief, desire, intention) logics and by epistemic game theory. However, in real-world situations, many people seem to lose track of such recursive social reasoning after only a few levels. The workshop provides a forum for researchers that attempt to analyze, understand and model how resource-bounded agents reason about other minds. (shrink)

A fundamental question asked in modal logic is whether a given theory is consistent. But consistent with what? A typical way to address this question identifies a choice of background knowledge axioms (say, S4, D, etc.) and then shows the assumptions codified by the theory in question to be consistent with those background axioms. But determining the specific choice and division of background axioms is, at least sometimes, little more than tradition. This paper introduces generic theories for propositional modal logic (...) to address consistency results in a more robust way. As building blocks for background knowledge, generic theories provide a standard for categorical determinations of consistency. We argue that the results and methods of this paper help to elucidate problems in epistemology and enjoy sufficient scope and power to have purchase on problems bearing on modalities in judgement, inference, and decision making. (shrink)

Within the context of extensive-form (or dynamic) games, we use choice frames to represent the initial beliefs of a player as well as her disposition to change those beliefs when she learns that an information set of hers has been reached. As shown in [5], in order for the revision operation to be consistent with the AGM postulates [1], the player’s choice frame must be rationalizable in terms of a total pre-order on the set of histories. We consider four properties (...) of choice frames and show that, together with the hypothesis of a common prior, are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a plausibility order that rationalizes the epistemic state (that is, initial beliefs and disposition to revise those beliefs) of all the players. The plausibility order satisfies the properties introduced in [6] as part of a new definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for dynamic games. Thus the present paper provides epistemic foundations for that solution concept. (shrink)

Williamson (2000a) has argued that posi- tive introspection is incompatible with in- exact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety prin- ciple for knowledge, but leads to the counter- intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and posi- tive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety require- ment while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge (...) that underlies the new require- ment provides a better account of inexact knowledge and higher-order knowledge than both Williamson’s and Halpern’s. (shrink)

Recent ideas about epistemic modals and indicative conditionals in formal semantics have significant overlap with ideas in modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic. The purpose of this paper is to show how greater interaction between formal semantics and dynamic epistemic logic in this area can be of mutual benefit. In one direction, we show how concepts and tools from modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic can be used to give a simple, complete axiomatization of Yalcin's [16] semantic consequence relation for (...) a language with epistemic modals and indicative conditionals. In the other direction, the formal semantics for indicative conditionals due to Kolodny and MacFarlane [9] gives rise to a new dynamic operator that is very natural from the point of view of dynamic epistemic logic, allowing succinct expression of dependence (as in dependence logic) or supervenience statements. We prove decidability for the logic with epistemic modals and Kolodny and MacFarlane's indicative conditional via a full and faithful computable translation from their logic to the modal logic K45. (shrink)

Stochastic independence has a complex status in probability theory. It is not part of the definition of a probability measure, but it is nonetheless an essential property for the mathematical development of this theory. Bayesian decision theorists such as Savage can be criticized for being silent about stochastic independence. From their current preference axioms, they can derive no more than the definitional properties of a probability measure. In a new framework of twofold uncertainty, we introduce preference axioms that entail not (...) only these definitional properties, but also the stochastic independence of the two sources of uncertainty. This goes some way towards filling a curious lacuna in Bayesian decision theory. (shrink)

Communication facilitates coordination, but coordination might fail if there's too much uncertainty. I discuss a scenario in which vagueness-driven uncertainty undermines the possibility of publicly sharing a belief. I then show that asserting an epistemic modal sentence, 'Might p', can reveal the speaker's uncertainty, and that this may improve the chances of coordination despite the lack of a common epistemic ground. This provides a game-theoretic rationale for epistemic modality. The account draws on a standard relational semantics for epistemic modality, Stalnaker's (...) theory of assertion as informative update, and a Bayesian framework for reasoning under uncertainty. (shrink)

Recent years witnessed a growing interest in non-standard epistemic logics of knowing whether, knowing how, knowing what, knowing why and so on. The new epistemic modalities introduced in those logics all share, in their semantics, the general schema of ∃x◻φ, e.g., knowing how to achieve φ roughly means that there exists a way such that you know that it is a way to ensure that φ. Moreover, the resulting logics are decidable. Inspired by those particular logics, in this work, we (...) propose a very general and powerful framework based on quantifier-free predicate language extended by a new modality, which packs exactly ∃x◻ together. We show that the resulting language, though much more expressive, shares many good properties of the basic propositional modal logic over arbitrary models, such as finite-tree-model property and van Benthem-like characterization w.r.t.\ first-order modal logic. We axiomatize the logic over S5 frames with intuitive axioms to capture the interaction between the new modality and know-that operator in an epistemic setting. (shrink)

Epistemic protocols are communication protocols aiming at transfer of knowledge in a controlled way. Typically, the preconditions or goals for protocol actions depend on the knowledge of agents, often in nested form. Informal epistemic protocol descriptions for muddy children, coordinated attack, dining cryptographers, Russian cards, secret key exchange are well known. The contribution of this paper is a formal study of a natural requirement on epistemic protocols, that the contents of the protocol can be assumed to be common knowledge. By (...) formalizing this requirement we can prove that there can be no unbiased deterministic protocol for the Russian cards problem. For purposes of our formal analysis we introduce an epistemic protocol language, and we show that its model checking problem is decidable. (shrink)