Pythagoras von Samos (ca. 570-510 v.Chr.) war in den antiken Uberlieferungen nicht nur als Naturphilosoph, sondern auch als religioser Experte und Wundertater bekannt. Diesen Wundererzahlungen rund um Pythagoras widmet sich Stephan Scharinger in der vorliegenden Studie. Basis seiner Uberlegungen sind Analyse und Auswertung des einschlagigen Quellenmaterials, beginnend mit den altesten schriftlichen Quellen, die in die Lebenszeit des Pythagoras zuruckreichen, bis hin zu den Pythagorasviten der romischen Kaiserzeit. Darauf aufbauend und mithilfe der historischen Kontextualisierung des Pythagoras (Pythagoreismus und Orphik, Pythagoras und (...) die "Sieben Weisen", Schamanismus) klassifiziert Scharinger die pythagoreischen Wundertaten in Abhangigkeit von der griechisch-romischen Umwelt (ethnische Religionen, altindische und alttestamentarisch-fruhkirchliche Vorstellungen). Die Wundertraditionen in den pythagoreischen Uberlieferungen werden schliesslich in einem zweifachen Vergleich beleuchtet. Der "interne" Vergleich zeigt Parallelen und Unterschiede zwischen den Wunderberichten bei Diogenes Laertios, Porphyrios von Tyros und Iamblichos von Chalkis auf, wahrend der "externe" Vergleich die pythagoreischen Wundertaten mit den Berichten rund um andere Wundertater der antiken Mittelmeerwelt in einen grosseren Zusammenhang stellt. Uberlegungen zum religionshistorischen Umfeld, zur Diskussion um Pythagoras als theios aner sowie zur Klassifikation der Wundertaten als "magische" oder "religiose" Wunder runden die Arbeit ab. (shrink)

A commonly held idea regarding the nature of time is that the future is open and the past is fixed or closed. This article investigates the notion that there is an asymmetry in openness between the past and the future. The following questions are considered: How exactly is this asymmetry in openness to be understood? What is the relation between an open future and various ontological views about the future? Is an open future a branching future? What is the relation (...) between an open future and the question of whether contingent statements about the future are true or false? Is an open future compatible with a single determinate future? (shrink)

There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the (...) grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth.2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. (shrink)

De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.

In its last round of publications in September 2012, the Encyclopedia Of DNA Elements (ENCODE) assigned a biochemical function to most of the human genome, which was taken up by the media as meaning the end of ‘Junk DNA’. This provoked a heated reaction from evolutionary biologists, who among other things claimed that ENCODE adopted a wrong and much too inclusive notion of function, making its dismissal of junk DNA merely rhetorical. We argue that this criticism rests on misunderstandings concerning (...) the nature of the ENCODE project, the relevant notion of function and the claim that most of our genome is junk. We argue that evolutionary accounts of function presuppose functions as ‘causal roles’, and that selection is but a useful proxy for relevant functions, which might well be unsuitable to biomedical research. Taking a closer look at the discovery process in which ENCODE participates, we argue that ENCODE’s strategy of biochemical signatures successfully identified activities of DNA elements with an eye towards causal roles of interest to biomedical research. We argue that ENCODE’s controversial claim of functionality should be interpreted as saying that 80 % of the genome is engaging in relevant biochemical activities and is very likely to have a causal role in phenomena deemed relevant to biomedical research. Finally, we discuss ambiguities in the meaning of junk DNA and in one of the main arguments raised for its prevalence, and we evaluate the impact of ENCODE’s results on the claim that most of our genome is junk. (shrink)

In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions (...) for the truth of tensed tokens and conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I demonstrate that there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of tensed tokens, and there is a true formulation of the date theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I argue that once the views are properly formulated, the A-theorist’s objections fail to make their mark. However, I conclude by claiming that even though there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory and a true formulation of the date theory, the New B-theory nonetheless fails to provide a complete account of the truth and falsity of tensed sentences. (shrink)

I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the selfascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of selfascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two different formulations (...) of the self-ascription account of tensed belief, one that is compatible with a perdurantist account of persons and the other that is compatible with an endurantist account of persons. I argue that a self-ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring subjects most plausibly involves the self-ascription of relations rather than properties. I argue that whether one takes the subject of self-ascription to be a momentary personstage or an enduring person, the self-ascription theory provides a plausible B-theoretic account of how tensed belief and timely action are possible. (shrink)

When do objects at different times compose a further object? This is the question of diachronic composition. The universalist answers, ‘under any conditions whatsoever’. Others argue for restrictions on diachronic composition: composition occurs only when certain conditions are met. Recently, some philosophers have argued that restrictions on diachronic compositions are motivated by our best physical theories. In Persistence and Spacetime and elsewhere, Yuri Balashov argues that diachronic compositions are restricted in terms of causal connections between object stages. In a recent (...) article, Nikk Effingham argues that the standard objections to views that endorse restrictions on composition do not apply to a view that restricts composition according to compliance with the laws of nature. On the face of it, such restrictions on diachronic composition preserve our common-sense ontology while eliminating from it scientifically revisionary objects that travel faster than the speed of light. I argue that these attempts to restrict diachronic composition by appealing to either causal or nomological constraints face insurmountable difficulties within the context of special relativity. I discuss how the universalist should best respond to Hudson’s argument for superluminal objects, and in doing so, I present and defend a new sufficient condition for motion that does not entail that such objects are in superluminal motion. 1 Introduction2 Diachronic Composition3 Diachronic Composition and Superluminal Objects4 Restricting Diachronic Composition5 Causal and Nomological Restrictions on Composition in a Relativistic Context6 Superluminal Objects and Motion7 Conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument, proposed by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions and (...) argue that this response is unsuccessful. I then consider David Lewis’s theory of de se attitudes involving the self-ascription of properties. I claim that, according to this theory, there are two senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F). I then argue that the second sense allows for the compatibility of de se knowledge with the existence of an omniscient being. (shrink)

Professor H. L. Van Breda had hoped to write this preface, but his recent, unexpected and untimely death has left that task in my hands. Although my remarks will not be as eloquent and insightful as his surely would have been, some few words are clearly in order here; for the phenomenological community has not only lost the leadership of Fr. Van Breda these last years, but also the scholarship and leadership of Aron Gurwitsch and Alden Fisher - both contributors (...) to this volume - as well as that of Dorion Cairns and John Wild. Our leaders are fewer now but Herbert Spiegelberg is still very obviously one of them. This volume thus presents the work of some of the past and presently recognized leaders in phenomenology - e. g. Gurwitsch, Straus, and Fisher - but, more important perhaps, it also presents the work of some of those who are sure to be future leaders of our community of phenomenological philosophers, if in fact they have not already achieved this status. Most, if not all, of the contribu tors to this volume are in some way or another indebted to Herbert Spiegelberg and his work in phenomenology. (shrink)

In the last few years, biologists and computer scientists have claimed that the introduction of data science techniques in molecular biology has changed the characteristics and the aims of typical outputs (i.e. models) of such a discipline. In this paper we will critically examine this claim. First, we identify the received view on models and their aims in molecular biology. Models in molecular biology are mechanistic and explanatory. Next, we identify the scope and aims of data science (machine learning in (...) particular). These lie mainly in the creation of predictive models which performances increase as data set increases. Next, we will identify a tradeoff between predictive and explanatory performances by comparing the features of mechanistic and predictive models. Finally, we show how this a priori analysis of machine learning and mechanistic research applies to actual biological practice. This will be done by analyzing the publications of a consortium—The Cancer Genome Atlas—which stands at the forefront in integrating data science and molecular biology. The result will be that biologists have to deal with the tradeoff between explaining and predicting that we have identified, and hence the explanatory force of the ‘new’ biology is substantially diminished if compared to the ‘old’ biology. However, this aspect also emphasizes the existence of other research goals which make predictive force independent from explanation. (shrink)

In the past few years, machine learning (ML) tools have been implemented with success in the medical context. However, several practitioners have raised concerns about the lack of transparency—at the algorithmic level—of many of these tools; and solutions from the field of explainable AI (XAI) have been seen as a way to open the ‘black box’ and make the tools more trustworthy. Recently, Alex London has argued that in the medical context we do not need machine learning tools to be (...) interpretable at the algorithmic level to make them trustworthy, as long as they meet some strict empirical desiderata. In this paper, we analyse and develop London’s position. In particular, we make two claims. First, we claim that London’s solution to the problem of trust can potentially address another problem, which is how to evaluate the reliability of ML tools in medicine for regulatory purposes. Second, we claim that to deal with this problem, we need to develop London’s views by shifting the focus from the opacity of algorithmic details to the opacity of the way in which ML tools are trained and built. We claim that to regulate AI tools and evaluate their reliability, agencies need an explanation of how ML tools have been built, which requires documenting and justifying the technical choices that practitioners have made in designing such tools. This is because different algorithmic designs may lead to different outcomes, and to the realization of different purposes. However, given that technical choices underlying algorithmic design are shaped by value-laden considerations, opening the black box of the design process means also making transparent and motivating (technical and ethical) values and preferences behind such choices. Using tools from philosophy of technology and philosophy of science, we elaborate a framework showing how an explanation of the training processes of ML tools in medicine should look like. (shrink)

In Walter Benjamin. Presence of Mind, Failure to Comprehend Stéphane Symons offers an innovative reading of the work of German philosopher, essayist and literary critic Walter Benjamin that characterizes his writings as "neither a-theological, nor immediately theological.".

In the past few years, the ethical ramifications of AI technologies have been at the center of intense debates. Considerable attention has been devoted to understanding how a morally responsible practice of data science can be promoted and which values have to shape it. In this context, ethics and moral responsibility have been mainly conceptualized as compliance to widely shared principles. However, several scholars have highlighted the limitations of such a principled approach. Drawing from microethics and the virtue theory tradition, (...) in this paper, we formulate a different approach to ethics in data science which is based on a different conception of “being ethical” and, ultimately, of what it means to promote a morally responsible data science. First, we develop the idea that, rather than only compliance, ethical decision-making consists in using certain moral abilities, which are cultivated by practicing and exercising them in the data science process. An aspect of virtue development that we discuss here is moral attention, which is the ability of data scientists to identify the ethical relevance of their own technical decisions in data science activities. Next, by elaborating on the capability approach, we define a technical act as ethically relevant when it impacts one or more of the basic human capabilities of data subjects. Therefore, rather than “applying ethics”, data scientists should cultivate ethics as a form of reflection on how technical choices and ethical impacts shape one another. Finally, we show how this microethical framework concretely works, by dissecting the ethical dimension of the technical procedures involved in data understanding and preparation of electronic health records. (shrink)

In the science and values literature, scholars have shown how science is influenced and shaped by values, often in opposition to the ‘value free’ ideal of science. In this paper, we aim to contribute to the science and values literature by showing that the relation between science and values flows not only from values into scientific practice, but also from (allegedly neutral) science to values themselves. The extant literature in the ‘science and values’ field focuses by and large on reconstructing, (...) post hoc, how values have influenced science; our reconstruction of the case studies, instead, aims to show that scientific concepts and methods _too, because of specific identifiable characteristics,_ can promote some values rather than (or at the expense of) others. We explain this bidirectional relation in analogy to debates on the normativity of technical artifacts and on feminist approaches in science, and we illustrate our claims with cases from the health sciences and machine learning. While our arguments in this paper also draw on post hoc reconstructions, we intend to show where, in the science in the making, we should engage not only with the question whether a practice is value-laden, but also how specific conceptual and methodological choices can influence values down the road. All in all, these considerations expand the ways in which philosophers can contribute to more value-aware scientific practices. (shrink)

In the last few years, biologists and computer scientists have claimed that the introduction of data science techniques in molecular biology has changed the characteristics and the aims of typical outputs (i.e. models) of such a discipline. In this paper we will critically examine this claim. First, we identify the received view on models and their aims in molecular biology. Models in molecular biology are mechanistic and explanatory. Next, we identify the scope and aims of data science (machine learning in (...) particular). These lie mainly in the creation of predictive models which performances increase as data set increases. Next, we will identify a tradeoff between predictive and explanatory performances by comparing the features of mechanistic and predictive models. Finally, we show how this a priori analysis of machine learning and mechanistic research applies to actual biological practice. This will be done by analyzing the publications of a consortium—The Cancer Genome Atlas—which stands at the forefront in integrating data science and molecular biology. The result will be that biologists have to deal with the tradeoff between explaining and predicting that we have identified, and hence the explanatory force of the ‘new’ biology is substantially diminished if compared to the ‘old’ biology. However, this aspect also emphasizes the existence of other research goals which make predictive force independent from explanation. (shrink)

Recently, biologists have argued that data - driven biology fosters a new scientific methodology; namely, one that is irreducible to traditional methodologies of molecular biology defined as the discovery strategies elucidated by mechanistic philosophy. Here I show how data - driven studies can be included into the traditional mechanistic approach in two respects. On the one hand, some studies provide eliminative inferential procedures to prioritize and develop mechanistic hypotheses. On the other, different studies play an exploratory role in providing useful (...) generalizations to complement the procedure of prioritization. Overall this paper aims to shed light on the structure of contemporary research in molecular biology. (shrink)

The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

Machine learning (ML) has been praised as a tool that can advance science and knowledge in radical ways. However, it is not clear exactly how radical are the novelties that ML generates. In this article, I argue that this question can only be answered contextually, because outputs generated by ML have to be evaluated on the basis of the theory of the science to which ML is applied. In particular, I analyze the problem of novelty of ML outputs in the (...) context of molecular biology. In order to do this, I first clarify the nature of the models generated by ML. Next, I distinguish three ways in which a model can be novel (from the weakest to the strongest). Third, I dissect the way ML algorithms work and generate models in molecular biology and genomics. On these bases, I argue that ML is either a tool to identify instances of knowledge already present and codified, or to generate models that are novel in a weak sense. The notable contribution of ML to scientific discovery in the context of biology is that it can aid humans in overcoming potential bias by exploring more systematically the space of possible hypotheses implied by a theory. (shrink)

It has been argued that ethical frameworks for data science often fail to foster ethical behavior, and they can be difficult to implement due to their vague and ambiguous nature. In order to overcome these limitations of current ethical frameworks, we propose to integrate the analysis of the connections between technical choices and sociocultural factors into the data science process, and show how these connections have consequences for what data subjects can do, accomplish, and be. Using healthcare as an example, (...) attention to sociocultural conversion factors relevant to health can help in navigating technical choices that require broader considerations of the sociotechnical system, such as metric tradeoffs in model validation, resulting in better ethical and technical choices. This approach promotes awareness of the ethical dimension of technical choices by data scientists and others, and that can foster the cultivation of 'ethical skills' as integral to data science. (shrink)

The notion of biological function is fraught with difficulties—intrinsically and irremediably so, we argue. The physiological practice of functional ascription originates from a time when organisms were thought to be designed and remained largely unchanged since. In a secularized worldview, this creates a paradox which accounts of functions as selected effect attempt to resolve. This attempt, we argue, misses its target in physiology and it brings problems of its own. Instead, we propose that a better solution to the conundrum of (...) biological functions is to abandon the notion altogether, a prospect not only less daunting than it appears, but arguably the natural continuation of the naturalisation of biology. (shrink)

There are different ways in which imaginings can involve the first-person. I can imagine skiing down a mountain, looking down the slope, the wind whipping me in the face. I can also imagine myself skiing down a mountain from the outside, adopting the point of view of a spectator watching myself fly down the mountain. I can also imagine that I am someone else entirely, say Angela Merkel, skiing down a mountain. In this paper I develop and defend a new (...) account of the content of first-person imaginings. I first look at two existing accounts, one proposed by Francois Recanati (2007a, 2007b) and the other proposed by Dilip Ninan (2008), and I argue that they lack the resources to model the rich and distinct types of first-person imaginings that we can have. I then present and defend a new account that reconstrues the imagining from the inside vs. imagining from the outside distinction and can accommodate the various ways in which imaginings involve the first-person. (shrink)

We argue that mechanistic models elaborated by machine learning cannot be explanatory by discussing the relation between mechanistic models, explanation and the notion of intelligibility of models. We show that the ability of biologists to understand the model that they work with severely constrains their capacity of turning the model into an explanatory model. The more a mechanistic model is complex, the less explanatory it will be. Since machine learning increases its performances when more components are added, then it generates (...) models which are not intelligible, and hence not explanatory. (shrink)

In the past few years, scholars have been questioning whether the current approach in data ethics based on the higher level case studies and general principles is effective. In particular, some have been complaining that such an approach to ethics is difficult to be applied and to be taught in the context of data science. In response to these concerns, there have been discussions about how ethics should be “embedded” in the practice of data science, in the sense of showing (...) how ethical issues emerge in small technical choices made by data scientists in their day-to-day activities, and how such an approach can be used to teach data ethics. However, a precise description of how such proposals have to be theoretically conceived and could be operationalized has been lacking. In this article, we propose a full-fledged characterization of ‘embedding’ ethics, and how this can be applied especially to the problem of teaching data science ethics. Using the emerging model of ‘microethics’, we propose a way of teaching daily responsibility in digital activities that is connected to the higher level ethical challenges discussed in digital/data ethics. We ground this microethical approach into a virtue theory framework, by stressing that the goal of a microethics is to foster the cultivation of moral virtues. After delineating this approach of embedding ethics in theoretical detail, this article discusses a concrete example of how such a ‘micro-virtue ethics’ approach could be practically taught to data science students. (shrink)

Molecular biologists exploit information conveyed by mechanistic models for experimental purposes. In this article, I make sense of this aspect of biological practice by developing Keller’s idea of the distinction between ‘models of’ and ‘models for’. ‘Models of (phenomena)’ should be understood as models representing phenomena and are valuable if they explain phenomena. ‘Models for (manipulating phenomena)’ are new types of material manipulations and are important not because of their explanatory force, but because of the interventionist strategies they afford. This (...) is a distinction between aspects of the same model. In molecular biology, models may be treated either as ‘models of’ or as ‘models for’. By analysing the discovery and characterization of restriction–modification systems and their exploitation for DNA cloning and mapping, I identify the differences between treating a model as a ‘model of’ or as a ‘model for’. These lie in the cognitive disposition of the modeller towards the model: a modeller will look at a model as a ‘model of’ if interested in its explanatory force, or as a ‘model for’ if interested in the material manipulations it can possibly afford. (shrink)

This study examined narrative identity in a group of 81 patients with schizophrenia and 50 healthy controls through the recall of self-defining memories. The results indicated that patients’ narratives were less coherent and elaborate than those of controls. Schizophrenia patients were severely impaired in the ability to make connections with the self and extract meaning from their memories, which significantly correlated with illness duration. In agreement with earlier research, patients exhibited an early reminiscence bump. Moreover, the period of the reminiscence (...) bump, which is highly relevant for identity development, was characterized by fewer achievements and more life-threatening event experiences, compared with controls. A negative correlation was found between negative symptoms, number of self-event connections and specificity of narratives. Our results suggest that schizophrenia patients have difficulties to organize and extract meaning from their past experiences in order to create coherent personal narratives. (shrink)

First published in 1990. How we perceive and respond to the visual image has been traditional concern of psychologists, philosophers and art historians. Today, where the visual image increasingly permeates our everyday life and consciousness, the question becomes ever more relevant. How do we, for instance, instinctively ‘know’ what it is that a picture represents without having to be taught? How it is that we experience pleasure in looking at certain pictures? How is it that we often want to talk (...) about the pictures we look at? Such questions are currently asked by a wide range of disciplines, including: semiotics, psychoanalysis, anthropology, neuropsychology, and in general, contemporary critical analysis of the visual arts. In _A Transformational Theory of Aesthetics_, Michael Stephan links the findings of these areas. Drawing on their common area of knowledge, he has developed a theory of picture perception and aesthetic response, arguing that images can generate in us a complex pattern of mental changes, or transformations. A Transformation Theory of Aesthetics is essential reading to those seriously involved in linking the arts and cognitive sciences. (shrink)

In biology—as in other scientific fields—there is a lively opposition between big and small science projects. In this commentary, I try to contextualize this opposition in the field of biomedicine, and I argue that, at least in this context, big science projects should come first.

A recent article by Herzog provides a much-needed integration of ethical and epistemological arguments in favor of explicable AI in medicine. In this short piece, I suggest a way in which its epistemological intuition of XAI as “explanatory interface” can be further developed to delineate the relation between AI tools and scientific research.

Tudo se passa como se a escrita filosófica de Voltaire se desenvolvesse em uma dupla oposição: de um lado, ela visa denunciar o palavrório dos fazedores de sistemas e a cacofonia a que ele conduz, opondo-lhes a prudência e a modéstia; de outro, ela pretende restaurar, contra a tentação cética, o direito à busca da verdade. Em Voltaire, o discurso filosófico nasce desta tensão, do desejo de dizer o mundo e da vontade de se calar, tensão que a escolha do (...) diálogo tem por função explicitar, dramatizando-a. Perguntamo-nos, então, sobre o lugar e o estatuto da filosofia nos Diálogos . Conteúdo ou continente, conjunto de temas ou modalidade discursiva, a filosofia não está tranquila nesses textos, ela aparece em muitos aspectos como uma exigência problemática. (shrink)

I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s (...) account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities. (shrink)

This article argues that Robert Alexy's influential theory of balancing is affected by a contradiction that makes it unfeasible as an instrument by which to explain some aspects of law and legal reasoning it aims to clarify. In particular, I will show that one of the premises of Alexy's theory of balancing is incompatible with its conclusion. Alexy's theory is based upon a sharp distinction between rules and principles. However, as my analysis will demonstrate, its conclusion implies that it is (...) impossible to distinguish between rules and principles. This is because the so‐called weight formula and the law of colliding principles (i.e., the two main notions used by Alexy to explain balancing) cancel out any difference between these two types of norms. (shrink)

This comprehensive new book introduces the core history of phenomenology and assesses its relevance to contemporary psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. From critiques of artificial intelligence research programs to ongoing work on embodiment and enactivism, the authors trace how phenomenology has produced a valuable framework for analyzing cognition and perception, whose impact on contemporary psychological and scientific research, and philosophical debates continues to grow. The first part of _An Introduction to Phenomenology_ is an extended overview of the history (...) and development of phenomenology, looking at its key thinkers, focusing particularly on Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, as well as its cultural and intellectual precursors. In the second half Chemero and Käufer turn their attention to the contemporary interpretations and uses of phenomenology in cognitive science, showing that phenomenology is a living source of inspiration in contemporary interdisciplinary studies of the mind. Käufer and Chemero have written a clear, jargon-free account of phenomenology, providing abundant examples and anecdotes to illustrate and to entertain. This book is an ideal introduction to phenomenology and cognitive science for the uninitiated, as well as for philosophy and psychology students keen to deepen their knowledge. (shrink)

In the past few years, calls for integrating ethics modules in engineering curricula have multiplied. Despite this positive trend, a number of issues with these ‘embedded’ programs remains. First, learning goals are underspecified. A second limitation is the conflation of different dimensions under the same banner, in particular confusion between ethics curricula geared towards addressing the ethics of individual conduct and curricula geared towards addressing ethics at the societal level. In this article, we propose a tripartite framework to overcome these (...) difficulties. Our framework analytically decomposes an ethics module into three dimensions. First, there is the ethical dimension, which pertains to the learning goals. Second, there is the moral dimension, which addresses the moral relevance of engineers’ conduct. Finally, there is the political dimension, which scales up issues of moral relevance at the civic level. All in all, our framework has two advantages. First, it provides analytic clarity, i.e. it enables course instructors to locate ethical dilemmas in either the moral or political realm and to make use of the tools and resources from moral and/or political philosophy. Second, it depicts a comprehensive ethical training, which enables students to both reason about moral issues in the abstract, and to socially contextualize potential solutions. (shrink)

Bayesian epistemology addresses epistemological problems with the help of the mathematical theory of probability. It turns out that the probability calculus is especially suited to represent degrees of belief (credences) and to deal with questions of belief change, confirmation, evidence, justification, and coherence. Compared to the informal discussions in traditional epistemology, Bayesian epis- temology allows for a more precise and fine-grained analysis which takes the gradual aspects of these central epistemological notions into account. Bayesian epistemology therefore complements traditional epistemology; it (...) does not re- place it or aim at replacing it. (shrink)

This article reflects a conversation between Jan G. van der Watt and Stephan Joubert. The article serves as the introduction to the Special Collection: ‘From timely exegesis to contemporary ecclesiology: Relevant hermeneutics and provocative embodiment of faith in a Corona-defined world – Festschrift for Stephan Joubert, sub-edited by Willem Oliver ’. Following a brief bio-statement as introduction, the following issues are discussed: the collection for the Jerusalem church; relevance of theology for society; social-scientific exegesis; the ancient concept of grace; Bible (...) translation in South Africa; public theology on the electronic platform; biblical examples of leadership and electronic media in religious activities and education.Contribution: This Festschrift represents current trends in biblical scholarship and ecclesial leadership. It contributes to the public discourse in church and society, especially the role of the electronic media in current Fourth Industrial Revolution. (shrink)