The article deals with Hurka?s critique of Kymlicka and Arneson?s critique of Dworkin on endorsement constraint thesis, according to which a person cannot have a valuable life if values are imposed on her - primarily by state action - overriding her preferences and convictions on the good life. This thesis has often been identified with neutral liberalism and counterposed to perfectionism. The text argues against Hurka?s and Arneson?s argument that mild coercion and paternalistic reduction of trivial, bad or worthless options (...) can indeed bring about a more valuable life. Their argument does not acknowledge adequately the difference between coercion from a person?s immediate social environment and state coercion, which are not equally legitimate. My critique, however, does not exclude the legitimacy of perfectionistic measures, as a person could accept as justified state intervention concerning the support of particular values or goods, while at the same time not endorsing those values and goods. Not all endorsed goods or activities should be treated equally, as more relevant and valuable ones can be legitimately supported by particular policy. (shrink)

This paper points to the relation between Wittgenstein's position and Kant's transcendental dialectics with regard to the nature of philosophical problems and their roots in language, thinking and affinities of humans. Related to this, there is the question of function of philosophy which involves the removal of these problems, according to both authors. The author supports the thesis that, when it comes to Wittgenstein, it cannot be discussed about the end of philosophy if he considers that there is the natural (...) affinity towards philosophical errors, the cause of which is the complexity of language. Therefore, the author criticizes the view according to which Wittgenstein speaks about antiphilosophy, that is, about the negative meaning of philosophical thought. U ovom radu se pokazuje srodnost Vitgenstajnovih stavova sa Kantovom transcendentalnom dijalektikom u pogledu prirode filozofskih problema i njihove duboke ukorenjenosti u jeziku, misljenju i sklonostima ljudskih bica. Sa time je povezano i pitanje funkcije filozofiranja, koju prema obojici autora, cini otklanjanje ovih duboko usadjenih problema. Autor zastupa tezu da se kod Vitgenstajna ne moze govoriti o kraju filozofije ukoliko smatra da postoji prirodna sklonost ka filozofskim pogreskama ciji je uzrok u kompleksnosti jezika. Stoga autor kritikuje stanoviste prema kojem je kod Vitgenstajna rec o antifilozofiji, odnosno o negativnom odredjenju filozofskog misljenja. (shrink)

The text considers points of view of theoreticians of the radical pluralism : Connolly, Mouffe and Tully with regard to the status and the nature of concepts in the political discourse, as well as the consequences of these conceptual presumptions to understanding democracy. The three authors emphasize the essential contestability of political concepts, the paradox of liberal democracy and the need to revise standard rational consensus theories of democracy. Also, the three authors take over the specific interpretation of Vittgenstein to (...) the direction of political theory the centre of which consists of everyday contingent practices of politics as well as dissent about their assessment. The text analyzes the extent to which this reading is compatible to Wittgenstein's position. The author defends the opinion that the essential contestability does not imply agonism and denial of the significance of rules and tries to indicate to the points of illegitimate transition from antiessentialism to unconsensus rules. Also, the text underlines the flaws of dissent conception of democracy and social integration. U tekstu se razmatraju stanovista Konolija, Mufove i Tjulija u pogledu statusa i prirode pojmova u politickom diskursu, kao i posledice ovih konceptualnih pretpostavki na shvatanje demokratije. Sva tri autora isticu esencijalnu spornost politickih pojmova, paradoksalnosti liberalne demokratije i neophodnost revidiranja standardnih racionalno-konsenzusnih teorija demokratije. Takodje, sva tri autora preuzimaju specificno tumacenje Vitgenstajna u pravcu politicke teorije u cijem su sredistu svakodnevne kontingentne prakse politike, kao i disenzus oko njihovog razumevanja i vrednovanja. Autor brani stav da esencijalna spornost pojmova ne podrazumeva agonizam i negiranje znacaja pravila i pokusava da ukaze na tacke nelegitimog prelaza od antiesencijalizma ka nekonsenzusnosti pravila. Takodje, u tekstu se ukazuje na nedostatke radikalne-disenzusne koncepcije demokratije i drustvene integracije. (shrink)

Pojam politicke zajednice spada medju nedovoljno tematizovane pojmove u tradiciji politicke filozofije, a narocito liberalisticke teorije. Ovaj teorijski nedostatak nadoknadjivanja u poslednje dve decenije, kada su u sirokom opsegu istrazivani problemi odredjenja, znacaja, konstituisanja i mogucnosti politicke zajednice. U prvom delu ovog rada pokusao sam da ukazem na razloge za tematizovanje ovog pojma, kao i njegovu relevantnost u analizi savremenih zbivanja na ovim prostorima. U drugom delu nastojao sam da blize odredim pojam politicke zajednice. Treci deo posvecen je sporovima koji (...) su se vodili oko ovog pojma u okviru razlicitih teorija, a koji su ostali do danas aktuelni. U cetvrtom delu ovog rada pokusao sam da razmotrim perspektive politicke zajednice u savremenim uslovima pluralizma posebnih zajednica i etnokulturne heterogenosti. (shrink)

This paper deals with Wright’s criticism of Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgeinstein and his understanding of the problem of following the rules, and particularly the understanding of a so called skeptical paradox. In the first part of the text, the author gives the basic points of Kripke’s position, whereas the second part examines Wright’s answer to the skeptical solution, that is, Wright’s defense of the objectivity of both the meaning and the connections of rules and their use. The third part discusses (...) the range and certain weak points of Wright’s position which have to do with the issue of the constitutive question of rules and the nature of their normativity. (shrink)

In the first part of the article the concept of associative duties and their justification as distinctive from general moral duties are analyzed. The second part considers associative duties to fellow citizens and distinguishing features of those duties such as reciprocity, mutuality and equal status. In the final part the author deals with specific cases concerning refugees and stresses arguments as to why the associative duties of cocitizens should overcome duties to refugees, as well as the failures of those arguments. (...) It is argued that the status of refugees is different from the status of other non-citizens, such as immigrants, due to the lack of institutional representation and protection. (shrink)

The text begins with the analysis of two terms regarding life crucial to both Wittgenstein's early and late philosophy. These are life form and nature, specifically, human nature. Wittgenstein treats both concepts in a very specific manner, different from the traditional approach of philosophy. He also criticized philosophical attempts to attribute special characteristics to human intellectual abilities which would separate them from natural processes. A particular 'spiritual' status of epistemic and other rational powers disappears when there is an insight into (...) their dependence on discursive practices and specific forms of life on which these powers are based. Concepts such as certainty, knowledge, or explanations do not rest on a rational foundation, that is, they do not refer to processes with particular un-natural properties. Nor can they be reduced to neuro-physiological processes, either. Instead, it is a specific grammar of their usage that makes them different from other concepts describing physical or biological processes. In that sense, Wittgenstein develops a non-reductionist version of naturalism which preserves the diversity of human relations in the world. (shrink)

The introductory part of the article deals with general features of Brandom?s social pragmatic position. The central part considers Brandom?s interpretation of Kripke?s conception of social character of rules, as well as Habermas? critique of Brandom?s conception of I-thou and I-we types of intersubjectivity. In the final part the author is surveying Brandom?s interpretation of Wittgenstein?s understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and rules in general. According to the author, Brandom treats intersubjectivity as immediate communication, while neglecting the (...) role of socially and historically shared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of rules by past application, and, by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences of accepted rules, he considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments as oriented towards future validation of meaning and rules. The author also claims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication and intersubjectivity involve more a profound re-adjustment of interlocutors? perspectives rather than doxatic interchange of perspectives, as Brandom suggested. (shrink)

The paper argues that Rawls’ critique of perfectionism from the standpoint of neutral liberalism scrutinizes the conceptions of the good without demarcation between them, that is, without distinguishing whether they are comprehensive religious or philosophical conceptions, or whether they are piecemeal comprehensions of local values, concepts and goods. In addition to the high contestability in the use of the concept of comprehensiveness, it is necessary to retain the concept of reasonableness, as comprehensions of the good have to be to some (...) extent well-founded, consistent and coherent to be considered relevant in a political dispute. Considering these distinctions, it can be claimed that, in particular cases, the application of considerations of the good in disputes concerning constitutional essentials can be supported and, considering reasonable pluralism, morally justified. Nevertheless, moderate perfectionism has to specify whether political decisions create and support options, promote valuable goods or they discourage worthless goods. It is necessary to delineate the limits of perfectionistic measures accordingly. (shrink)

The paper is an analysis of Dworkin's attempt to develop, within liberal theory, a conception of community and associative obligations, where community is taken as a particular intrinsic value. Certainly, this attempt encounters various difficulties, like the insufficiently robust distinction between political community and other types of communities, as well as Dworkin's too narrow delimitation of the scope of activities and competences of political community. It is argued nevertheless that this endeavor is highly significant, complementing substantially the theoretical concerns of (...) standard liberal theories. U ovom radu autor analizira Dworkinov pokusaj da u okviru liberalisticke teorije razvije koncepciju zajednice i duznosti iz udruzivanja, pri cemu zajednistvo shvata kao posebnu intrinsicnu vrednost. Mada u ovom pokusaju iskrsavaju problemi, kao sto je nedovoljno jasno distingviranje politicke od drugih zajednica, kao i Dworkinovo preusko odredjenje domena aktivnosti i kompetencija politicke zajednice, autor smatra da je rec o izuzetno znacajnom poduhvatu, koji bitno upotpunjuje teorijska interesovanja standardnih liberalistickih teorija. (shrink)

Analysis starts from Rawls’s disposition that in a liberal society autonomous persons should have two moral powers – the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity to establish, pursue and revise the concept of the good. Political or neutral liberalism advocates the justification of state intervention to improve the first type of capacity while declaring the interference with the second capacity illegitimate. The critique of this disposition is done by analysing the perspectives of Jonathan Quong and Martha Nussbaum, (...) showing that they lead to allowing irrational and authoritarian perspectives in education, that is, neglecting the development of valuable capacities. Although institutional influence can be biased and paternalistic, in some cases it may be legitimate for the institution to create conditions that enhance people’s ability to evaluate, reevaluate, and revise their conceptions of the good. (shrink)

In first chapters of this article MacIntyre?s view of ethics is analyzed, together with his critics of liberalism as philosophical and political theory, as well as dominant ideological conception. In last chapters MacIntyre?s view of the relation between politics and ethics is considered, along with the critical review of his theoretical positions. Macintyre?s conception is regarded on the one hand as very broad, because the entire morality is identified with ethical life, while on the other hand it is regarded as (...) too narrow since it excludes certain essential aspects of deliberation which refers to the sphere of individual rights, the relations between communities, as well as distribution of goods within the state. U prvim poglavljima ovog rada analizira se MacIntyreova shvatanje etike, zajedno sa njegovom kritikom liberalizma kao filozofske i politicke teorije i kao dominantne ideoloske koncepcije. U poslednjim poglavljima se razmatra MacIntyreovo shvatanje odnosa politike i etike, uz kriticki osvrt na njegova pojedina stanovista. MacIntyreovo se polaziste pokazuje s jedne strane kao veoma siroko, posto celokupni moralitet poistovecuje sa etickim zivotom, dok je, s druge strane, preusko posto iz politike iskljucuje pojedine bitne aspekte odlucivanja, koje se odnose na sferu individualnih prava, odnosa izmedju zajednica, kao i raspodele dobara u okviru drzave. (shrink)

U ovom tekstu razmatra se Walzerova pozicija u odnosu na liberalisticka shvatanja pravde, nejednakosti, gradjanstva i etnokulturalne pripadnosti. Za razliku od liberala, Walzer pridaje znacaj nedobrovoljnim udruzenjima i duznostima proisteklim iz takvog udruzivanja, kao i socijalnoj nejednakosti koja je posledica pripadanja etnokulturalnoj grupi. Tekst takodje razmatra Walzerove odgovore na primedbe da njegova pozicija podrazumeva moralni relativizam. Na planu politike, iz Walzerove pozicije proistice da su eticki sistemi na kojima se zajednice u jednom liberalnom drustvu zasnivaju dovoljno liberalizovani, sa usvojenim principima (...) nepristrasnosti tolerancije i medjugrupne pravde. Ovi sistemi odgovaraju politickom "liberalnom konsenzusu", koji se ne moze izvesti iz same pretpoliticke obicajnosti. (shrink)

The article gives the reasons why a distinction between political morality and ethical conceptions needs to be drawn, as well as the reasons for which political liberalism is a substantial moral conception, and as such in tension with certain understandings of the neutrality. Further, the text analyzes the definition of personality through capacity for action. Recognition of this capacity is necessary, but not sufficient to attribute to a person a special status from the standpoint of political morality, since individuals also (...) must be capable to coordinate their ethical actions with moral principles of others. Further, the text critiques Charles Larmore?s moral grounding of the theory of justice on respect of persons by arguing that the concept of respect should be considered as part of the complex interrelationships with other moral concepts, such as equality. In this way, neutrality regarding content of respect, as well as neutrality regarding capacity for ethical action turns out to be insufficient. (shrink)

This text reflects on the book written by Milorad Stupar, Political Philosophy. Based on the perspectives given in Stupar?s book, the author?s intention is to illustrate the problems regarding certain topics such as: citizenship, the dispute about the nature of Hobbes?s philosophy, as well as social, political and historical background of Kant?s political philosophy. The article points at dilemmas related to the meaning of citizenship in modern states, to the compatibility between absolutism and certain elements of liberalism in Hobbes?s work, (...) and to the possible reconstruction of the context within which Kant produced his last works. Ovaj tekst predstavlja osvrt na knjigu Milorada Stupara Politicka filozofija. Oslanjajuci se na stavove izlozene u ovoj knjizi, autor teksta nastoji da problematizuje pojedine teme kao sto su pripadnost drzavi, spor oko karaktera Hobsove filozofije, kao i drustvena, politicka i istorijska pozadina Kantove politicke filozofije. U clanku se ukazuje na dileme oko znacenja gradjanstva u savremenim drzavama, na kompatibilnost apsolutizma i pojedinih elemenata liberalizma kod Hobsa, kao i na mogucu rekonstrukciju konteksta u kojem su nastali Kantovi poslednji spisi. (shrink)

The author first looks at how the basic tenets of libertarianism, as presented in the opening chapters of Nozick?s?Anarchy, State and Utopia?, are connected with the idea of community. In the second section Nozick?s own conception of utopia and voluntary associations is discussed. In the closing section various critiques of this libertarian conception are analyzed. Though compatible with social co-operation, Nozick?s position rests on an indeterminate concept of rights and is incapable of explaining adequately the relations of mutual connectedness, i.e. (...) community. Communities are treated as selfsufficient entities in a way that is in line with the communitarian standpoint, but incongruent with the republican model of integration. The latter objection refers especially to the conflict of loyalties to particular associations and to the?framework community?. U ovom radu autor ukazuje na vezu osnovnih postavki libertarijanizma, izlozenim u prvim poglavljima Nozickove knjige Anarhija, drzava i utopija sa idejom zajednice. U drugom delu rada razmatra se Nozickova vlastita koncepcija utopije i dobrovoljnosti udruzivanja. U poslednjem delu rada autor analizira kritike ove libertarijanske koncepcije. Mada kompatibilna sa socijalnom kooperacijom, Nozickova pozicija pociva na neodredjenom pojmu prava i nije u stanju da adekvatno objasni odnose medjusobnih povezanosti, odnosno zajednistva. Zajednice se tretiraju kao samodovoljne celine na nacin koji je saglasan sa komunitaristickom pozicijom, ali je neuskladiv sa republikanskim modelom integracije. Ovo poslednje se narocito odnosi na konflikt lojalnosti prema partikularnim zajednicama i prema okvirnoj zajednici. (shrink)

In the first part of the text the distinction between first- and second-order impartiality, along with Brian Barry?s thorough elaboration of their characteristics and the differences between them, is examined. While the former impartiality is related to non-favoring fellow-persons in everyday occasions, the latter is manifested in the institutional structure of society and its political and public morality. In the second part of the article, the concept of public impartiality is introduced through analysis of two examples. In the first example, (...) a Caledonian Club with its exclusive membership is considered as a form of association which is partial, but nevertheless morally acceptable. In the second example, the so-called Heinz dilemma has been reconsidered and the author points to some flaws in Barry?s interpretation, arguing that Heinz?s right of giving advantage to his wife?s life over property rights can be recognized through mitigating circum-stances, and this partiality can be appreciated in the public sphere. Thus, public impartiality imposes limits to the restrictiveness and rigidity of political impartiality implied in second-order morality. (shrink)

U ovom radu izlaze se kratak pregled Vincovog poimanja drustvenih nauka kao neodvojivih od filozofije i Vitgenstajnovog uticaja na ovakvo shvatanje. Autor ukazuje da su brojne primedbe kriticara za subjektivizam i relativizam uzrokovane nedovoljnom razradom i generalizacijama koje nalazimo u ranim Vincovim tekstovima, a koji su bili predmet njegove samokritike u kasnijem periodu. Osim tematizovanja standardno prihvacenog znacaja Vitgenstajnovih pojmova jezickih igara, zivotnih formi i sledjenja pravila po drustvenu teoriju, u tekstu se naglasava znacaj manje tematizovanih koncepata preglednog prikaza i (...) aspektnog sagledavanja po Vincovo poimanje mogucnosti razumevanja drugih kultura. (shrink)

In this text the problem of legitimacy of democracy is considered through particular aspects of its crisis. On theoretical and philosophical level, the crisis of legitimacy of democracy is reflected as the primacy which some of the liberal thinkers give to judicial review in relation to self-determination and democratic will. On practical level, crisis as citizens’ distrust in democratic institutions, as well as diminished participation in bringing of political decisions are being discussed. In the text the legitimacy of democracy is (...) considered together with analysis of concepts of citizenship, participation in political processes and deliberative democracy. In this context of distrust in democratic processes the text considers the problem of Serbia on its way of integration into European institutions. (shrink)

In the first part of this text, the author explains the arguments against partiality in moral decision-making, as well as the arguments advocating for partiality and indicating to limitations and possible unacceptable consequences of impartial position. The central part of the text concerns the moral status of personal projects and the issue of whet her and how relation ships and close ness between persons are relevant for moral decision-making. The final part discusses the importance of reflection regarding the limits of (...) validity of moral reasons of partiality, while pointing at the crucial importance of nature of relations between people, the context and moral relevance or the significance of case to which moral assessment refers. (shrink)

The text begins with the analysis of two terms regarding life crucial to both Wittgenstein's early and late philosophy. These are life form and nature, specifically, human nature. Wittgenstein treats both concepts in a very specific manner, different from the traditional approach of philosophy. He also criticized philosophical attempts to attribute special characteristics to human intellectual abilities which would separate them from natural processes. A particular 'spiritual' status of epistemic and other rational powers disappears when there is an insight into (...) their dependence on discursive practices and specific forms of life on which these powers are based. Concepts such as certainty, knowledge, or explanations do not rest on a rational foundation, that is, they do not refer to processes with particular un-natural properties. Nor can they be reduced to neuro-physiological processes, either. Instead, it is a specific grammar of their usage that makes them different from other concepts describing physical or biological processes. In that sense, Wittgenstein develops a non-reductionist version of naturalism which preserves the diversity of human relations in the world. (shrink)

The skeptical solution is based on two assumptions — the rejection of semantic facts and the denial of semantic nihilism. On the basis of the non-factualist interpretation of this solution, these two assumptions are reconciled by stating that meaning ascriptions possess non-descriptive function. Nonetheless, Alexander Miller argues that this position is self-refuting since, as despite its non-descriptivism, by rejecting any kind of semantic facts, it inevitably leads to semantic nihilism. In this text, I demonstrate that Miller’s argument is not sound. (...) I argue that a coherent non-factualist way of formulating the conditions of correct use of meaning ascriptions may be performed by rejecting the closure principle of assertibility of meaning ascriptions. On this basis, I demonstrate that argument formulated against non-factualist interpretation by Miller may be refuted. What is more, I argue that rejection of the closure principle should be regarded as the central aspect of Kripke’s skeptical solution. (shrink)

This book stands at the intersection of two topics: the decidability and computational complexity of hybrid logics, and the deductive systems designed for them. Hybrid logics are here divided into two groups: standard hybrid logics involving nominals as expressions of a separate sort, and non-standard hybrid logics, which do not involve nominals but whose expressive power matches the expressive power of binder-free standard hybrid logics.The original results of this book are split into two parts. This division reflects the division of (...) the book itself. The first type of results concern model-theoretic and complexity properties of hybrid logics. Since hybrid logics which we call standard are quite well investigated, the efforts focused on hybrid logics referred to as non-standard in this book. Non-standard hybrid logics are understood as modal logics with global counting operators ) whose expressive power matches the expressive power of binder-free standard hybrid logics. The relevant results comprise: 1. Establishing a sound and complete axiomatization for the modal logic K with global counting operators ), which can be easily extended onto other frame classes, 2. Establishing tight complexity bounds, namely NExpTime-completeness for the modal logic with global counting operators defined over the classes of arbitrary, reflexive, symmetric, serial and transitive frames ), MT), MD), MB), MK4) with numerical subscripts coded in binary. Establishing the exponential-size model property for this logic defined over the classes of Euclidean and equivalential frames ), MS5).Results of the second type consist of designing concrete deductive systems for standard and non-standard hybrid logics. More precisely, they include: 1. Devising a prefixed and an internalized tableau calculi which are sound, complete and terminating for a rich class of binder-free standard hybrid logics. An interesting feature of indicated calculi is the nonbranching character of the rule, 2. Devising a prefixed and an internalized tableau calculi which are sound, complete and terminating for non-standard hybrid logics. The internalization technique applied to a tableau calculus for the modal logic with global counting operators is novel in the literature, 3. Devising the first hybrid algorithm involving an inequality solver for modal logics with global counting operators. Transferring the arithmetical part of reasoning to an inequality solver turned out to be sufficient in ensuring termination.The book is directed to philosophers and logicians working with modal and hybrid logics, as well as to computer scientists interested in deductive systems and decision procedures for logics. Extensive fragments of the first part of the book can also serve as an introduction to hybrid logics for wider audience interested in logic.The content of the book is situated in the areas of formal logic and theoretical computer science with some elements of the theory of computational complexity. (shrink)

A history of logic -- Patterns of reasoning -- A language and its meaning -- A symbolic language -- 1850-1950 mathematical logic -- Modern symbolic logic -- Elements of set theory -- Sets, functions, relations -- Induction -- Turning machines -- Computability and decidability -- Propositional logic -- Syntax and proof systems -- Semantics of PL -- Soundness and completeness -- First order logic -- Syntax and proof systems of FOL -- Semantics of FOL -- More semantics -- Soundness and (...) completeness -- Why is first order logic "First Order"? (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to discuss Kant’s concept of juridical state as the foundation of the contemporary rule of law. Therefore, the article tries to answer two questions: (1) what character can be attributed to Kant’s concept of juridical state taking into account the obligations arising from it; (2) can the analysis of the Kantian juridical state have any impact on the contemporary understanding of the rule of law and if so, what can this impact be. In order (...) to accomplish this task, moral presuppositions of Kant’s juridical state are discussed, according to the commonly accepted view that Kant’s political philosophy is closely linked with his moral and ethical reflection. Then, two interpretations of Kant’s juridical state – the liberal one and the authoritarian one – are analysed. The crucial difference between these interpretations lies in establishing the circumstances in which the duty of obedience to state power should be carried out. Then, Kantian juridical state is compared with two ways of understanding the rule of law – the material one and the formal one – in order to evaluate whether the rule of law should be considered as continuity of or rupture with the Kantian concept. (shrink)

We introduce a three-tiered framework for modelling and reasoning about agents who (i) can use possibly complete reasoning systems without any restrictions but who nevertheless are (ii) bounded in the sense that they never reach infinitely many results and, finally, who (iii) perform their reasoning in time. This last aspect does not concern so much the time it takes for agents to actually carry out their reasoning, as the time which can bring about external changes in the agents’ states such (...) as arriving of new information or discarding previously available information due to bounds of the agent’s resources. These three aspects are treated with the maximal possible degree of independence from each other. The treatment of layer (iii) can be combined with arbitrary logic at level (ii) which, in turn, can be combined with arbitrary agent logic at level (i). At the level (iii), we discuss briefly the duality (or rather, complementarity) of system descriptions based on actions and transitions, on the one hand, and states and their changes, on the other. We settle for the latter and present a simple language, for describing state changes, which is parameterized by an arbitrary language for describing properties of the states. The language can be viewed as a simple fragment of step logic, admitting however various extensions by appropriate choices of the underlying logic. Alternatively, it can be seen as a very specific fragment of temporal logic (with a variant of ‘until’ or ‘chop’ operator), and is interpreted over dense linear time. The reasoning system presented here is sound, as well as strongly complete and decidable (provided that so is the parameter logic for reasoning about single states). We give the main idea of the completeness proof and suggest a wide range of possible applications, which is a simple consequence of the parametric character of both the language and the reasoning system. We address then in more detail the case of non-omniscient rational agents, (ii). Their models are syntactic structures (sets of available formulae) similar in spirit, though not in the technical formulation, to the models used in other syntax oriented approaches and in active logic. We give a new sound, complete and decidable system for reasoning about such agents. Finally, we illustrate its extensions with the internal reasoning of agents, (i), by equipping them with some example logics. (shrink)

Graph normal form, introduced earlier for propositional logic, is shown to be a normal form also for first-order logic. It allows to view syntax of theories as digraphs, while their semantics as kernels of these digraphs. Graphs are particularly well suited for studying circularity, and we provide some general means for verifying that circular or apparently circular extensions are conservative. Traditional syntactic means of ensuring conservativity, like definitional extensions or positive occurrences guaranteeing exsitence of fixed points, emerge as special cases.

Despite their ethical intentions, ethically minded consumers rarely purchase ethical products (Auger and Devinney: 2007, Journal of Business Ethics76, 361–383). This intentions–behaviour gap is important to researchers and industry, yet poorly understood (Belk et al.: 2005, Consumption, Markets and Culture8(3), 275–289). In order to push the understanding of ethical consumption forward, we draw on what is known about the intention–behaviour gap from the social psychology and consumer behaviour literatures and apply these insights to ethical consumerism. We bring together three separate (...) insights – implementation intentions (Gollwitzer: 1999, American Psychologist54(7), 493–503), actual behavioural control (ABC) (Ajzen and Madden: 1986, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology22, 453–474; Sheeran et al.: 2003, Journal of Social Psychology, 42, 393–410) and situational context (SC) (Belk: 1975, Journal of Consumer Research2, 157–164) – to construct an integrated, holistic conceptual model of the intention–behaviour gap of ethically minded consumers. This holistic conceptual model addresses significant limitations within the ethical consumerism literature, and moves the understanding of ethical consumer behaviour forward. Further, the operationalisation of this model offers insight and strategic direction for marketing managers attempting to bridge the intention–behaviour gap of the ethically minded consumer. (shrink)

Responding to the increasingly influential role of Hannah Arendt's political philosophy in recent years, Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Total Domination: The Holocaust, Plurality, and Resistance, critically engages with Arendt's understanding of totalitarianism. According to Arendt, the main goal of totalitarianism was total domination; namely, the virtual eradication of human legality, morality, individuality, and plurality. This attempt, in her view, was most fully realized in the concentration camps, which served as the major "laboratories" for the regime. While Arendt focused (...) on the perpetrators' logic and drive, Michal Aharony examines the perspectives and experiences of the victims and their ability to resist such an experiment. The first book-length study to juxtapose Arendt's concept of total domination with actual testimonies of Holocaust survivors, this book calls for methodological pluralism and the integration of the voices and narratives of the actors in the construction of political concepts and theoretical systems. To achieve this, Aharony engages with both well-known and non-canonical intellectuals and writers who survived Auschwitz and Buchenwald concentration camps. Additionally, she analyzes the oral testimonies of survivors who are largely unknown, drawing from interviews conducted in Israel and in the U.S., as well as from videotaped interviews from archives around the world. Revealing various manifestations of unarmed resistance in the camps, this study demonstrates the persistence of morality and free agency even under the most extreme and de-humanizing conditions, while cautiously suggesting that absolute domination is never as absolute as it claims or wishes to be. Scholars of political philosophy, political science, history, and Holocaust studies will find this an original and compelling book. (shrink)

In a recent series of papers, Jane Friedman argues that suspended judgment is a sui generis first-order attitude, with a question as its content. In this paper, I offer a critique of Friedman’s project. I begin by responding to her arguments against reductive higher-order propositional accounts of suspended judgment, and thus undercut the negative case for her own view. Further, I raise worries about the details of her positive account, and in particular about her claim that one suspends judgment about (...) some matter if and only if one inquires into this matter. Subsequently, I use conclusions drawn from the preceding discussion to offer a tentative account: S suspends judgment about p iff S believes that she neither believes nor disbelieves that p, S neither believes nor disbelieves that p, and S intends to judge that p or not-p. (shrink)

According to the orthodox view, the goodness of a life depends exclusively on the things that actually happened within it, such as its pleasures and pains, the satisfaction of its subject’s preferences, or the presence of various objective goods and bads. In this paper, I argue that the goodness of a life also depends on what could have happened, but didn’t. I then propose that this view helps us resolve ethical puzzles concerning the standards for a life worth living for (...) animals and the significance of a life’s shape. (shrink)

We introduce a variant of pointer structures with denotational semantics and show its equivalence to systems of boolean equations: both have the same solutions. Taking paradoxes to be statements represented by systems of equations (or pointer structures) having no solutions, we thus obtain two alternative means of deciding paradoxical character of statements, one of which is the standard theory of solving boolean equations. To analyze more adequately statements involving semantic predicates, we extend propositional logic with the assertion operator and give (...) its complete axiomatization. This logic is a sub-logic of statements in which the semantic predicates become internalized (for instance, counterparts of Tarski’s definitions and T-schemata become tautologies). Examples of analysis of self-referential paradoxes are given and the approach is compared to the alternative ones. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to measure professional and personal values among nurses, and to identify the factors affecting these values. The participants were 323 Israeli nurses, who were asked about 36 personal values and 20 professional values. The three fundamental professional nursing values of human dignity, equality among patients, and prevention of suffering, were rated first. The top 10 rated values all concerned nurses' responsibility towards patients. Altruism and confidentiality were not highly rated, and health promotion and nursing (...) research were rated among the last three professional values. For personal (instrumental) values, honesty, responsibility and intelligence were rated first, while ambition and imagination were rated 14th and 16th respectively out of 18. Significant differences (P < 0.05) were found among some personal and professional values rated as functions of culture, education, professional seniority, position and field of expertise. The results may assist in understanding the motives of nurses with different characteristics and help to promote their work according to professional ethical values. (shrink)