Abstract

The text begins with the analysis of two terms regarding life crucial to both Wittgenstein's early and late philosophy. These are life form and nature, specifically, human nature. Wittgenstein treats both concepts in a very specific manner, different from the traditional approach of philosophy. He also criticized philosophical attempts to attribute special characteristics to human intellectual abilities which would separate them from natural processes. A particular 'spiritual' status of epistemic and other rational powers disappears when there is an insight into their dependence on discursive practices and specific forms of life on which these powers are based. Concepts such as certainty, knowledge, or explanations do not rest on a rational foundation, that is, they do not refer to processes with particular un-natural properties. Nor can they be reduced to neuro-physiological processes, either. Instead, it is a specific grammar of their usage that makes them different from other concepts describing physical or biological processes. In that sense, Wittgenstein develops a non-reductionist version of naturalism which preserves the diversity of human relations in the world.