Ibn Djuljul from Andalusia who wrote in the Western Islamic World and Nadīm from Baghdād who wrote in the Eastern Islamic World, give information about lots of physicians and translators in their books that contributed significantly to history of science. Both authors write their books at same time or very close time. Sometimes they offer similar information, but sometimes they provide different information. -/- One of the physicians whom Ibn Djuljul mentioned in his book, Māsarjawayh lived at the times of (...) Umayyads. Nadīm gives information about Māsarjīs who lived at the times of Abbāsids. However, in the course of centuries, some authors combined the knowledge about these two people by giving reference to Ibn Djuljul’s and Nadīm’s work and represented as the same person. Accordingly, most of the modern scholars mentioned the two authors as a substitute. -/- This paper wants to keep track of this confusion and wants to clarify whether Māsarjawayh who was mentioned by Ibn Djuljul and Māsarjīs who was told by Nadīm are the same person or not. (shrink)

This paper assesses the first-person authority account (FPA) of gender, according to which X's self-identification of what X's gender is, is the final say on what X's gender is, such that if others disagree, they are mistaken. One main reason in support of FPA is respecting X's autonomy—that is, overriding X's self-identification amounts to denying X's autonomy. Ozturk criticizes this view using analogies of religious and patriotic self-identifications, such that there are cases in which someone can permissibly claim that (...) another is not, say, a true Muslim or a true patriot. This implies that there might also be cases of permissible rejections of gender self-identification. Ozturk offers instead the negotiative theory of identity, according to which it is permissible to reject a self identification as long as three constraints are satisfied: no harm is done to the self-identifier, and their privacy and dignity are not violated. (This essay is a slightly revised version of that found in the 7th edition of The Philosophy of Sex.). (shrink)

Corporeality: Emergent consciousness within its spatial dimensions develops our understanding of what we can experience through our bodies in relation to the space around us. Rather than considering architecture as being about manifestation and mediation of fixed meanings, the book focuses instead on architectural space as a field that envelopes us incessantly, intimately, and affectively. We are in immediate contact with that space, and the way we relate to it determines how we are able to grasp the realities of the (...) social and material worlds around us. This enquiry considers architectural space and its impact on and relation to us from a range of disciplines and perspectives, leading from space to sense and to sensibility. The theatre becomes a central point of reference on this journey, allowing us to understand how space “works” by linking concrete spatial conditions to corresponding “forms of experience”. It allows showing how the ways we feel, think, and act emerge from within the rich texture of the pre-conscious and non-contemplative. That texture is induced and nourished by our bodily encounters with space. Offering a view of how immediate experience is generated in the body, this book enhances empirical research into the links between space, body, experience and consciousness. Maya Nanitchkova Öztürk is Associate Professor in Theory and Criticism of Architecture. Her academic interests and publications focus on space-body relationships and experience of space/place, as grounds for developing analytical methodologies and interdisciplinary links in discourse, and teaching. She works at Bilkent University (Ankara), Faculty of Art, Design and Architecture, Department of Interior Architecture and Environmental Design. She is on the editorial boards of ISI journal Space and Culture, and the web-journal Consciousness, Literature and the Arts. (shrink)

This paper shows the ways in which Kant’s notions of the feeling of life and the feeling of the promotion of life may be influenced by Epicurus’ theory of pleasure and the Stoic notion of oikeiôsis, respectively. Accordingly, getting a clear picture of Epicurus’ theory of pleasure and the Stoic notion of oikeiôsis will help us (i) understand why Kant introduces these notions in the third Critique and (ii) why he identifies aesthetic pleasure with the feeling of the promotion of (...) life. As I will demonstrate, the feeling of life allows us to be conscious of the harmonious interaction of our faculties with each other while the feeling of the promotion of life allows us to be aware of the harmonious relationship between our faculties and nature. Hence, the feeling of the promotion of life indicates the well-being of the subject in its relation to its environment. (shrink)

The first-person authority view (FPA) is the current dominant view about what someone’s gender is. According to FPA the person has authority over her own gender identity; her sincere self-identification trumps the opinions of others. There are two versions of FPA: epistemic and ethical. Both versions try to explain why a person has authority over her own gender identity. But both have problems. Epistemic FPA attributes to the self-identifier an unrealistic degree of doxastic reliability. Ethical FPA implies the existence of (...) an unreasonably strong and unqualified obligation on the part of others not to reject the person’s identification. This essay offers an alternative: the negotiative theory of identity. Unlike epistemic FPA, the negotiative theory doesn’t presume the reliability of self-directed beliefs. Unlike ethical FPA, the negotiative theory doesn’t imply an obligation not to reject. Instead, it contends that an act of rejection is morally permissible if and only if it respects three ethical and epistemic constraints. In doing so, the negotiative theory combines the strengths and avoids the weaknesses of both versions of FPA, and gives us substantive insight into how far first-person authority reaches in terms of grounding rights and obligating others. (shrink)

Universities regulate speech in various ways. How should we assess when such restrictions are justified, if they ever are? Here, we propose an answer to this question. In short, we argue that we should think about speech restrictions as being like acts of war, and so should approach their justification using just war theory. We also make some suggestions about its implications. For instance, one of the jus ad bellum requirements for a just war is that you have a reasonable (...) hope of success; you shouldn’t enter or continue a war unless you’ve got good reason to think that your objectives are achievable. We offer some reasons to think that many speech restrictions fail to pass this test in our current political climate: we are too far from the kind of society that universities hope to create via speech restrictions, and in employing them, they only exacerbate the problems they’re trying to solve. (shrink)

In the second Critique, Kant argues that for the highest good to be possible we need to postulate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in a future world. In his other writings, however, he suggests that the highest good is attainable through mere human agency in this world. Based on the apparent incoherence between these texts, Andrews Reath, among others, argues that Kant’s texts reveal two competing conceptions of the highest good, namely a secular and a (...) theological conception. In this paper, I argue that Kant has a coherent conception of the highest good which applies to two different domains, namely the domain of the individual humans and the domain of the human species. (shrink)

In this paper, I advance a new interpretation of the argumentative structure of the third Critique, which in turn clarifies the connection between its two apparently unrelated parts. I propose to read the third Critique as a response to Kant’s question of hope, which concerns the satisfaction of reason’s practical and theoretical interests. On this proposal, while the first part on aesthetics describes what we—as possessors of theoretical reason – may hope for, the second part, on teleology, describes what we (...) – as possessors of practical reason – may hope for. The main question of the third Critique is, ‘What may we hope if we act as we should, i.e. act rationally?’ Kant’s implicit answer is, ‘to attain the ideals of reason, which leads to happiness as a consequence of it.’ This novel reconstruction of the argumentative structure of the third Critique contributes to the literature by (i) explaining how the two parts of the third Critique on aesthetics and teleology are connected, (ii) clarifying how the ideals of reason are connected to hope and happiness, and (iii) showing how the spheres of nature and freedom can be synthetically unified through the faculty of judgment. (shrink)

There are two popular ways of explaining why a person has authority over her own gender identity: epistemic FPA and ethical FPA. Both have problems. Epistemic FPA attributes to the self-identifier an unrealistic degree of doxastic reliability. Ethical FPA implies the existence of an unqualified obligation not to reject which is too strong to be plausible. This essay offers a third explanation called “weak FPA” and investigates how far first-person authority reaches in terms of grounding rights and obligating others. Weak (...) FPA doesn’t obligate one not to reject but it implies that when self-identification can be satisfactorily defended against attempted defeaters, the self-identifier has the right to recognition, which entails the respect and all other legal and social rights any other self-identifier receives from her peers. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to develop an Administrative Ethical Behaviour Scale (AEBS) and to determine whether nurses found their head nurses’ behaviours ethical and to reveal head nurses’ ethical and unethical administrative behaviour. It was conducted on 264 nurses working in five state hospitals in Trabzon, Turkey. Content validity index of the scale was 0.87, item-to-total correlations ranged from 0.50 to 0.81 and Chronbach Alpha was 0.98. The scale included five subscales, i.e. truthfulness and honesty, liabilities and supremacy (...) of laws, rights and freedom, good human relationships and humanism, justice and equality. Overall, head nurses’ behaviour was considered ethical by nurses; however, their behaviour in terms of justice and equality, good human relationships and humanism was not found ethical. Positions, satisfaction with head nurses’ behaviour and frequency of contact with them affect nurses’ opinions. (shrink)

Ed Gein was a serial killer, grave robber, and body snatcher who made a lampshade from human skin. Now consider the detective who found that lampshade. Let's suppose that he would never want to own it; however, he does find that he wants a synthetic one just like it – a perfect replica. We assume that there is something morally problematic about the detective having such a replica. We then argue that, given as much, we can reach the surprising conclusion (...) that it's morally problematic to consume realistic fake-meat products. After explaining why we might the detective's replica lampshade morally problematic, we clarify the analogy between the replica and fake meat products. Then, we defend it against a number of objections, the most notable one being we can sever any association between fake meat and the real stuff without moral cost. We conclude by pointing out that our argument generalises: if it works, then there is something morally problematic about many fake animal products, including fake leather and fur. (shrink)

This article presents a critical analysis of two influential readings of Kant’s Second Analogy, namely, Gerd Buchdahl’s “modest reading” and Michael Friedman’s “strong reading.” After pointing out the textual and philosophical problems with each, I advance an alternative reading of the Second Analogy argument. On my reading, the Second Analogy argument proves the existence of necessary and strictly universal causal laws. This, however, does not guarantee that Kant has a solution for the problem of induction. After I explain why the (...) empirical lawfulness of nature does not guarantee the empirical uniformity of nature, I examine the modal status of empirical laws in Kant and argue contra Buchdahl and Friedman that empirical laws express two different kinds of necessity that are not reducible to each other. -/- . (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, I advance a new interpretation of the argumentative structure of the third Critique, which in turn clarifies the connection between its two apparently unrelated parts. I propose to read the third Critique as a response to Kant’s question of hope, which concerns the satisfaction of reason’s practical and theoretical interests. On this proposal, while the first part on aesthetics describes what we—as possessors of theoretical reason – may hope for, the second part, on teleology, describes what (...) we – as possessors of practical reason – may hope for. The main question of the third Critique is, ‘What may we hope if we act as we should, i.e. act rationally?’ Kant’s implicit answer is, ‘to attain the ideals of reason, which leads to happiness as a consequence of it.’ This novel reconstruction of the argumentative structure of the third Critique contributes to the literature by (i) explaining how the two parts of the third Critique on aesthetics and teleology are connected, (ii) clarifying how the ideals of reason are connected to hope and happiness, and (iii) showing how the spheres of nature and freedom can be synthetically unified through the faculty of judgment. (shrink)

This study aims to explore the influence of workplace bullying incidences on both targets and bystanders with respect to their perceptions of organizational justice and organizational citizenship behavior. Responses from 288 white-collar public employees revealed that one third of the participants stated themselves as being exposed to workplace bullying behavior in the last six months. As hypothesized, findings support the view that workplace bullying experience plays a significant negative role in organizational justice and citizenship behavior perceptions. Moreover, a significant negative (...) effect is also found on justice perceptions and citizenship behavior of bystanders. Subjective evaluations did not reveal a significant effect in both cases. (shrink)

The word "civilisation", coined by French intellectuals in the middle of the 18th century, was soon adopted by other European societies. This name meant that they were different and superior to all other societies. Ottoman bureaucrats and writers translated the word "civilisation" into Turkish as "medeniyet". However, "medeniyet", one of the important concepts of the Islamic tradition, was far from expressing the mentality and lifestyle meant by civilisation. The concept of "civilisation" was specific to Europe under the existing conditions and (...) expressed the understanding that Europe was unique and superior. At the same time, it represented an understanding that legitimized the invasion and exploitation of non-European countries by some European states, particularly Britain and France. In order to reduce the reactions of the societies that were the victims of their occupation and exploitation and to idealize being European, Europeans claimed that there were other "civilisations" in history. The concept of "Islamic civilisation" was born under these circumstances. Şemseddin Sami, who wrote the first book entitled "Islamic civilisation" in 1879, defended the thesis that Muslims had a "civilisation" in history and that this "civilisation" had contributed to the formation of the European one. However, after a while, he significantly changed his view and argued that "Islamic civilisation" was completely lost in history and that "European civilisation" was the only and the most superior "civilisation" in the present world. This study aims to examine the conceptualization process of the word "civilisation" and especially Şemseddin Sami's comparison of "civilisations" in the context of this process. The subject will be examined with reference to the written texts of the period and current studies on "civilisation". (shrink)

Bu makalede David Hume’un nedensellik ve tümevarımsal çıkarımların akılsal gerekçelendirilmesine karşı eleştirileri incelenecek ve bu eleştirilerin geleneksel metafiziğin olanaklılığına dair temel bir probleme işaret ettiği savunulacaktır. Hume’un nedensellik ilkesine ve bu ilkenin ima ettiği zorunlu nedensel ilişkilerin varlığına dair eleştirel argümanları ayrıntılı bir şekilde analiz edilerek, nedensellik probleminin nasıl olup da bizi tümevarımsal çıkarımlarımızın gerekçelendirilmesiyle ilgili olan tümevarım problemine götürdüğü gösterilecektir. Görüleceği gibi, Hume’a göre nedensellik ve tümevarımsal çıkarımların ortak problemi her ikisinin de genel geçer doğrular olarak kabul edilen ancak (...) akılsal olarak gerekçelendirilemeyen nedensellik ilkesi ile doğanın tekdüzeliği ilkelerini doğru varsaymasıdır. Bu ilkelerin akılsal olarak gerekçelendirilemeyeceğini göstererek, Hume aslında daha büyük çaplı bir problemin, yani metafizik probleminin varlığına dikkat çekmektedir. Hume’un asıl ilgilendiği soru metafiziğin temelinde yer aldığı düşünülen ilke ve idelerin akılsal temellendirilmesinin olanaklılığı sorusudur. Bu da bir nevi metafizik bilginin temellendirilmesi ve bu bilginin olanaklılığı ile ilgili olan metafizik problemidir. Dolayısıyla Hume’un nedensellik ve tümevarım problemlerini geleneksel anlamda metafizik anlayışına karşı bir eleştiri olarak okumak mümkündür. (shrink)

Despite the apparent lack of any cultural and religious connection between Kierkegaard and Iqbal, their philosophical and religious concerns and their methods of dealing with these concerns show certain parallels. This book provides a Kierkegaardian reading of Muhammad Iqbal's idea of becoming a genuine Muslim. It reflects on the parallels between the philosophical approaches of Kierkegaard and Iqbal, and argues that, though there are certain parallels between their approaches, there is a significant difference between their philosophical stances. Kierkegaard was concerned (...) with developing an existential dialectics; Iqbal, however, focused mostly on the identification of the problems of the modern Muslim world. As a result, Iqbal's idea of becoming a genuine Muslim - the practical aspect of his thought and one of the most central issues of his philosophy - seems to be unclear and even contradictory at points. This book therefore uses the parallels between the two philosopher's endeavours and the notions developed by Kierkegaard to provide a strong hermeneutical tool for clarifying where the significance of Iqbal's idea of becoming a Muslim lies. By bringing together two philosophers from different cultural, traditional and religious backgrounds, this book will appeal to students and scholars of Comparative Politics, Contemporary Islamic Philosophy and the Philosophy of Religion. (shrink)

Advances in medical technology and information have facilitated clinical practices that favourably affect the success rates of treatment for diseases. Regenerative medicine has been the focus of the recent medical agenda, to the extent of fundamentally changing treatment paradigms. Stem cell practices, their efficacy, and associated ethical concerns have been debated intensively in many countries. Stem cell research is carried out along with the treatment of patients. Thus, various groups affected by the practices inevitably participate in the discussions. In addition (...) to discussions based on avoiding any harm, providing benefits and respecting personal autonomy and justice, problems arise owing to the lack of legal regulations for stem cell research and practice. The dimensions of the problems vary in the developing countries, with widespread use of advanced medical technology but with lack of sources allocated for healthcare, dominance of paternalistic physician–patient relationships and failure to achieve a sufficient level of awareness of patients’ rights. This article discusses the current situation of stem cell practices within the context of regenerative medicine in Turkey and ethical concerns about some of the legal regulations, such as the Regulation for Umblical Cord Blood Banking and Guidelines for Non-embryonic Stem Cell Study for Non-clinical Purposes directing the research on this issue. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to identify and analyze Iqbal's use of literature, particularly poetry, as a means of communication with his reader. By this means, it is hoped that a distinctive aspect of Iqbal's intellectual character will be uncovered that has largely been ignored by scholars working on Iqbal's thought. To identify and analyze Iqbal's use of literature to communicate with his reader, Kierkegaard's theory of "indirect communication" will be used as a hermeneutical key. There are two reasons (...) for this. First, it is one of the contentions of this study that Iqbal, a twentieth-century Muslim thinker living in colonial India, and Kierkegaard, a nineteenth-century Danish Christian thinker, show certain... (shrink)

During the Second World War, the Allies faced a question colloquially known as the “German Tank Problem”: how many tanks will the Axis ever produce? The answer resulted from an elegant probabilistic argument which was used by Allied mathematicians to make successful upper-bound estimates for the total Axis tank production. This paper shows that if two empirical postulates are true of the history of science, a parallel argument can be used to come up with lower-bound estimates for the number of (...) alternative scientific theories that remain undiscovered. The lower bound in question increases proportionally with the number of theories that have already been discovered. So, the problem of underconsideration is a serious problem and it will get worse, not better, as we discover new theories. (shrink)

There is a well-established correspondence between interpolation and amalgamation for algebraizable logics that satisfy certain additional assumptions. In this paper, we introduce the Robinson property of a logic and show that a conditionally algebraizable logic without any additional assumptions has the Robinson property if and only if the corresponding class of Lindenbaum–Tarski algebras has the amalgamation property. Moreover, we give the logical characterization of the strong amalgamation property, solving an open problem of Andréka–Németi–Sain. It is also shown that given the (...) mentioned extra assumptions the Robinson property implies the interpolation property. As conditionally algebraizable logics cover algebraizable logics as well as various quantifier logics such as classical first order logic, our results yield a generalization of some of the results concerning interpolation and amalgamation. (shrink)

Bu çalışma, Aristoteles ve Platon özelinde, “poiēsis” fiilinin iki farklı tarzda kavramsallaştırmasından doğan yapıca uzlaşmaz iki “tragedya” anlayışını irdeleme amacı taşımaktadır. Bunun için, Peri Poiētikēs Tekhnēs ile Politeia metinleri yol gösterici olarak seçilmiştir. Tartışmamızı “mimēsis” bağlamına yerleştirerek, bir yandan “poiēsis” etkinliğine diğer yandan ise “poiēsis” etkinliğinin gerçekleştiricisi olan “poiētēs”e yönelip, bu kavramların bahsedilen iki filozofun “sanat” ve “felsefe” kavrayışlarındaki yerini açmayı deniyoruz. Bu denemeyi ise tragedya bağlamında karşımıza çıkan fâil, fiil, münfâil hâl ve seyirci mefhumları üzerinden derinleştirmeye çalışıyoruz. Böylece, sunduğumuz (...) eleştirel değerlendirmelerden hareketle, aslında Aristoteles’in değil, fakat Platon’un “sanat”ın bir “tekhnē ” ve “poiētikē ” olarak asıl anlamını yakalamış olabileceğine dair bir ipucu bırakıyoruz. (shrink)

Kant defines enlightenment as “man’s release from his self-imposed tutelage” (my emphasis, WiE, p. 83).This definition suggests that those who remain unenlightentened, according to Kant, are responsible for their own state of immaturity. Despite this straightforward picture, however, closer examination of Kant’s “What is Enlightenment” essay and his other writings reveal that the satisfaction of certain necessary conditions for enlightenment, such as freedom of thought and proper education is beyond individual’s control. Hence, whether individuals are capable of attaining enlightenment is (...) usually determined by external factors. This in turn means that contrary to Kant’s definition of and recommendations toward enlightenment, individual’s inability to think for herself could not entirely be self-imposed, and cannot be overcome merely by courage and resolution as Kant claims. It seems, therefore, that Kant’s definition of enlightenment is both untennable and incompatible with his other works. In this paper, I argue that we can salvage Kant’s definition of enlightenment, if we read it in its proper frame of reference. More specifically, I argue that Kant’s conception of enlightenment (as he presents it in the “What is Enlightenment”) requires two different sets of conditions to be met for the individual and for the society. In order for the definition to apply to individual human beings, we have to assume the validity of Kant’s conception of transcendental freedom. For the same definition to apply to the human species, on the other hand, we need to assume a different kind of freedom, i.e., freedom of expression. (shrink)

Kant defines enlightenment of the individual as emergence of the individual from a self-imposed immaturity. In this definition, individuals who are not enlightened are held responsible for their failures. This is because Kant, in this text, implies that the only thing we need in order to be enlightened as individuals is to be able to use our capacity to think, which is present in every mentally fit individual. One can infer that Kant has an egalitarian understanding of enlightenment, since anyone (...) who has the courage and determination to use their mind can be enlightened. However, when the text is examined more closely and Kant's other writings are consulted, it becomes clear that another factor beyond the individual's control plays a role in whether an individual is enlightened. This factor is the individual's upbringing and education. If Kant admits that the education one receives plays a role in one’s state of being enlightened, and if not everyone is exposed to the education necessary to become an enlightened individual, then Kant would have an elitist approach to enlightenment. In this article, I will first point out the visible tension in Kant’s texts about the enlightenment of the individual. This apparent tension, however, will be resolved by showing that Kant stands in opposition to the Platonic account of enlightenment and the elitist attitude attached to it, and instead adopts a Stoic account of enlightenment and thereby develops an egalitarian approach to enlightenment. __________________ -/- Kant bireyin aydınlanmasını insanın kendi suçu ile düşmüş olduğu bir ergin olmama durumundan kurtulması olarak tanımlar. Bu tanımda aydın olamayan bireyler başarısızlıklarından kendileri sorumlu tutulur. Zira bu metinde Kant, aydın bireyler olabilmemiz için gereken tek şeyin –mental olarak sağlıklı her bireyde var olan- düşünme kapasitesini kullanabilmek olduğunu ima eder. Aklını kullanma cesareti ve azmi gösteren herkesin aydın olabileceğini iddia etmesi sebebiyle Kant’ın eşitlikçi bir aydınlanma anlayışını olduğu düşünülebilir. Ancak bu metne daha yakından baktığımızda ve Kant’ın diğer metinlerine danıştığımızda, bireyin aydın olup olmamasında bireyin kontrolü dışındaki başka bir faktörün daha rol oynadığını görüyoruz. Bu faktör de bireyin yetiştirilme tarzı ve aldığı eğitimdir. Eğer aydın olmamızda aldığımız eğitimin rolü varsa ve aydın bireyler olabilmek için herkes gerekli olan eğitimi alamıyorsa, Kant’ın aydınlanma konusunda elitist bir yaklaşıma sahip olduğunu düşünebiliriz. Bu çalışmada bireyin aydınlanması konusunda Kant’ın metinlerinde görünür bir gerilim olduğuna işaret edilecektir. Kant’ın aydınlanma konusunda kendi dönemine hâkim olan Platoncu aydınlanma anlayışından ve buna bağlı olarak gelişen elitist tavırdan farklı olarak Stoacı aydınlanma anlayışını benimsediği ve dolayısıyla da eşitlikçi bir tutum sergilediği gösterilerek bu gerilim çözümlenecektir. (shrink)

According to W. V. O. Quine's received view, Rudolf Carnap's Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (henceforth Aufbau) is a radical empiricist project that attempts at reducing scientific knowledge to a phenomenalistic basis. In Quine's reading, having a phenomenalistic basis is an essential part of the thesis of the Aufbau. According to Michael Friedman, on the other hand, Aufbau is a neo-Kantian project that is primarily concerned with showing the possibility of objective and unified scientific knowledge. Thus, for Friedman, Carnap's choice (...) of phenomenalistic language is rather circumstantial. In this paper, I argue that both Quine and Friedman focus on two different aspects of the Aufbau, which as I shall suggest were equally significant and essential for Carnap's philosophical outlook at the time he was writing Aufbau. Hence, Aufbau should be appreciated for its truly ambitious objective that comprises both the radical empiricist and the neo-Kantian goals. (shrink)

This dissertation project aims to solve −what I call− Kant’s “problem of empirical laws,” a problem concerning the coherence of Kant's claims that empirical laws as laws express a kind of necessity, and as empirical judgments they are contingent. In the literature, this issue is framed in the context of Kant’s relation to Hume, and formulated as a question of whether Kant agrees with Hume that empirical laws are mere contingent generalizations. The disagreement on Kant’s conception of empirical laws partly (...) stems from attributing different goals to Kant's argument in the Second Analogy. In my dissertation, I closely examine the two most popular readings of the Second Analogy, namely the "modest" and the "strong" readings, which view the Second Analogy as responding to Hume's "problem of causation" and "problem of induction" respectively. After pointing out some textual and philosophical problems with both readings, I offer an alternative interpretation of what the Second Analogy establishes, which allows me to read Kant's apparently conflicting passages in a coherent manner, and thereby solve Kant’s problem of empirical laws. (shrink)

This paper attempts to resolve the apparent conflict between Descartes’ commitments to the creation doctrine and the necessity of eternal truths by elaborating different conceptions of necessity in Descartes’ framework. More specifically, I argue that the fact that Descartes concedes the necessity of eternal truths does not compel him to assert the impossibility of their negation. Necessity, for Descartes, rather means immutability. Descartes distinguishes two kinds of immutable truths. While truths about God’s essence are absolutely immutable, truths about the essences (...) of God’s creation are conditionally immutable, i.e., they can change if God’s will changes. Since there are different kinds of eternal truths, they express different kinds of necessity as well, namely conditional and absolute necessity. After I clarify these two kinds of necessity, I explain how Descartes coherently maintains both that eternal truths are necessary and that God could have created eternal truths otherwise without undermining their necessity. (shrink)

This paper deploys a Cantor-style diagonal argument which indicates that there is more possible mathematical content than there are propositional functions in Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica and similar formal systems. This technical result raises a historical question: "How did Russell, who was himself an expert in diagonal arguments, not see this coming?" It turns out that answering this question requires an appreciation of Russell's understanding of what logic is, and how he construed the relationship between logic and Principia Mathematica.

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.